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Abstract 
This thesis explores the ethics of relating oneself to temporality that emerges in the 
philosophies of Henri Bergson, Emmanuel Levinas and Gilles Deleuze. Focusing on 
Bergson’s, Levinas’ and Deleuze’s respective suggestions as to how an ethical relation to a 
time of novelty is effectuated, this thesis argues that each of those ethical models retains a 
problematic relation to history, and that a potential resolution to this problem is only found in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s joint work. Starting with an exploration of Bergson’s metaphysical 
writings, this thesis argues that Bergson’s conception of intuition remains insufficiently 
attuned to that practice’s implication with the domain of history, and that this presents a 
problem for Bergson’s ethical philosophy. The thesis then turns to Bergson’s The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion to argue that this text, despite seemingly historicising the 
intuition, in fact fails to provide a resolution to the problem of history that announces itself in 
Bergson’s metaphysical writings. Motivated by these failures in the Bergsonian oeuvre, this 
thesis then turns its attention to two self-professed Bergsonians, Levinas and Deleuze, to 
consider the extent to which their respective ethical philosophies can be said to provide a 
resolution to the Bergsonian problem of history. Exploring Levinas’ temporal ethics in Totality 
and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, I argue that Levinas remains 
incapable of providing such a resolution, for his own ethical philosophy remains decidedly 
caught up in a problematic relation to history, and that despite Levinas’ explicit claims that 
his ethics transcends the historical. I then turn my attention to Deleuze, to argue that despite 
remaining (like Levinas) unable to resolve this problem in Difference and Repetition, 
Deleuze does indeed offer a potentially fruitful way of negotiating it in his joint work with Félix 
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. 
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Introduction 
This thesis explores the ethics of relating oneself to temporality that emerges in the 
philosophies of Henri Bergson, Emmanuel Levinas and Gilles Deleuze. Focusing on 
Bergson’s, Levinas’ and Deleuze’s respective suggestions as to how an ethical relation to a 
time of novelty is effectuated, this thesis argues that each of those ethical models retains a 
problematic relation to history, and that a potential resolution to this problem is only found in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s joint work. As this project’s opening salvo, this Introduction sets itself 
four main tasks. I begin, in section one, by briefly exploring the philosophical context that 
underpins this thesis. Having introduced this context, in section two I provide an explanation 
and overview of my aims in bringing together the ethical philosophies of Bergson, Levinas 
and Deleuze in this project. In section three, I then offer a methodological clarification on the 
thesis’ central terms, before considering its main theoretical contributions in section four. 
 
1. Context: Bergsonian openings 
Despite its relative fall from grace in the early twentieth century, Henri Bergson’s 
philosophy has recently had something of a revival in Anglophone continental philosophy. In 
part due to Gilles Deleuze’s unorthodox and largely laudatory readings of this philosophy in 
texts like Bergsonism, Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, Bergson has re-emerged as a central figure 
for thinking about the nature of temporality and humanity’s relation to it. 1  Bergson’s 
philosophy is now seen by many as providing a fruitful way of thinking time in its own terms, 
that is, without the common sense mediations of space, language and matter. Particularly 
with his conception of time as duration, Bergson is said to offer a way of thinking temporality 
that not only goes beyond the “mundane” conceptions of time (clock-time, object-time, 
linear-time, etc.) that traditionally govern our everyday lives, but which also 
                                                
1 Deleuze (1986, 1989) is not solely responsible for Bergson’s renewed prominence. As Giuseppe 
Bianco (2011: 858) notes, “the use of Bergson’s model of irreversible temporality in Ilya Prigogine’s 
and Isabelle Stengers’ work on dissipative systems, the success of the neurosciences, the crisis of 
phenomenology and the search for alternative philosophical sources has also resulted in a serious 
historical and exegetical analysis of Bergson’s work.” 
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“reconceptualises, and complicates, our understanding of life in its open-ended and 
unpredictable becoming.”2 Similarly, Bergson’s notion of intuition—with its suggestions for 
immediately reconnecting human beings with the durational becoming from which they find 
themselves so habitually distracted—is now taken by many scholars as proposing an 
invaluable practice for not only making “both thought and action more subtle”, but also for 
affirming the “interconnectedness of being in its temporal embeddedness”.3 
This renewed focus on Bergson’s reflections on time and the intuition has led some 
scholars to identify an ethical promise or “challenge” in the Bergsonian oeuvre.4 As Leonard 
Lawlor clarifies, this challenge “does not concern moral prescriptions or moral theories, it 
concerns the relation of thought to the unthought.”5 In other words, following the definition of 
ethics provided by prominent figures like Michel Foucault and Deleuze, the challenge that 
presents itself in Bergson’s writings has less to do with the rational or normative values that 
ought govern society than with the alternative “modes of existence” by which ethical subjects 
relate themselves to difference.6 Ethics here refers to the mode of “conduct” by which 
subjects begin to expose themselves to a singular dimension of alterity and becoming.7 And 
on such a definition of ethics, the contribution made by Bergson’s philosophy is clear. By 
simultaneously thinking time as becoming and by advocating that human beings actively 
(and intuitively) relate themselves to such becoming, Bergson’s “philosophy of creative 
evolution can be shown to be an ‘ethical’ one, concerned with opening up the human 
experience to a field of alterity.”8 
This ‘return to Bergson’ has in many ways been a positive phenomenon.9 Philosophically, 
it has led to a welcome re-evaluation of Bergson’s decisive influence on some key twentieth-
                                                
2 Grosz, 2004: 12; cf. Connolly, 2011: 77. 
3 Connolly, 2011: 2; Grosz, 2004: 13; cf. Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 20-77; Ansell-Pearson, 2002: passim; 
Lorraine, 2011: 6-12. 
4 The latter expression is used by Leonard Lawlor in his important The Challenge of Bergsonism 
(2003: 60-79). 
5 Lawlor, 2003: 62. 
6 cf. Foucault, 1990: 3-32; Foucault, 1997: 253-280; Deleuze, 1988: 17-29. 
7 cf. Foucault, 1990: 25-32; DR 1. 
8 Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 2; cf. Mullarkey, 1999: 158. 
9 “A Return to Bergson” is the title of Deleuze’s 1988 Afterword to the American edition of Bergsonism. 
B 115-118. 
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century philosophical figures like Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Gilles Deleuze, and even Jacques Derrida, Georges 
Canguilhem and Foucault.10 Practically, or at least at the level of political theorising, this 
attentiveness to Bergson has also contributed to a renewed consideration of how a pluralist 
politics seeking to challenge conventional, identity-based political activity might benefit from 
the development of an ethical relation to temporality such as is suggested by Bergson’s 
writings.11 Influential political theorists like William E. Connolly and Elizabeth Grosz have 
been at the forefront of this political deployment of Bergson’s ethical thought.12 Inspired by 
the conception of intuition provided by Bergson in texts like The Creative Mind and The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion, both Connolly and Grosz argue that fostering Bergsonian 
intuitive practices might lead political agents to develop a more positive relation to the 
temporal difference that is so constitutive of politics. Bergson’s intuition, these theorists 
argue, provides us with a method for politically or ethically “belonging to time as 
becoming.”13 
The productive effects of such reconsiderations and redeployments of Bergson certainly 
cannot be denied. Nevertheless, and once again perhaps due to Deleuze’s largely salutary 
readings of Bergson, contemporary scholarship’s attention to the ethical promise of 
Bergsonism has not always been met with a concomitant interest in its potential problems.14 
Despite the historical existence of many rigorous and persuasive critiques of Bergsonian 
intuition, for instance, few philosophical commentators have contended with the implications 
such critiques might hold for their repeated ethical valorisation of the intuition. In his recent 
monograph on Bergson, Keith Ansell-Pearson, for example, despite showing some 
                                                
10 For studies on Bergson’s philosophical legacy, see for example: Ansell-Pearson, 2018: 87-90; 
Bianco, 2011: 855-872; Bianco, 2015: passim; Descombes, 1998: passim; Fradet, 2014; Guerlac, 
2006: 173-196; Gutting, 2010: 63-77; Gutting, 2011: passim; Lawlor, 2012: 15-37, passim; Massey, 
2015; Pilkington, 1976; Richmond, 2008: 77-95; Somers-Hall, 2017: 85-107.  
11 Widder, 2008: 2. 
12 cf. Connolly, 2005: 97-130, 161-170; Connolly, 2011: 1-15, 102-106, 115, 166-168, passim; Grosz, 
2004: 13-14, 155-243; 243-261; Grosz, 2012: 147-152. 
13 Connolly, 2011: 10. 
14 An exception to this tendency is Nathan Widder’s (2008: 1-4, 40-49, 89-91; cf. 2012a: 127-146) 
work, which, drawing on Nietzsche and Deleuze, variously argues that Bergson’s philosophy fails to 
open up a conception of time qua absolute novelty. 
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awareness of the critiques of Bergson advanced by Critical Theorists like Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer, ends up avoiding any sustained consideration of such criticisms, 
saying nothing of their potential implications for the success of Bergson’s attempt to think 
‘beyond’ the human condition.15 
The neglect of such critiques also marks the aforementioned politico-theoretical work 
seeking to deploy Bergson for radical political purposes. Despite variously insisting, as noted 
above, that Bergsonian intuition offers subjects a valuable and novel perspective on life and 
temporality that exceeds our common sense view of the world, political theorists have 
generally failed to contend with critiques of Bergson (such as the one developed by the late 
Levinas) suggesting that his ethical method of intuition may in fact tend towards the 
replication of “old” forms of knowledge.16 Connolly, for example, insists that engaging the 
intuition or “[d]welling in duration [productively] affects the sensibilities through which we 
act.”17 But he does not pause to consider the extent to which that practice itself may 
reinforce or replay ‘old’ ways of thinking and acting. Given Connolly’s otherwise 
sophisticated analysis of the ideological coding that perception undergoes under the 
determined conditions of capitalism, this failure to engage such critiques feels like a missed 
opportunity for a balanced reflection on the ethical promises of Bergson’s intuitive thought.18 
This at times uncritical valorisation of Bergson has also somewhat overshadowed the 
importance of the ethical moves away from the intuition that are made by some of Bergson’s 
most significant philosophical successors. Deleuze’s philosophy in particular has been 
widely read in contemporary scholarship as primarily intuitive, and that despite Deleuze’s 
                                                
15 Ansell-Pearson, 2018: 87-88. Other Bergson scholars have likewise hinted at these critiques 
without providing any substantive (Lundy, 2013: 19-20), or indeed robust (ter Schure, 2019: 111-116), 
engagements with them. In some cases, the critiques have gone altogether unmentioned (Lawlor, 
2003; Guerlac, 2006). 
16 ON 121-138. Levinas’ critique has received more sustained attention than the one put forward by 
Critical Theorists, with both Lawlor (2003: x, 62-63; 2005: 175-184) and John Mullarkey (1999: 157-
187) seemingly taking it seriously. However, Levinas’ substantive critical points remain unmentioned 
in other works (Ansell-Pearson, 2018: 2; Guerlac, 2006: 185n47). 
17 Connolly, 2005: 166. 
18 cf. Connolly, 2011: 43-67. 
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relatively infrequent usage of that concept post-Bergsonism.19 In her recent study of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s Immanent Ethics, for example, Tamsin Lorraine argues that Deleuze’s late 
ethics should be understood in terms of Bergson’s method of intuition, and that to be ethical 
for Deleuze (and Guattari) is to develop “an intuition of the time of Aion”.20 Now, it would of 
course be foolish to deny that Bergson remains a decisive influence on Deleuze. That said, 
and pace Lorraine, to suggest that Deleuze’s ethical philosophy remains thoroughly intuitive 
is not only to ignore that philosophy’s distinctiveness, but is also to gloss over the 
disparateness of its privileged ethical modalities.  
From an inverse angle, because the recent ‘turn’ to Bergson has mostly proceeded 
through a Deleuzian lens (with the stress on ‘immanence’ that usually tints it), there has also 
been a generalised lack of scholarly recognition that Bergson’s philosophy has historically 
been taken up in a variety of directions—some decidedly less immanent than Deleuze’s own 
appropriation.21 Alongside Deleuze, Levinas stands as another major figure in European 
philosophy whose own ethics remains strongly inspired by Bergson’s emphasis on temporal 
creativity and novelty. Indeed, as Levinas states in a now famous interview with Richard 
Kearney, alongside Heidegger and phenomenology, Bergson was the figure who had the 
most decisive influence on his own intellectual trajectory.22 This influence has of course not 
gone completely unnoticed by Bergson scholars.23 But where those scholars are usually 
content to supplement their studies of Bergson with an extensive focus on Deleuze, the 
same attention has not always been given to Levinas, despite the fact that Levinas’ own 
explicit attempts to develop an ethical philosophy (of time) that goes beyond—by responding 
                                                
19  Much recent literature has focused on emphasising the continuities between Bergson’s and 
Deleuze’s thought. See, for example: Alliez, 1998: 226-246; Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 20-76, 139-208; 
Boundas, 1996: 81-106; Bryant, 2008: 49-72; Grosz, 2007: 287-300; Lundy, 2010: 67-85; Lundy, 
2017: 174-194; Sholl, 2012: 544-563. 
20 Lorraine, 2011: 22, cf. 1-30. 
21 In this project, I largely leave aside the much-debated question of whether Bergson, Levinas and 
Deleuze are best classified as thinkers of 'immanence' or 'transcendence'. I do not find those labels 
particularly useful for clarifying the complexity of those three ethical philosophies, all of which, 
moreover, seem to me to contain both immanent and transcendent moments at various stages of their 
development. For discussions of this debate that remain sensitive to this complexity, see: Gutting, 
2011: 117-132; Lawlor, 2003: 60-63; Lawlor, 2005: 175-184.  
22 Levinas and Kearney, 1986: 17. 
23 cf. Ansell-Pearson, 2018: 2; Lawlor, 2003: 60-63; Mullarkey, 1999: 157-187. 
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to—Bergson’s own philosophy would seem to offer a useful counterpoint to Deleuze's highly 
idiosyncratic account of Bergson.24 
In my view, Levinas and Deleuze both stand in a similarly ambivalent relation to Bergson, 
insofar, that is, as they both remain inspired by Bergson’s ethical emphasis on relating 
subjects to a time of novelty and futurity, whilst also departing from Bergson’s more specific 
ethical pronouncements on the intuition.25 This shared ambivalence, I contend, makes both 
of their philosophies a fertile ground for tackling the problems that arise in Bergson’s thought. 
Deleuze’s work on intensity and Levinas’ focus on the Other must both be taken as providing 
promising theoretical routes out of the problems of Bergson’s ethical philosophy, and any 
work dealing with those problems must also contend with the ethical promises that are 
offered by both Levinas’ and Deleuze’s thought. And it is with this philosophical context—
and opportunities it presents—in mind that I propose to explore the connections between 
Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze in this thesis. 
 
2. Aims and overview: temporal ethics and the problem of history 
The connections between the ethics of Bergson, Levinas, and Deleuze are certainly 
complex and multifaceted. It is also clear that much important work remains to be done in 
clarifying the philosophical relations between these three profoundly ethical thinkers—
especially on the Bergson-Levinas and Deleuze-Levinas sides of this triangle.26 That said, in 
this thesis I do not aim to provide a traditional account of Bergson’s ‘influence’ on Levinas 
                                                
24 Widder (2008: 40-49), for example, argues that Bergson’s philosophy of time remains incapable of 
thinking discontinuity, but only considers Bachelard and Deleuze as two “options” out of this problem, 
leaving aside any consideration of Levinas’ explicit arguments against Bergson that “[t]here must be a 
rupture of continuity” (TI 283-284). 
25 To my knowledge, only Lawlor (2003: 61-63; 2005: 175-184) seriously acknowledges that Levinas 
and Deleuze both stand on an equally ambivalent footing in relation to Bergson. 
26 Beyond a select number of short articles and chapters, relatively little has been written on the 
Bergson-Levinas connection. For some examples, see: Caygill, 2002: 5-68; de Warren, 2010: 174-
200; Durie, 2010: 371-392; Harold, 2009: 63-80; Lawlor, 2005: 175-194; Paley, 2017: 304-318; Peters, 
1997: 9-16; Veulemans, 2008: 279-302. 
Studies on the Levinas-Deleuze connection also remain sparse. For a few examples, see: Gutting, 
2011: 117-132; Kouba, 2008: 74-96; Lawlor, 2005: 175-194; Rae, 2016: 279-303; Schroeder, 2012: 
251-266; Sparrow, 2013: 22-42; Ventura, 2020; Williams, 2005: 33-52. 
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and Deleuze’s respective philosophies. Studies of influence can easily turn into discourses 
on the similarities between profoundly disparate thinkers, even when the textual evidence 
does not justify such assimilation.27 That is why in this thesis I have chosen to devote little 
attention to what is explicitly ‘common’ between Bergson, Levinas, and Deleuze. Neither my 
Levinas nor my Deleuze emerge here as particularly intuitive (in the Bergsonian sense) 
philosophers, even if I agree that they each take up Bergson’s ethical injunction that, as 
human subjects, we have a certain responsibility to relate ourselves to the temporality of the 
new.  
Instead, in this project I have opted to engage these thinkers through their differences, 
focusing specifically on what unites Levinas and Deleuze with Bergson at precisely those 
junctures where they most explicitly depart from the latter’s ethical emphasis on the intuition. 
In my view, this strategy gives this thesis two main strengths vis-à-vis a more traditional 
comparative exercise. First, this allows me to spend more time articulating what is distinctive 
about Bergson’s, Levinas’, and Deleuze’s respective ethical models—and as we will see 
throughout, there are indeed important differences between them. Secondly, if there is a 
problem ‘common’ to these three ethical philosophies—and this thesis contends that there 
is—then this is a problem that emerges in each case for different reasons and as a result of 
divergent motivations. Even if Deleuze and Levinas are both inspired by Bergson to think 
how we can positively and ethically relate ourselves to a time of novelty, that inspiration is 
always refracted through differing concerns and strategies. In eschewing extended 
comparisons between these three thinkers, my hope is that this thesis is able to better 
capture their singular differences, whilst nonetheless providing some indication of what 
unites them through those differences.28 
This thesis also does not attempt to provide an extensive overview of Bergson’s, 
                                                
27 The aforementioned ‘intuitionist’ readings of Deleuze exemplify this issue well. 
28 In all this, I am inspired by the following methodological assertion made by Deleuze and Guattari: 
“The history of ideas should never be continuous; it should be wary of resemblances, but also of 
descents or filiations; it should be content to mark the thresholds through which an idea passes, the 
journeys it takes that change its nature or object.” ATP 235. 
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Levinas’ and Deleuze’s respective conceptions of time. Much excellent work has already 
been carried on this front for all three thinkers considered here, and this thesis does not 
position itself as a contribution to the subset within the literature dealing specifically with their 
respective ontological or metaphysical conceptions of time.29 Thus, although each chapter of 
this thesis aims to provide some account of what Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze each 
respectively means by time (or temporality—I use these terms interchangeably throughout), 
these accounts are by no means novel, and they are not where this project makes its central 
contribution. 
Instead, this project directs its central attention to Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze’s 
respective models of temporal ethics. In other words, I focus on how, for each of these 
thinkers, an ethical relation to a time of novelty, difference, becoming and alterity is 
effectuated.30 I study their respective suggestions as to how a relation to the time of the new 
is established to ask specifically what the relative merits of each of those ethical conceptions 
is, particularly with regard to the way in which they position themselves in (dis)continuity with 
the realm of history.31 Once again, however, my focus on this question of temporal ethics— 
on the question of how a relation to the time of novelty and futurity is effectuated—is not 
primarily genealogical or filiational. Beyond their shared interest in directing ethical subjects 
to the time of the new, I do not seek to ‘trace’ what Levinas’ and Deleuze’s respective 
conceptions of temporal ethics owe to Bergson’s intuitive ethical philosophy. 
In place of such genealogical work, this thesis sets itself a critical task. In direct response 
to the aforementioned reluctance within recent scholarship to confront the problems with 
                                                
29 For studies of Bergson’s conception of time, see: Ansell-Pearson, 2002; Ansell-Pearson, 2018; 
Grosz, 2004; Guerlac, 2006; Lawlor, 2003; Mullarkey, 1999.  
For similar studies on Deleuze, see: Ansell-Pearson, 1999; Somers-Hall, 2013: 55-95; Widder, 
2008; Williams, 2011. 
Finally, on Levinas, see: Cohen, 1987: 1-27; Large, 2015; Mensch, 2015; Severson, 2013.  
30 The notion of ‘effectuation’ might be seen as too ‘active’, and thus as collapsing what is distinctive 
about Levinas’ brand of temporal ethics, namely, its emphasis on the subject’s passivity in relation to 
the temporality of the other person. However, as we will see in chapters three and four, for Levinas, 
though we are in a certain sense passive to the Other, that passivity nonetheless finds its condition of 
possibility—or “effectuation”—in certain structures (TI 280). In this regard, it makes sense to speak of 
ethics as effectuated in Levinas, as in Bergson and Deleuze. For Levinas’ use of the term, see: TI 196, 
212, 280, 291, 297; OB 24, 35, 179. 
31 I will have more to say on what I mean by history shortly. 
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Bergson’s intuitive philosophy, this is exactly what this thesis seeks in the first instance to do. 
I seek to explore, that is, why Bergson’s conception of intuition might not quite (or not 
immediately, at least) provide the ethical solution to the human predicament that he 
otherwise so correctly identifies. I believe there is something immensely valuable in 
Bergson’s suggestion that, as human beings who move and live in time, we have much to 
gain from more closely relating ourselves to the temporal aspects of our existence. I concur 
that a “methodically cultivated and developed” attention to novelty can stimulate and revivify 
those habitual aspects of our everyday lives that would otherwise remain so stagnant and 
static.32 I also agree with Bergson that social impulses and conventions (like language) have 
historically tended to prevent the creation of this positive and enlivening relation to the 
new.33 Where I part ways with Bergson is in thinking that socio-historical assemblages 
necessarily act as such an impediment to an enlivening or ethical contact with the novelty of 
time. The social, it seems to me, is as much a place of blockage as it is “a place of 
passage.”34 Additionally, Bergson’s philosophy seems to me to put undue faith on the 
capacity human beings have for divorcing themselves from those determined forms of 
sociality that have historically constituted them. While it is certainly not impossible that we 
might become capable of relating ourselves to a time that is other than the ‘social’ or 
‘habitual’ time of clocks, meetings and measurements, it seems to me unfeasible to suggest 
that such a relation could ever be immediate in the particular sense of leaving all traces of 
the social and the historical behind. It seems to me that an ethical relation to time cannot 
simply consist of a complete ‘turn away’ from the socio-historical domain. 
Yet, as the first chapter of this thesis shows, it is precisely this turn away from the social 
that Bergson’s metaphysical writings recommend when speaking of the intuition.35  For 
Bergson, the intuition is the immediate vision, contact, apprehension or knowledge that the 
mind has of time qua duration. Now, this vision, contact, apprehension or knowledge is 
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immediate in the precise sense that it leaves the prismatic mediations (or “interposed 
prejudices”) of the social behind.36 Intuition “is the direct vision of the mind by the mind—
nothing intervening, no refraction through the prism, one of whose facets is space and 
another, language.”37 In other words, for Bergson, it is precisely by leaving behind our socio-
historically determined perceptive impulses—or our ‘action-oriented perception’—that we 
can begin to feel ourselves intuitively moved by the temporal novelty of duration. 
Now, as I have noted, I think there is something profoundly inspiring in Bergson’s claim 
that we should seek to immediately relate ourselves to the time of the new. Nevertheless, as 
I argue in this thesis’ first chapter, while this move is ethically inspiring, it also remains 
deeply problematic. For as Bergson’s own metaphysical writings define it, the method of 
intuition can be shown to remain constitutively contaminated or implicated with precisely that 
socio-historical domain that Bergson so variously casts as an impediment to an ethical or 
vivifying contact with time qua duration. As we will see, because the intuition takes shape as 
a method for knowing duration, it always finds itself constitutively affected by other forms of 
knowledge that themselves play an eminently ‘social’ function. And the content of those 
functions is, of course, historically determined. 
This not only entails that the intuition is not as immediate as Bergson suggests. If the 
intuition finds itself constitutively implicated with the social, then far from being freed from 
any and all social ‘prejudice’, intuitive knowledge can itself tend towards a replication of the 
very social impulses and conventions that have historically prevented humanity from directly 
engaging duration. And it is here, I contend, that history starts to become a problem for 
Bergson’s temporal ethics. For if, through its constitutive involvement with the socio-
historical domain, the intuition can itself tend towards a replication of those conventions that 
have traditionally separated us from duration, then to be successful, that method—or indeed, 
temporal ethics itself—clearly needs to find a way of dissociating itself from that tendency. 
Insofar as it can reinforce humanity’s separation from duration, the constitutive implication 
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between Bergson’s temporal ethics and history here presents itself as a problem to be 
resolved or negotiated. 
Broadly speaking, I believe there are two types of philosophical ‘solutions’ that can be 
offered to this problem that announces itself in Bergson’s metaphysical writings. On the one 
hand, we can continue to go down the route of immediacy first suggested by Bergson, by 
trying to further remove or isolate temporal ethics from its involvement with the historical. In 
my view, this is the resolution that Levinas and the early Deleuze both try to offer in 
response to this problem. In both cases, this resolution involves creating a new concept of 
immediacy. Take the following assertions by Levinas in Totality and Infinity: “The notion of 
contact does not represent the primordial mode of the immediate. Contact is already a 
thematisation and a reference to a horizon. The immediate is the face to face.”38 What 
appears to be at stake in Levinas’ claim here is that in order to truly reach an immediate 
relation to the new—and the new for Levinas is the face-to-face relation with another 
person—we must go further down the route of immediacy than Bergson’s notion of intuition 
is capable of going.39 We must think immediacy beyond its horizon-laden signification qua 
intuitive contact (or vision), precisely so that we can establish an ethical relation to time that 
does not simply ensure the “signification of things within the same.”40 Similarly, when in 
Difference and Repetition Deleuze speaks of the eternal return as the power that affirms 
difference by placing differences “into immediate relation to one another”, it seems to me 
that he is also trying to go further than Bergson on the question of immediacy.41 And once 
again, this move is clearly reflected in his temporal ethics, which, far from remaining intuitive, 
models itself instead on the thought of eternal return. And as we will see in chapter five, one 
of Deleuze’ implicit criticisms of Bergson in this move towards the eternal return is that the 
latter’s temporal ethics has not quite been able to fully “abjure” its empirical or historical 
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content, and that, in that sense, it remains caught up with “the Same and the Similar.”42 
On the other hand, we may seek to resolve this problem by accepting that historical 
factors inevitably have a constitutive role to play in temporal ethics, and that the success of 
such an ethics depends on a careful negotiation of the risks that follow from that inevitable 
implication. In my view, this is the solution that Bergson’s penultimate major text, The Two 
Sources, begins to open up. In that text, Bergson seemingly recognises that the success of 
any ethics attempting to relate itself to the new must contend with its own connection with—
indeed, even find its “support” on—a range of factors that have a decidedly historical edge, 
such as the transmission of ideas through static language and large-scale, industrialised 
mechanism.43 Deleuze, it seems to me, also takes up this second route in his later work with 
Guattari. Specifically in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and 
Guattari firmly recognise that any ethical project for connecting subjects with a temporality of 
becoming must necessarily involve itself with those stratified social formations that most 
directly bind us as human beings.44 Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, only by directing our 
attention to such socio-historical assemblages can we ensure that our temporal ethics does 
not simply tend towards the replication of those forms of social organisation that have 
historically prevented an alignment with the new.45 
In this thesis, beyond initially pointing to the problem of history that emerges in Bergson’s 
metaphysical thought, I also want to consider the respective merits of each of the ‘solutions’ 
I have just mentioned. I want to assess, that is, not only whether Bergson’s Two Sources is 
capable of developing a less problematic conception of temporal ethics than his metaphysics, 
but also whether Levinas’ and Deleuze’s respective solutions to this problem fare any better. 
I begin this endeavour, in chapter two, by turning my attention to Bergson’s The Two 
Sources. As I read it, this text attempts to show how the intuition can play a concrete ethical 
function in developing a form of social organisation that is more attuned to the force of the 
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new—or what Bergson calls “the open society”.46 As just noted, this text also seems much 
more willing to accept that the success of this ethical project depends on the support it 
receives from the determined historical factors of language and mechanism. In this sense, 
The Two Sources appears to promise a conception of temporal ethics that is more 
thoroughly historicised than the one found in Bergson’s metaphysical writings—an ethics 
that takes shape, as Frédéric Worms argues, “without at any time leaving the field of human 
history for that of a transcendent metaphysics.”47 
In chapter two, I want to consider whether The Two Sources in fact delivers this more 
historicised conception of temporal ethics. It seems to me that were the text to provide such 
a conception, it perhaps would also contain some valuable suggestions as to how we might 
begin to dissociate the Bergsonian method of intuition from its tendency to replicate those 
social impulses that have historically prevented humanity from engaging the novelty of 
duration. However, as I will argue in chapter two, while this solution’s promise is indeed 
signaled in The Two Sources, it is not in fact delivered by it. On my reading, Bergson’s 
penultimate text continues to frame the intuition as an ethical practice that is purified from 
any constitutive involvement with the concrete manifestations or accretions of the historical. 
To engage the intuition is still, for Bergson, to immediately relate oneself to time “beyond 
these manifestations.”48 In this sense, I contend, The Two Sources remains incapable of 
offering an adequate resolution to the problem of history that emerges in Bergson’s 
metaphysical writings. The question that Bergson fails to answer in continuing to frame the 
intuition as immediate is how that ethical method can divest itself of its tendency to replay 
those historical forces that have traditionally prevented humanity from reaching a contact 
with time qua duration. 
These failures in the Bergsonian oeuvre prompt my turn to Levinas in the next two 
chapters of the thesis. It cannot be denied that Levinas’ ethical philosophy significantly 
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departs from Bergson’s intuitive framework.49 Though Levinas remains, like Bergson, very 
much interested in the question of how we might immediately relate ourselves to the 
temporality of the new, this immediate relation is no longer thought at the level of a 
practice—much less an intuitive one—that we can engage ourselves in as ethical subjects.50 
As Levinas pithily writes in a 1967 essay, to ethically reach the singularity of time it is “not 
enough to supress spoken discourse and abandon oneself to duration”, as Bergson would 
have it.51 For Levinas, an ethical relation to a time of novelty must instead be thought in 
terms of our immediate passivity or exposure to the alterity of the Other person: “The 
absolutely other [Autre] is the Other [Autrui].”52 
In terms of my central focus in this thesis, I believe that the main promise presented by 
Levinas’ thought consists of its repeated insistence that temporal ethics can take place 
entirely beyond history. As Levinas famously writes in Totality and Infinity, “[w]hen man truly 
approaches the Other he is uprooted [arraché] from history.”53 Otherwise said, for Levinas, 
the possibility of a temporal ethics that does not find itself implicated with the historical 
remains a live one. Now, if Levinas is correct on these points, and if the model of temporal 
ethics he provides in texts like Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being does manage 
to avoid a constitutive implication with the historical, then perhaps this ethical thought also 
offers a fruitful route out of the problem of history that presents itself in Bergson’s intuitive 
philosophy. Perhaps, Levinas offers us a model of temporal ethics that is no longer 
constitutively involved with a tendency to replay or replicate those historical arrangements 
that “obscure” and do “violence” to essential novelty of time.54 
My central task in chapters three and four of this thesis is to determine whether Levinas’ 
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ethical philosophy in fact delivers on this promise. Turning my attention to Totality and 
Infinity, in chapter three, I argue that this text’s model of temporal ethics does not—Levinas’ 
explicit claims notwithstanding—manage to entirely absolve itself from a constitutive 
implication with the historical. As I read him, despite arguing that an ethical relation to the 
temporality of the Other is immediate, Levinas also holds that this relation finds its condition 
of possibility in certain ontological structures. Namely, it finds its possibility in the two 
ontological conditions for the individuation of the ethical subject, which Levinas respectively 
calls interiority and fecundity.55 Directing my specific focus to the ontological condition of 
fecundity, I argue in chapter three that Levinas' model of temporal ethics in Totality and 
Infinity remains caught up with the historical because it continues to ground itself on a 
situation that carries with it an eminently historical aspect: the situation of the family, which, 
for Levinas, precisely captures the distinction of the ontological condition of fecundity. I 
argue that if temporal ethics remains grounded in the family, as Levinas' account implies, 
then that ethics cannot entirely absolve or uproot itself from history, for the family, as I will 
show in chapter three, remains in each of its aspects historical. 
Driven by Totality and Infinity's inability to resolve the problem of history, in chapter four, 
I turn to Levinas' second major work, Otherwise than Being, to test the feasibility of its own 
claims that temporal ethics can take place entirely beyond "the recuperable time of history 
and memory in which representation continues."56 Otherwise than Being significantly revises 
some of the central themes of Totality and Infinity. Significantly, in the later text, Levinas 
drops the claim that the immediacy of temporal ethics finds itself grounded in certain 
ontological conditions. Although Otherwise than Being continues to uphold a certain 
condition "at the basis" of its proposed model of temporal ethics—an ethics which is now 
conceived by Levinas in terms of the subject's immediate proximity to another person, or 
neighbour—that condition is no longer conceived ontologically, but ethically.57 Indeed, for the 
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Levinas of Otherwise than Being, it is no longer the ontological conditions of interiority and 
fecundity that explain the possibility of an ethical relation to the temporality of the Other. That 
grounding role is now performed by what Levinas calls the "superindividuation" of the 
subject in the thoroughly ethical condition of substitution.58 
Taking up and extending my argument in chapter three, in chapter four, I contend that 
Levinas' temporal ethics in Otherwise than Being, despite its explicit and repeated claims to 
the contrary, remains constitutively implicated with the historical. The main issue, as I 
conceive it, is that despite distancing the 'basis' of temporal ethics from all ontological 
predicates, Levinas nonetheless continues to deploy a range of gendered metaphors that 
suggest precisely that basis' involvement with the historical. As we will see, Levinas 
continues to describe the ethical condition of substitution in terms of the familial metaphor of 
maternity. Thus, while it cannot be denied that Otherwise than Being introduces many 
significant changes into Levinas' conception of temporal ethics, in the final analysis, that 
ethics remains incapable of providing a resolution to the problem of history that suggests 
itself in Bergson's thought. Far from showing how the project of temporal ethics can take 
place entirely beyond history, Levinas' ethical philosophy not only remains constitutively 
implicated with history. Because it effectively and repeatedly disavows this implication, 
Levinas' philosophy also fails to offer any positive suggestions as to how the risks that follow 
from that it might become strategically negotiated. 
Given these inadequacies in Levinas’ thought, in the last two chapters of the thesis, I 
turn my attention to Deleuze to see how much better his own solutions to the problem of 
history fare. I begin by focusing on the magnum opus of Deleuze's early solo period, 
Difference and Repetition, to investigate whether its ethical model for the affirmation of 
eternal return is indeed capable of liberating itself from any involvement with the historical. 
As I have already suggested, for the early Deleuze, to think temporal ethics in terms of the 
affirmation of eternal return is precisely 'abjure' that ethics' constitutive involvement with any 
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historical or empirical content. When the ethical subject affirms the eternal return, Deleuze 
tells us, it also 'frees' itself from all those events that make up the content of historical time: 
"it repudiates these and expels them with all its centrifugal force" and, as such, it itself 
becomes "the new, complete novelty."59 
However, as I show in chapter five, there is good reason to doubt Deleuze's confidence 
that his model of temporal ethics is capable of liberating itself from all sense of the historical. 
As I seek to show by taking up and extending Guattari's critical reading of Deleuze's solo 
philosophy, to operate in the way Deleuze proposes, his model of temporal ethics needs to 
relate itself much more closely to the domain of actuality than he is willing to admit. As we 
will see, Deleuze frames his notion of temporal ethics in structuralist terms: for him, the 
affirmative activity of the 'Self' of eternal return must be understood in terms of the notion of 
a differenciator towards which the structuralist philosophy of figures like Claude Levi-Strauss 
and Jacques Lacan begins to point. However, I argue that in framing temporal ethics in 
these terms, Deleuze fails to recognise that what provides a structural agent of that nature 
with its affirmative force is precisely its involvement with the historical. In this sense, I 
maintain, to function in the way Deleuze proposes, his ethics of affirming the eternal return 
must retain a constitutive involvement with historical factors—an involvement which Deleuze 
ultimately fails to recognise, and which thus prevents him from providing an adequate 
solution to the problem of history. 
Motivated by Deleuze’s inability to resolve this problem in Difference and Repetition, in 
this project’s final chapter, I turn my attention to Deleuze and Guattari’s joint work. As I have 
already suggested, this co-authored philosophy seems to me much more willing than 
Deleuze’s solo work to recognise the importance of the historical for the project of ethics. 
This recognition already expresses itself in the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
where the authors suggest that ethical movements of escape always simultaneously involve 
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concrete forms of social investment.60 This recognition arguably comes to its full fruition in A 
Thousand Plateaus, where the authors provide a machinic model of temporal ethics that not 
only recognises the constitutive implication between the ethical and the historical but also 
suggests how we might—as ethical subjects—strategically negotiate the risks and 
opportunities that this implication creates. Deleuze and Guattari recognise that insofar as it 
remains constitutively implicated with concrete forms of social investment, the project of 
temporal ethics is as potentially enlivening as it is dangerous. And that is why the authors 
suggest that to ethically relate ourselves to the new, we must remain equally attentive to our 
involvement with those stratified forms of actuality that constitute us as human subjects.61 
Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is only by meticulously relating ourselves to our stratified 
historical conditions that we can prevent our temporal ethics from lapsing into its tendency to 
reproduce and replicate those forms of social organisation that separate us from the new. 
My argument in the last chapter of this thesis is that, of the all works considered here, A 
Thousand Plateaus offers the best solution to the problem of history that emerges in 
Bergson’s writings. In my view, by actively confronting the constitutive implication between 
temporal ethics and the historical, Deleuze and Guattari are also able to develop a 
convincing ethical strategy for negotiating the risks that follow from that implication. That is, 
unlike Bergson, Levinas and the early Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari are able to offer 
valuable suggestions as to how we might, as ethical subjects, vigilantly dissociate the project 
of temporal ethics from its tendency to replicate and reproduce problematic forms of social 
organisation. To be sure, as Deleuze and Guattari remind us, there can be no guarantees 
here, since even a vigilant temporal ethics can fall back into the dangers of replication.62 But 
in recognising these dangers, and in actively folding this recognition into their model of 
temporal ethics, Deleuze and Guattari offer us a potentially productive way of negotiating the 
risks that can be associated with the project of relating oneself to the new. And it is in this 
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sense, I contend, that their ethics offers a valuable resolution to the problem of history that 
announces itself in Bergson’s intuitive philosophy. 
 
3. Terms: problems and histories 
My explorations in this thesis are methodologically guided by two key concepts, neither 
of which finds its proper home in Bergsonism. First, I am loosely guided by Jacques 
Derrida's late conception of a problem as that which brings about the return—or the 
revenance—of what it attempts to conjure away. As Derrida writes in Spectres of Marx, a 
problem is not to be defined exclusively as a task to be resolved through 'inquiry'; it can also 
be defined as a kind of protection or shield against 'external' or 'impure' influences: 
"problema: at once question, task, program, and shield, the apotropaic armour, armour 
against armour".63 It seems to me that when Bergson, Levinas, and (the early) Deleuze 
consider the relation between their temporal ethics and history, that they treat history as a 
problem in these two senses identified by Derrida. On the one hand, determined forms of 
history and actuality present an issue that must be dealt with or resolved philosophically 
through the development of a notion of immediate temporal ethics. At the same time, it 
seems to me that this conceptual working out also tries to shield or protect the task of 
temporal ethics from a mixing with the 'impurities' of the historical. In trying to provide an 
account of temporal ethics grounded in immediacy, Bergson, Levinas, and (the early) 
Deleuze all likewise try to "conjure away" what they perceive to be the 'negative' influence of 
the historical.64 But this philosophical act of conjuration, like all conjuration, always causes 
that which it attempts to exorcise to come back, to return. In this sense, I suggest, we should 
not be surprised that the problem of history re-emerges in Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze's 
ethical philosophies at those exact moments where they most explicitly try to dispel it by 
articulating a notion of immediate temporal ethics. For such attempts, as Derrida says, 
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"always cause to come back, they convoke the revenant [in this case, the history] that they 
conjure away."65 
Secondly, when throughout this project I speak of 'history', 'actuality', 'empirical' or 
'determined states of affairs' and 'stratifications', I am in each case inspired by Michel 
Foucault's concept of actuality (actualité).66 This concept, developed by Foucault in his later 
writings on Kant, denotes a form of sociohistorical reality, a "contemporary reality", that is 
never simply an aggregate of all that exists or all that has come to be through a gradual or 
teleological process of historical accumulation.67 Neither is actuality, qua contemporary 
reality, simply a frozen and immobile moment in time that offers no routes for escape (no 
"way out") towards the future.68 Our actuality, according to Foucault, does refer to concrete 
historical processes: it refers specifically to the historical "contingency that has made us 
what we are".69 But this historical contingency is not simply the static chain of events that 
have led to our 'present'; it is not simply our 'history' as it may be written in traditional 
textbooks and chronicles. In opposition to these traditional conceptions of history, Foucault's 
actuality refers instead to a mobile form of historical contingency that always contains within 
it "the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think."70 In other 
words, for Foucault, actuality refers to our concrete historical situation (our 'now' or 'today'), 
but as already predisposed towards alteration or the future: "'today' as difference in 
history."71 
Like Foucault, I agree that history should not be reductively defined as a static series of 
events that have become frozen in time. I think the concept of history can, and should, 
encompass within it the sense of opportunity in relation to the future that is conveyed by 
Foucault's notion of actuality. I also believe that it is only by accepting such a notion of 
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history and by taking up the opportunities that it presents, as it were, that we can 
successfully make sense of the task of temporal ethics that is so valuably insisted upon by 
Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze. I hold that to successfully relate ourselves to the future, we 
must see history not as an obstacle to be overcome or escaped through ethics, but rather as 
that contingent milieu (consisting of both opportunities and dangers) that precisely enables 
us to go towards another time, towards a time that is different to our own 'present', other 
than our presence to ourselves. It is this milieu, moreover, that we cannot fail to contend with 
if we want to ethically free ourselves from our static or illusory conceptions of time without, at 
the same time, having our ethics replay or replicate the dangers and violence that follow 
from such conceptions. Indeed, as Foucault recognises (and I believe the remainder of this 
thesis will bear out the truth of this remark), "the claim to escape from the system of 
contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another 
way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the 
most dangerous traditions."72 
All that said, when in this thesis I deal with Bergson's, Levinas', and Deleuze's respective 
models of temporal ethics, I do not criticise each of those models for failing to live up to this 
conception of history qua actuality that emerges in Foucault's late writings. I do believe that 
some of the dangers that follow from each of those models could perhaps have been 
avoided, or at least better negotiated, through the adoption of a more nuanced conception of 
history—and indeed, one of my arguments in relation to Deleuze and Guattari in chapter six 
is that their philosophy provides a potential resolution to the problem of history in part 
because it adopts one such conception of history.73 For the most part, however, my use of 
terms like 'history', 'actuality', and 'determined states of affairs', remains contextually or 
parasitically attached to what Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze respectively mean by history. 
As a way of doing justice to those three philosophers, in each of my chapters, I work with the 
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conception of history that is presented by the text(s) I am in the process of analysing. In this 
sense, my critical task in this thesis is not to suggest that the various models of temporal 
ethics I explore are problematic simply because they fail to take up Foucault's notion of 
history qua actuality. Rather, my task is to suggest that even as they themselves define 
history, history can be shown to remain a constitutive part of Bergson's, Levinas' and 
Deleuze's respective conception of temporal ethics. And it is in this sense that history 
emerges as a problem in each of those ethical philosophies. In each case, history re-
emerges as that impurity with which temporal ethics cannot entirely do away. And that is 
why, I argue, a successful temporal ethics is one that seeks to contend with its own 
constitutive implication with the historical, one that tries to strategically use that domain as 
the contingent milieu consisting of both opportunities and dangers that enables us to go 
beyond ourselves, in the 'here and now'. 
 
4. Theoretical contributions 
What, then, are this thesis' main contributions to the literature? As the first book-length 
study exploring the relation between Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze's ethical thought, this 
thesis will make a welcome contribution to the sub-field of continental philosophy exploring 
the connections between these three thinkers. This subset of the field is certainly burgeoning. 
But as I mentioned above, there is still a relatively limited amount of work exploring the 
philosophical links between Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze. And although my thesis does 
not engage itself in detailed genealogical work, my hope is that it still clarifies aspects of this 
philosophical triangle in a way that bolsters the ongoing debate within the literature. 
To my knowledge, there is also nothing to date in the field attempting to explore these 
three profoundly ethical thinkers from the perspective of a problem that they might all share. 
If my arguments that Deleuze's, Levinas' and Bergson's respective models of temporal 
ethics all share a problematic relation to history are in any way convincing, then beyond 
extending already ongoing debate, this thesis also makes a novel contribution to that debate 
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by providing an extended exploration of the problematic overlap between these three ethical 
philosophies. And again, my hope is that this contribution leads to a more expanded and 
balanced debate on the philosophical and ethical opportunities that are presented by the 
ethical philosophies of Bergson, Levinas, and Deleuze. 
Finally, and perhaps more incidentally, I believe that this thesis will also bolster the 
ongoing debate in political theory seeking to determine how our political lives might benefit 
from the development of an ethical relation to time. As I hope to show throughout this thesis, 
although that ethical task is certainly to be welcomed, because it remains constitutively 
implicated with our concrete forms of actuality, that task presents not only opportunities but 
also risks or dangers that must be negotiated strategically. In this sense, then, this thesis 
also functions as a reminder that the political or ethical task of relating oneself to temporality 
always demands a great degree of prudence. As well as contributing to the philosophical 
literature dealing with the relationship between Bergson, Levinas and Deleuze, this project 
therefore also hopes to enrich the ongoing debate within political theory as to how we might 
be able to pluralise and diversify the ethical domain of our political lives. 
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1. Bergson I: the problem of history in Bergson’s metaphysical writings   
As I wrote in the introduction to this thesis, Henri Bergson’s metaphysics aims to 
establish a way for human beings to retrieve the novelty and creativity of time. According to 
Bergson, the habitual or everyday life of human beings is characterised by its distraction in 
relation to the temporal forces that constitute life itself. Because we are continually engaged 
in the work of society, and because that work always demands of us a thoroughly spatialised 
conception of the world, we seldom stop to expose ourselves to the temporality that is the 
very principle of life in general. As Bergson writes in a lecture from 1911, for the most part 
“we have no interest in listening to the uninterrupted humming of life’s depths. And yet, that 
is where real [time or] duration is.”1 Although this lack of interest in duration is certainly the 
cause of many “false” philosophical problems, for Bergson, its negative effects also have a 
much wider reach than the field of philosophy.2 In a certain sense, by continually ignoring the 
creative force of duration through habitual social practice, we also estrange ourselves from 
the most fundamental aspect of our existence qua living beings. We divorce ourselves, that 
is, from that “perpetual state of becoming” that we are beneath the spatiality of all our social 
or linguistic representations.3 
For Bergson, we can begin to rectify our estrangement from the fundamental temporality 
of life only by adopting a method for knowing or grasping duration. This method is precisely 
what Bergson calls the “intuition”.4 Intuition is that effort, or that series of efforts, whereby we 
begin to immediately grasp time without any refraction through the distorting prisms of 
language and spatiality that govern our habitual social interactions.5 Bergson's claim is that 
                                                
1 CM 125. 
2 CM 46-50. 
3 TFW 130; CM 103. 
4 Bergson’s conception of the intuition as a philosophical “method” already appears in one of his 
earlier pieces on the subject of metaphysics, namely, in his 1903 “Introduction to Metaphysics” (CM 
155). But as Bergson (1972: 1146-1150) notes in a famous letter to Harald Höffding, the real 
significance of this conception only became clear to him “long afterwards.” Its most sustained 
elaboration is to be found in the opening sections of Bergson’s second introduction to The Creative 
Mind: CM 18-72. 
5 CM 29. 
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by engaging in this method we can immediately reconnect ourselves with the novelty of time 
qua duration. This effort of reconnection with duration can, moreover, play a dual function. In 
one sense, the intuition can help us dispel certain philosophical problems that have hitherto 
plagued the history of philosophy. More widely, the intuition can also become more than a 
mere philosophical tool. Though Bergson does not—at least until the Two Sources—often 
speak of it in these terms, it is clear that the intuition can also play a positive ethical role in 
expanding the domain of our lives.6 It can become the means by which we begin to “revivify 
[revivifie]” the stability that sociality continually imposes upon our interaction with the world.7 
In this sense, Bergson’s contention is that the intuition provides the occasion for human 
beings to overcome their merely social condition and to once again immediately realign 
themselves with the temporal principle of life itself.8  
But if Bergson is sanguine about the potentialities that are offered by the intuition for 
immediately reconnecting human beings with duration, there is also, following some of his 
prominent critics, some reason to doubt the plausibility of these claims. As Levinas, for 
example, argues, although the philosophical significance of Bergson’s emphasis on duration 
cannot be underestimated, we must nonetheless ask whether the intuition in fact operates 
as an immediate opening on “absolute newness”.9 The main issue, as Levinas conceives it, 
is that in continuing to associate the intuition with the modalities of knowledge, grasping, and 
vision, Bergson’s thought remains still too closely attached to a philosophical tradition 
whereby “the alterity of the new is reduced to its being”, that is, where temporal alterity is 
approached not in its own terms, but rather in terms of an ontological framework that divests 
time of its essential futurity.10 
From a different, though not unrelated angle, Bergson’s conception of intuition has also 
                                                
6 As Pilkington (1976: 165) aptly phrases it: “There is an ethical quality in Bergson’s thought on this, 
since it becomes an imperative to retain as great a degree of consciousness and freedom of action as 
possible.” 
7 CM 131-132. 
8 TFW 97. 
9 ON 133. 
10 ON 133. 
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come under scrutiny by Critical Theorists, like Max Horkheimer, who suggests that in 
positing intuition as an unmediated or immediate contact with duration, Bergson remains 
insufficiently aware of that method’s constitutive implication with social and historical 
factors.11 According to Horkheimer, though it cannot be denied that Bergson’s philosophy 
“towers above most philosophical phenomena of the present”, at least on these points 
pertaining to the relation between intuition and history (or the social), that philosophy 
remains relatively “naïve”.12 
Taking inspiration from each of these critiques, in this chapter I want to test Bergson’s 
claims that the intuition enables us to immediately relate ourselves to the novelty of duration. 
Combining aspects of both Horkheimer’s and Levinas’ critiques, I want to argue that this 
method is not as freed from social and historical factors as Bergson would have us believe. 
Paying particular attention to Bergson’s own methodological stipulations in metaphysical 
writings like The Creative Mind, I contend here that the intuition always remains 
constitutively implicated with its surrounding social and historical field of actuality. In this 
sense, not only is the intuition not the immediate or unrefracted relation to time that Bergson 
envisages. Because the intuition remains constitutively implicated with social and historical 
factors, it can also become a means by which the impulses and prejudices that govern those 
other domains are replicated at the level of ethical practice. And it is in this sense, I contend, 
that history emerges as a problem in Bergson’s metaphysical writings. 
I develop this argument in three main stages. I begin, in section one, by briefly outlining 
Bergson’s conception of duration, before considering his arguments as to why our social 
perception habitually separates us from it. In section two, I turn my attention to Bergson’s 
conception of intuition, focusing in particular on his definition thereof as a method for the 
acquisition of knowledge of duration. In section three, I begin by considering why this 
method can be said to contain an ethical dimension, before arguing (with the help of 
                                                
11 As I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, despite receiving a direct response from Bergson 
himself (2002: 1491-1492), Horkheimer’s critique has not always been given the attention it deserves 
in Anglophone Bergson scholarship. 
12 BMT 10, 12. 
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Horkheimer and Levinas) that even qua ethical, this method always finds itself constitutively 
implicated with determined forms of actuality. Having made this argument, I conclude by 
restating why this constitutive implication presents a problem for Bergson’s ethical 
philosophy, whilst also recapitulating the two potential solutions that may be given in 
response to it. 
 
1.1. Time as duration 
In Time and Free Will, Bergson begins to develop his account of time as duration by 
distinguishing between two different types of “multiplicity”.13 According to Bergson, these two 
kinds of multiplicity are “two possible senses of the word ‘distinguish’, two conceptions, the 
one qualitative and the other quantitative, of the difference between same and other.”14 They 
are, in other words, the two principles according to which the elements in a series can be 
distinguished from one another. Quantitative—or discrete—multiplicities treat the elements 
in a series as identical or homogenous units that occupy separable positions in an equally 
homogenous and divisible space.15 This kind of multiplicity can be subjected to a process of 
counting or addition. When we count sheep, for instance, we not only take them, for the 
purposes of the addition, as identical, but we also “place them side by side in an ideal 
space”.16 As Bergson writes, “the process by which we count units and make them into a 
discrete multiplicity (…) assume[s] that they are identical, which is conceivable only on 
condition that these units are ranged alongside each other in a homogeneous medium.”17 
Thus, if quantitative multiplicities assume an identity between their elements, this is because 
they take the idea of a homogeneous and infinitely divisible space as their “fundamental 
datum”.18 
                                                
13 TFW 75-139. 
14 TFW 121. 
15 TFW 86-87 
16 TFW 76-77. 
17 TFW 123. 
18 TFW 99. 
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As Bergson warns, however, not everything is counted in the same way, and if we have 
a tendency to quantitatively connect the elements in series, we can also combine them in 
accordance with their quality.19 The discrete sounds of a distant bell, for example, can also 
be combined as a function of their overall rhythm: “in that case, I do not count the sounds, I 
limit myself to gathering, so to speak, the qualitative impression produced by the whole 
series.”20 Though consciousness usually directs itself towards objects quantitatively, it is also 
capable of being confronted by quite another type of multiplicity. When consciousness 
refrains from spatially representing its sensuous elements, it encounters each of them 
“permeating the other and organising themselves like the notes of a tune, so as to form what 
we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity”.21 Such qualitative multiplicities, Bergson 
argues, are “nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate 
one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in 
relation to one another, without any relation to number: [they are] pure heterogeneity.”22 In 
contrast to quantitative multiplicities, qualitative multiplicities are thus defined by the lack of 
homogeneity and identity between their elements and instead by an interpenetration of their 
distinct moments.23 
According to Bergson, these two types of multiplicities also present “two possible 
conceptions” that the mind can take on time.24 When we speak of temporality we tend to 
think of it as a quantitative multiplicity: “we generally think of a homogeneous medium in 
which our conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space.”25 Under this 
view, our perception of time is taken as equivalent to our perception of external objects in 
space. But since we can also relate to the world on the basis of its quality, this quantitative 
                                                
19 In Time and Free Will, Bergson takes the latter process as primary in relation to the former: “without 
this interpenetration and this, so to speak, qualitative progress, no addition would be possible. Hence 
it is through the quality of quantity that we form the idea of quantity without quality.” TFW 123. 
20 TFW 86. 
21 TFW 105. 
22 TFW 104. 
23 As Bergson notes, in qualitative multiplicities one can hardly even speak of ‘elements’ at all, since 
any distinction between them is only acquired via a process of symbolic representation. TFW 86. 
24 TFW 100, 128. 
25 TFW 90. 
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view of time is by no means the only one possible. Indeed, for Bergson, the purely 
symbolical character of this quantitative conception of time “becomes more striking as we 
advance further into the depths of consciousness: the deep-seated self which ponders and 
decides, which heats and blazes up, is a self whose states permeate one another”.26 When 
consciousness is made to “isolate [isoler] itself from the external world, and by a vigorous 
effort of abstraction, to become itself again”, it finds that its temporality is in fact that of a 
qualitative multiplicity.27 Consciousness discovers that “pure duration is the form which the 
succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains 
from separating its present state from its former states.”28 In this context, the quantitative 
view that we normally take on time emerges as nothing more than a spurious concept that 
distorts the fundamentally qualitative reality of both consciousness and the living world more 
generally. At its heart, all life is durational.29 Above all, this means that rather than taking 
shape as the juxtaposition and homogeneity of discrete temporal states, the temporality of 
life is instead a perpetual state of becoming, a becoming where there is nothing but a 
ceaseless continuity of change and creativity.30 Life, as duration, is “a wholly qualitative 
multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which [continually] pass over into one 
another.”31  
But on Bergson’s reading, it is precisely this living continuity of becoming that we, as 
human beings, are generally incapable of grasping.32 While even our daily experience 
should teach us that it is duration, and not a spatialised time, that “immediately” presents 
itself to consciousness, we are for the most part content to let the latter representation 
                                                
26 TFW 126. 
27 TFW 91, 128. 
28 TFW 100. 
29 Time and Free Will ascribes a reality to duration only in the context of individual consciousness. But 
in Creative Evolution this durational reality is expanded onto the domain of life itself. TFW 99; cf. CE 
1-11. 
30 CE 2. 
31 TFW 229. 
32 Bergson consistently presents the inability to engage with duration as a properly human problem, 
doing so on the basis that other forms of life, lacking intelligence, almost certainly perceive the 
external world otherwise than we do. TFW 96, 138; CE 137-176. 
 37 
govern our perceptive encounters with not only the world but also with ourselves.33 Bergson 
explains in Matter and Memory that this tendency to regard the world spatially finds at least 
part of its reason in our existence as living beings. As he argues, even the humblest of living 
forms must sustain themselves in order to live. But they cannot do so except by 
distinguishing, from the continuity of the world’s sensible qualities, “a body which is to be 
their own and then [subsequently] other bodies with which the first can enter into relation.”34 
To live, living forms must thus distinguish themselves from the greater continuity of life, since 
only this discernment enables them to act in the world, or to follow “the fundamental law of 
life, which is a law of action.”35 In human beings, this vital necessity most readily expresses 
itself in terms of our perception of the external world: “Our representation of matter is the 
measure of our possible action upon bodies: it results from the discarding of what has no 
interest for our needs, or more generally, for our functions.”36 This vital need for action also 
in part determines the form and function of specific human faculties, like that of the 
intellect.37 As Bergson argues in Creative Evolution, when we, as intelligent beings, act upon 
a material object, “our interest is directed, before all, to its actual or future positions, and not 
to the progress by which it passes from one position to another, progress which is the 
movement itself.”38 In a similar way, when as intelligent beings we attempt to fabricate such 
objects—and fabrication is the “first” aim of the human intellect—our attention is primarily 
directed to their apparent solidity, while “the rest escapes by its very fluidity.”39 In the context 
of this demand for activity that governs all life in general, it is not hard to grasp why human 
beings are normally content to let spatialised representations dominate their engagement 
with both the world and themselves. For beings like ourselves, who are determined by a 
necessity for action, to discern and carve out spatialised solidities from the continuity of 
                                                
33 TFW 125, 128. 
34 MM 198. 
35 MM 150; cf. CE 128-129. 
36 MM 38. 
37 “We regard the human intellect (…) are relative to the needs of action. Postulate action, and the 
very form of the intellect can be deduced from it.” CE 152. 
38 CE 154. 
39 CE 153. 
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becoming is, in a certain sense, just what it means to live.40 
This necessity for action that in part determines all living perception takes up a properly 
human specificity in a social setting.41 “In reality,” Bergson writes, “man is a being who lives 
in society.”42 Now, in order to take shape as a common way of living, social life requires a 
certain degree of stability and regularity.43 In human societies, both of these aspects are 
provided by language. 44 As Bergson notes, it is “the word with [its] well-defined outlines, the 
rough and ready word, which stores up the stable, common, and consequently impersonal 
element in the impressions of mankind.” 45  Put differently, the words and concepts of 
language operate as a kind of “mold” within which the heterogeneity of life can be 
temporarily fixed.46 Consciousness can get a handle on the fluidity of its experience of 
flavour, for example, by giving it a name and thus solidifying it in the shape of a taste.47 It is 
this process of linguistic fixing, moreover, that not only enables consciousness to compare 
its sensations to one another in time, but which also enables the “whole of society” to get a 
sense of its shared experiences.48 Now, in itself, this process of symbolical representation is 
relatively innocuous. Indeed, for Bergson, this process can even play a productive role in 
human society, insofar as the fabrication and modification of material objects, for instance, 
calls for a divisible and discontinuous representation of parts that language is well equipped 
to provide.49 In a more abstract sense, and in part because language is precisely a power for 
abstraction from things, language has even contributed to the “liberation” of human 
                                                
40 MM 198. 
41 MM 184-185. 
42 CE 157. 
43 “Our tendency to form a clear picture of the externality of things and the homogeneity of their 
medium is the same as the impulse which leads us to live in common and to speak.” TFW 138. 
44 Though Time and Free Will exclusively equates language with stability, Creative Evolution develops 
a more ambiguous conception thereof by insisting that “mobility” is inherent to words (CE 157-161). 
Even so, Bergson refuses to consider that the mobility of language might itself provide an entry into 
the more generalized fluidity of duration. Even qua mobility, language always continues to cover up 
duration by turning it into a thing. cf. CM 141. 
45 TFW 132; cf. CM 62-63. 
46 CE 160, 314. 
47 TFW 131. 
48 TFW 133, 236. 
49 “Now, to modify an object, we have to perceive it as divisible and discontinuous.” CE 162; CM 63. 
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consciousness: it has enabled consciousness to remove itself from the material objects to 
which it would otherwise remain riveted, and to thus develop a reflection on itself.50 
The issue that emerges is that human consciousness displays an almost instinctive 
tendency to understand its own temporal becoming—and that of life more generally—on the 
basis of static or social linguistic categories.51 As Bergson holds in Time and Free Will, the 
“influence of language on sensations is deeper than usually thought. Not only does language 
make us believe in the unchangeableness of our sensations, but it will sometimes deceive 
us as to the nature of the sensation felt.”52 By relating to itself through the language that 
permeates society, consciousness deceives itself into thinking that its inner temporal reality 
is that of a quantitative multiplicity.53 In this way, Bergson contends, we spend the greater 
part of our time living “outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our 
own [linguistic] ghost, a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous 
space.” 54  Through language, we prevent ourselves from grasping the durational 
heterogeneity that constitutes our inner experience; we divorce ourselves from our 
“fundamental self [moi fondamental].”55 Similarly, Bergson contends in Creative Evolution, 
because we are habituated to engaging with the material world through linguistic concepts 
that “have the same stability as objects, on which they have been moulded”, we also have a 
tendency to believe that those concepts can adequately represent the mobility of life more 
generally.56 Nevertheless, it is an “undeniable” fact that life unfolds itself in its heterogeneity 
gradually and continually, “as if it occupied a duration like our own.”57 But in deploying static 
social symbols as a way of grasping that heterogeneity, the human intellect cannot but show 
                                                
50 CE 158-159, 177-178; Ansell-Pearson, 2018: 166. 
51 As early as Time and Free Will, Bergson contends that “our intellect has its instincts.”  We will see 
in the next chapter that Bergson extensively revisits this theme in The Two Sources. TFW 134-135. 
52 TFW 131. 
53 “This imaginary homogenous time is (…) an idol of language.” MM 207. 
54 TFW 231. 
55 TFW 128. 
56 CE 160. 
57 CE 9. 
 40 
itself as having “a natural inability to comprehend life.”58 By its use of linguistic symbols, “the 
intellect represents becoming as a series of states, each of which is homogeneous with itself 
and consequently does not change.”59 But what this process of symbolical representation 
leaves out is the essential temporal mobility and heterogeneity of life itself. By relating itself 
to the living world on the basis of its social representations, human consciousness allows 
temporal becoming and creativity to slip through its fingers just when it thinks that it is 
holding it tight.60 
Bergson contends that this almost instinctive tendency to engage with life’s temporality 
via social representations gives rise to a number of “false” philosophical problems.61 In Time 
and Free Will, for example, Bergson maintains that that “the contradictions implied in the 
[philosophical] problems of causality, freedom, personality, spring from no other source.”62 
Creative Evolution, for its part, contends that for as long we continue to think evolution on 
the basis of static social categories, we will remain “incapable of presenting the true nature 
of life, the full meaning of the evolutionary movement”, and our speculation will thus continue 
to rely on false categories—like “nothingness” and “disorder”—that serve a purpose only in 
relation to practical activity.63 In short, what our tendency to relate to the world on the basis 
of social categories prevents is an engagement with reality as it is in itself.64 What we remain 
incapable of grasping or following is “the internal life of the structure of things.”65 In this 
particular sense, if our knowledge bears a certain relativity, this is “simply due to the fact that 
the intelligence has contracted habits necessary for everyday living; these habits, transferred 
to the domain of speculation, bring us face to face with a reality [that is only] distorted or 
                                                
58 CE 165. 
59 CE 163. 
60 CE 163. 
61 For Bergson’s most succinct account of ‘false’ problems, see his lecture on “The Possible and the 
Real”: CM 77-86; cf. CE 272-370; Deleuze, 2002: 13-36. 
62 TFW 139. 
63 CE ix-x, 102, 298. 
64 “Spatiality, therefore, and in this quite special sense, sociability, are in this case the real causes of 
the relativity of our knowledge.” CM 16. 
65 MM 183. 
 41 
made over”.66 Crucially, these sorts of philosophical problems are not the only ones that 
emerge from our tendency to relate to time on the basis of social representations. Because 
we are of the same “essence” or “substance” as the mobility that works on all living things, 
by placing our static representations between that mobility and ourselves, we also, in a 
certain sense, divorce ourselves from ourselves.67 We divorce ourselves, that is, from the 
mobility and becoming that we are, and we therefore radically separate ourselves from “that 
[durational] heterogeneity which is the very ground of our experience.”68 
Fortunately, this habit of distorting durational reality on the basis of social categories 
“does not force itself upon us irresistibly; it comes from ourselves; what we have done we 
can undo; and we can enter then into direct contact with reality.”69 To achieve this, however, 
we cannot simply limit ourselves to rectifying this or that aspect of our normal thought. “You 
must take things by storm: you must thrust intelligence outside itself by an act of will.”70 That 
is, in order to “recover” the duration of which we are composed, we must seek to find ways 
of “isolating” its mobility from the homogenous space onto which our social life has projected 
it.71 As Bergson clarifies in Matter and Memory, however, this task does not consist of the 
merely “chimerical enterprise to try to free ourselves from the fundamental conditions of 
external perception.”72 To live we must perceive. But a perception based solely on our 
practical needs is not the only one possible. That is why, as Bergson puts it in Creative 
Evolution, in order to rectify the problematic tendencies of our thought, “we must accustom 
ourselves to think being directly, without making a detour (...). We must strive to see in order 
to see, and no longer to see in order to act.”73 In other words, we must seek to develop new 
ways of immediately perceiving duration in isolation from the mixture of abstraction and 
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spatialisation that it receives in our habitual, everyday experience.74 And to achieve this 
alternative perception of duration, we have no choice but to engage in “true experience [vrai 
expérience], that experience which arises from the immediate contact [contact immédiat] of 
the mind with its object”.75 It is precisely this experience that Bergson sees as being ideally 
engendered by metaphysics via its method of intuition. Having explained its necessity for 
Bergson, let us then investigate this method more closely on its own terms. 
 
1.2. The ‘method’ of intuition 
We have seen Bergson argue that though human social life is characterised by its 
problematic inability to comprehend and grasp duration, this shunning of duration that 
sociality involves is by no means irreversible. Indeed, “reversing” our separation from 
duration is precisely the task that Bergson attributes to metaphysics and its method of 
intuition.76 Before I proceed to outline the latter conception, however, let me first say a few 
words about Bergson’s own distinctive brand of metaphysics, focusing in particular on how it 
is said to differ from more traditional conceptions thereof.77 
Although the subject of metaphysics makes several appearances in Bergson’s early 
writings, it is perhaps only from 1903, with the essay “Introduction to Metaphysics”, that 
Bergson begins to explicitly clarify the stakes of his own contribution to that field.78 As that 
text insists, the mistake that traditional metaphysics—much like science—has heretofore 
made is that of attempting to explain the mobility of reality via a process of symbolical 
                                                
74 Mullarkey, 1999: 158. 
75 MM 183. 
76 “To philosophise means to reverse the normal direction of the workings of thought.” CM 106, 149. 
77 In both Time and Free Will (TFW xix, 174-175) and Matter and Memory (MM 66-68), metaphysics 
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until Creative Evolution (CE 191-192), and the 1910 “Introduction” to Matter and Memory (MM 15-16) 
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obscurities caused by habits formed in action. 
78 For an excellent introduction to this text, see: Lawlor, 2010: 24-41; CM 133-169. 
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“analysis” or representation. 79  For Bergson, these traditional enterprises have limited 
themselves to explaining reality through an immobile, conceptual “view” or “schema” of its 
flow.80 A classic example of this is the attempt by Zeno of Elea to reduce real movement to 
the series of ideal points in space through which a mobile passes.81 According to Bergson, 
this type of conceptual analysis—which works by “extracting” fixed representations from a 
mobile reality—leads traditional metaphysics to all kinds of “illusions”.82 The most pernicious 
of these is perhaps the idea that mobility can be explained via a process of aggregation or 
addition of immobiles.83 Now, in a certain sense, these types of illusions are well founded, 
insofar as the natural inclination of our intelligence is indeed to seek stability and solidity 
where there is only becoming.84 In this sense, Bergson writes, the attempts by traditional 
metaphysics and science to deploy symbolic and static categories are “perfectly natural”.85 
But these attempts ignore that this natural tendency is valid only in the context of a certain 
type of practical activity. What traditional metaphysics and science fail to grasp is that the 
knowledge they develop, far from being the truth of reality, is only the “practical knowledge” 
that the intellect develops in order to turn a “profit” from material things.86 Their knowledge is 
only the “superficial encrustment [croutê]” or “crystallisation” of a deeper, mobile reality.87 
By contrast, the “true” metaphysics that Bergson sees himself as developing not only 
begins by recognising the practical orientation that underlies all symbolical knowledge, but 
also claims to “dispense” with it altogether.88 For Bergson, a true metaphysics is not one that 
in any meaningful sense makes use of the static representations generated by the intellect: 
“it is strictly itself only when it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself of the 
                                                
79 CM 164. 
80 CM 152. 
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leads to false metaphysical problems—is one that Deleuze himself repeatedly deploys in his own 
philosophy. See for instance: DR 250. 
85 CM 5. 
86 CM 150. 
87 CM 7, 137. 
88 CM 136. 
 44 
inflexible and ready-made concepts and creates other very different from those we usually 
handle”.89 The type of knowledge that true metaphysics achieves is not, therefore, merely an 
immobile view or schema that the mind takes on reality with a view to practical activity. 
Indeed, insofar as true metaphysical knowledge does away with symbolical representation, it 
must be classified instead as a “disinterested knowledge [connaissance désintéressée]”.90 It 
is a type of knowledge that passes through no social or practical detour, and “by which one 
is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and 
consequently inexpressible in it.”91 Hence, rather than solely focusing itself on superficial 
manifestations of reality “in the form of facts side by side with other facts (…) which can to a 
certain extent be measured, and which in fact open out in the direction of distinct multiplicity 
and spatiality”, true metaphysics opens onto “a reciprocal penetration which is pure duration, 
refractory to law and measurement.”92 True metaphysics takes possession of a mobile 
reality as the latter develops itself in “depth”, and it does so without the mediation of the 
conventional social prejudices that necessarily enter into the efforts of analysis and 
measurement.93 
But if intellectual representation dominates our habitual interaction with the world, how is 
metaphysics able to “go beyond [dépasser]” this essentially human way of thinking?94 For 
Bergson, we must begin to answer this question by noting that besides the intellect, human 
beings are also composed of “another faculty capable of another kind of knowledge.”95 This 
faculty is what Bergson calls the intuition. As Creative Evolution explains, the general 
evolution of life has not produced the intellect as the exclusive capacity of humanity for 
engaging the world. Because evolution proceeds by way of the division of a generalised 
temporal impulsion—the élan vital—into divergent tendencies—like the intellect and 
instinct—each those tendencies retains a “trace” of the original creative force whence it 
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sprung, even as it continues to become increasingly differentiated from other tendencies.96 
Now, for Bergson, this means that around the intellect there is a “fringe of vague intuition 
that surrounds our distinct—that is, intellectual—representation.”97 There is a perceptual 
fringe in humanity, that is, that allows it to reconnect with the temporal force that created 
even the intellect itself.98 This fringe, furthermore, is something that “exists in each one of 
us”, but which has, by virtue of the fact that it serves no practical purpose, become “covered 
[recouverte] by functions more useful to life.”99 Nevertheless, because this fringe of intuition 
exists, and because it is also what directly links us to the temporality of life, it is via the 
intuition that a true metaphysics must seek to once again re-establish a contact with duration: 
“It is there, accordingly, that we must look for hints to expand the intellectual form of our 
thought; from there we shall derive the impetus necessary to lift us above [au-dessus] 
ourselves.”100 
Of what, then, does this intuition consist? In his second introduction to The Creative Mind, 
Bergson is keen to distinguish his own conception of intuition from that developed by 
German Idealists like Schelling and Schopenhauer, for whom the intuition is said to be “an 
immediate search for the eternal”. 101  In contrast to this, Bergson offers the following 
definition of intuition: 
The intuition we refer to then bears above all upon internal duration. It grasps [saisit] a succession 
which is not juxtaposition, a growth from within, the uninterrupted prolongation of the past into a 
present which is already blending into the future. It is the direct vision [vision directe] of the mind 
by the mind—nothing intervening [rien d’interposé], no refraction through the prism, one of whose 
facets is space and another language. Instead of states contiguous to states, which become 
words in juxtaposition to words, we have here the indivisible and therefore substantial continuity 
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of the flow of the inner life. Intuition, then, signifies first of all consciousness, but immediate 
consciousness [conscience immédiate], a knowledge [connaissance] which is contact and even 
coincidence.102 
The intuition, then, is a sort of vision or perspective that the human mind adopts on its own 
inner continuity and duration.103 Moreover, this vision is direct or immediate in the precise 
sense that it is not interspersed or contaminated with either of the prejudices that normally 
distort our relation to time—space and language.104 As such, and unlike the analysis and 
measurement that dominate traditional metaphysics and science, the intuition does not 
simply formulate a static view or schema of mobile reality.105 The knowledge provided by the 
intuition is exactly mapped onto the mobility of the real.106 Thus, by immediately coinciding 
with the flow of inner duration, the intuition places us in direct relation with precisely that 
fluidity that the intellect is only capable of reducing into symbols: “Intuition gives us the thing 
whose spatial transposition, whose metaphorical translation alone, is seized by the 
intellect.”107 
That is not to say that the intuition bears only upon internal duration. Indeed, for Bergson, 
the intuition possesses “multiple, complementary” senses.108 And crucially, beyond providing 
a direct access into inner duration, one of the additional senses of intuition is that of a 
possible sympathy with other durations.109 As Bergson rhetorically explains: 
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Does [intuition] not go even further? Is it merely the intuition of ourselves? Between our 
consciousness and other consciousnesses the separation is less clear-cut than between our 
body and other bodies, for it is space which makes these divisions sharp. (….) It may be that 
intuition opens the way for us into consciousness in general. But is it only with consciousness 
that we are in sympathy? If every living being is born, develops and dies, if life is an evolution 
and if duration is in this case a reality, is there not also an intuition of the vital, and consequently 
a metaphysics of life?110 
Clearly indicated here is the idea that the intuition is not a practice with a merely subjective 
significance. Although the intuition perhaps starts with that “one reality which we all seize 
from within”, it is also capable of acquiring a much wider object.111 Indeed, as a form of 
sympathy, the intuition also enables us “to affirm the existence of object both inferior and 
superior to us, though nevertheless in a certain sense interior to us, to make them co-
existent without difficulty”. 112  Following Deleuze, we might say that the intuition is the 
movement “by which we make use of our own duration to affirm and immediately recognise 
the existence of other durations, above or below us.”113 This means that if through the 
intuition “time is immediately given”, this time is no longer, for Bergson, simply that of the 
subject.114 By pushing the intuition to its extremity, we not only begin to directly relate 
ourselves to other living durations, but we can even coincide with that temporal impulsion 
that is creative of all life in general, with that élan vital which is “reciprocal interpenetration, 
endlessly continued creation.”115 In this sense, the intuition moves us beyond our ‘merely 
human’—or social—state precisely by immediately opening us up to a variety of other, 
fundamentally inhuman—or asocial—durations.116 
But how is this intuition of a temporality beyond the social to be reached? As Bergson 
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explains, to achieve the intuition his metaphysics directs itself to we must follow a strict 
series of methodological steps. In an initial step, we must seek to separate or disengage the 
mind from the space and language within which it is so usually at home.117 From this position, 
we must then identify what “lines of fact” suggest themselves to consciousness in isolation 
from the social prejudices that normally contaminate it.118 Only by studying these lines in 
their purity and following them all the way to their temporal origin, as it were, can we begin to 
“seek experience at its source, or rather above that decisive turn where, taking a bias in the 
direction of our utility, it becomes properly human experience.”119 And once this work is done, 
Bergson suggests, the lines of fact that were initially separated must again be reconnected 
in thought—as if by a process of “integration”—such that we can reconstitute the initial point 
of departure (that is, habitual human experience) from an altogether different perspective: 
the perspective of duration.120 Thus, it is by focusing our attention on natural tendencies—as 
they have become decoupled from social mixtures through the intuition—that we can begin 
to establish a contact with a duration that is not simply human or social “and so recover 
contact with the real.”121 As Bergson insists, however, nothing in this process is easy. 
Because the intuition must follow each of these methodological steps in direct opposition to 
our most ingrained habits of thinking, it always requires a serious and prodigious effort.122 
This effort, moreover, is never simply accomplished in one stroke. To achieve the intuition of 
duration that Bergsonian metaphysics directs itself to, we must engage not in a single, 
isolated act but rather “in an indefinite series of acts, all doubtless of the same genus”.123 
“For one does not obtain from reality an intuition, that is to say, a spiritual harmony with its 
innermost quality if one has not gained its confidence by a long comradeship with its 
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superficial manifestations.”124 
For these reasons, the intuition is also not a mere “feeling” of duration.125 Indeed, as 
Deleuze aptly puts it: “We might say, strangely enough, that duration would remain purely 
intuitive, in the ordinary sense of the word, if intuition—in the properly Bergsonian sense—
were not there as method.”126 Said differently, because each intuitive act builds upon the 
instantiation of previous acts like it, there is what we might call a methodological coherence 
that is proper to the metaphysical intuition, which also distinguishes it from the more 
inchoate feelings of duration that are continually suggested to us in lived experience. As 
Bergson insists, metaphysical intuition is not unlike science in the sense that each of its 
instantiations relies on the “collection of observations and experiences gathered by (…) [the 
previous] reflection of the mind on the mind.”127 Now, to grasp how this operation is possible, 
we must recognise that the “intuition, like all thought, finally becomes lodged in concepts 
such as duration, [and] qualitative or heterogeneous multiplicity”.128 That is to say that if the 
insights acquired by the intuition are immediate—in the sense that they do not pass through 
the social detour of language—they do nonetheless display a tendency to eventually 
become crystallised into symbolical representations that are then capable of being retained 
and communicated by the intelligence.129 Although these representations—insofar as they 
are ‘merely’ the linguistic crystallisations of a deeper reality—clearly cannot be counted as 
the immediate contact or vision of duration that the intuition seeks, they can nevertheless 
“suggest” useful reference points for future intuitive acts that do establish such immediacy.130 
In this way, although each morsel of knowledge that the intuition creates is practically 
useless, it nonetheless feeds into the further knowledge of duration that the intuition, as 
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method, will create.131 Far from being a mere familiarisation with duration that dies and is 
reborn with each intuitive act, the intuition—as a method of knowledge acquisition—
therefore draws upon a metaphysical order of knowledge that it itself has historically created. 
As Bergson himself puts it, there is a progressive character to the metaphysical intuition.132 
As a method, the intuition “consists in an interchange of impressions which, correcting and 
adding to each other, will end by expanding the humanity in us and making us even 
transcend it.”133 
Metaphysical intuition is further distinguished from mere feeling in the relations it 
entertains with science. As Bergson notes in the second introduction to The Creative Mind, 
his conception of metaphysics is not, despite appearances, strictly opposed to science.134 
For Bergson, both science and metaphysics hold equal value as attempts to describe reality: 
“They both bear upon reality itself.”135 But to retain that value, they must each stick to the 
side of reality (or of the “absolute”) that is “proper” to it: for metaphysics, this is the domain of 
spirit, for science, that of inert matter.136 Now, as Bergson explains, because there is no 
difference in value between these two enterprises, and because they each take one of the 
two sides of the absolute as their object, science and metaphysics are also capable of 
entering into a mutually productive relation: 
as mind and matter touch one another, metaphysics and science, all along their common surface, 
will be able to test one another [s’éprouver l’une a l’autre], until contact becomes fecundation 
[fécondation]. The results obtained on either side will of necessity be linked, because matter links 
up with mind. If the insertion is not perfect, it will be because there is something to rectify in our 
science, or in our metaphysics, or in both. Metaphysics will thus, by its peripheral part, exert a 
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salutary influence upon science. Conversely, science will communicate to metaphysics habits of 
precision which will spread through it from the periphery to the centre. (….) That is to say that 
science and metaphysics will differ in object and method, but will commune in experience.137 
In its communication with science, metaphysics thus receives a form of rigour and precision. 
The knowledge of duration acquired by the intuition—which might otherwise remain vague 
and inchoate, like feeling—not only finds itself ‘tested’ and ‘corrected’ by science, but also 
receives its “verification” from its material counterpart.138 We might say, through its fecund 
relation with science metaphysics receives its highest methodological expression: with 
science, the intuition is made to precisely and immediately coincide with its durational object 
whilst leaving aside any of the symbolical impediments that might otherwise interpose 
themselves between the two.139 In its relation with science, the intuition finally rises to the 
level of an immediate knowledge of duration.140 
When this process is finally achieved, when the intuition turns into the direct and 
immediate vision of duration that Bergson proposes, the knowledge of duration that it 
produces also comes to hold more than a merely epistemic value. Indeed, according to 
Bergson, when the intuition is finally reached, it can also become one of the means by which 
we enrich the domains of our lives: “Everyday life can be nourished and illuminated by it.”141 
By engaging in intuition we begin to expose ourselves to not only the difference and alterity 
of a number of other durations, but also to the temporal impulse that is creative of all life in 
general—the élan vital; in both cases, we begin to finally open ourselves to the temporality 
of the new. Furthermore, in immediately coinciding with this creative power through intuition, 
we also are carried along by its novelty: “What was immobile and frozen in our perception is 
warmed and set in motion. Everything comes to life [s’anime] around us, everything is 
revivified in us [se revivifie en nous]. A great impulse carries beings and things along. We 
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feel ourselves uplifted, carried away, borne along by it [soulevés, entraînés, portés].”142 
Slightly twisting one of Bergson’s formulations, we might say that in this particular sense the 
intuition becomes a veritable work of “differentiation”: that in establishing this immediate 
contact or vision of duration, the intuition also actively introduces temporal difference and 
novelty into our lives.143 “Hence”, as John Mullarkey has aptly put it, “intuition can act as a 
resource, the excavation of which can lead to new inventions, art forms, theories and 
emotions.”144 The intuition can become a means, that is, by which we overcome ourselves 
by introducing temporal mobility into our otherwise static modes of living.145 In a further 
sense, and insofar as life itself is composed and created by durational heterogeneity, we 
might also say that for Bergson the effort of intuition is a kind of “preparation for the art of 
living.”146 With the exception that this living will longer be constitutively determined by our 
‘merely’ social or practical impulses. It will be a form of living that derives its “strength” and 
“vitality” not from social or historical prejudice and convention, but from its immediate and 
intuitive participation “in the great work of creation which is the origin of all things and which 
goes on before our eyes.”147 It will be the living of “a mind which reinserts itself into the vital 
impetus, the generator of societies which in turn are the generator of ideas.”148 
 
1.3. The ethics and history of intuitive knowledge 
Having outlined Bergson’s conception of the intuition as the method by which humanity 
can immediately reunite itself with the temporal force of duration, we are now in a better 
position to more closely assess the ethical implications of this conception. As I began to 
strongly hint towards the end of the last section, although Bergson does not quite use that 
                                                
142 CM 131-132. 
143 “Let us say, then, (…) that one of the objects of metaphysics is to operate differentiations and 
qualitative integrations.” CM 161-162. 
144 Mullarkey, 1999: 160. 
145 For a comprehensive reading of intuitive knowledge as a form of self-overcoming, see: Kebede, 
2019: 11-50.  
146 CM 86. 
147 CM 86. 
148 CM 46. 
 53 
terminology in his metaphysical writings, there is clearly an ethical dimension to his claims 
that the intuition forms a method for opening onto the vitality of duration. If ethics is 
defined—as we defined it in the introduction to this thesis—as an openness and receptivity 
to difference, becoming, or alterity, then there is clearly something ethical in a practice that 
attempts to establish an immediate contact or direct vision of duration. Whether that intuition 
directs itself to those ‘inferior’ and ‘superior’ durations that Bergson speaks of, or, indeed, 
whether it takes aim at the great durational ‘impulse’ that carries all life along, it is clear that 
Bergsonian metaphysics positions itself as engendering an ethical exposure to the temporal 
novelty and creativity that is duration itself.149 
This ethical impulse that lies at the heart of Bergson’s conception of metaphysics has not 
gone unnoticed by many of his significant interlocutors. In an early essay entitled “Bergson’s 
Conception of Difference”, Deleuze, for example, writes that Bergson makes an “inestimable 
contribution” to philosophy with his method of intuition.150  Because this method is, for 
Deleuze, “a method that seeks difference”, Bergson’s thought distinguishes itself from that of 
his predecessors by introducing into philosophy the chance for a valorization of difference 
that goes “up to the absolute.”151 In effect, Bergson’s method presents us with a chance to 
return to things themselves and to encounter them “in person”—that is, in their internal 
difference—without representing or reducing them to something external that they are not.152 
In this sense, there is an ethical promise at the heart of Bergson’s philosophy insofar as 
ethics is, for Deleuze, precisely the movement by which thought is made to encounter a form 
of difference that is not covered over or mediated by any of the categories of identity and 
common sense.153 
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Similarly, Levinas, who defines ethics as “the Same taking the irreducible Other into 
account”, insists that Bergson’s contribution to philosophy cannot be underestimated.154 In 
his essay “The Old and the New”, Levinas asserts: 
It is important to underline the importance of Bergsonism for the entire problematic of 
contemporary philosophy; it is an essential stage of the movement which puts into question the 
ontological confines of spirituality. [Philosophy] no longer returns to the assimilating act of 
consciousness, to the reduction of all novelty—of all alterity—to what in one way or another 
thought already supported, to the reduction of every other [Autre] to the Same. (….) Priority is 
given to the relations traditional philosophy always treated as secondary and subordinate. (….) In 
this reversal—the priority of duration over permanence—there is access to novelty, an access 
independent of the ontology of the Same.155 
Like Deleuze, Levinas also identifies a concrete ethical promise in Bergson’s writings. 
Specifically, Levinas sees Bergson’s emphasis on the intuition—here understood as “the 
autonomous upsurge of an unceasing novelty before its reduction to like instants”—as at 
least providing some “valuable suggestions and encouragements” for the task of conceiving 
a truly ethical relation where the novelty and alterity of the Other is no longer reduced to the 
categories of the Same.156 
But if both Deleuze and Levinas locate an ethical promise in Bergson’s writings, there is 
also, following Levinas, perhaps some reason to question the extent to which the intuition in 
fact realises that promise. As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, alongside his 
praise of Bergson, Levinas also piercingly wonders whether the intuition in fact constitutes 
the modality “within which the alterity of the new would explode, immaculate and 
untouchable as alterity of absolute newness.”157 More accurately, Levinas asks whether 
there is not a sort of “aging of the new” involved in Bergson’s emphasis on the intuition; he 
asks whether this Bergsonian opening does not, by the very act of welcoming or opening 
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onto alterity, also strip it of its novelty.158 In short, Levinas’ concern is that there is something 
about Bergson’s intuition that prevents it from establishing an immediate relation with novelty 
where that novelty is not contained or contaminated by the dominance of the Same. This 
potential problem that Levinas identifies with Bergson is not simply, however—and as 
Mullarkey argues—that “Bergson’s philosophy of life is still too ontological for Levinas, too 
creative and active.”159 Levinas clarifies in another short essay published soon after “The Old 
and the New” that his worry relates more precisely to the question of knowledge and the 
extent to which the intuition is capable of proceeding “otherwise than according to 
knowledge,” that is, otherwise than according to a modality that reduces all temporal alterity 
to the Same and thereby divests it of its strangeness.160 Once again, Levinas bitingly asks: 
“Does Bergson go that far? Does he not introduce knowledge behind duration? Does he not 
speak, in expressing the ‘intuition of duration’ of a duration which is experienced rather than 
of a duration substituting itself for the act of experience? That is possible.”161 Once again, the 
concern is that as an enterprise of knowledge acquisition, the intuition risks or “compromises 
the novelty of the new” and allows that novelty to express itself only as a rearrangement of 
the old. 162 
Now, although, as we saw in the last section, Bergson at several points equates the 
intuition with knowledge, it is important for our purposes in this chapter that in the two texts I 
have just mentioned Levinas stops short of developing a sustained critique of Bergson on 
these points. Levinas’ objections to Bergson—if they are indeed objections—appear only in 
the form of rhetorical questions that hardly amount to a robust conclusion.163 Bearing in mind 
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that in both these texts Levinas is attempting to remind his audience of the value of a 
philosophy that has been too readily confined to the dustbins of history, this reticence to 
embark on an extended critique of Bergson is not unsurprising. 164  Unfortunately, this 
reticence is not helped by the fact that in both texts, Levinas also insists that Bergsonism 
brings an “inestimable message” against the all-encompassing tendency within Western 
philosophy to “equalise” alterity by knowledge.165  Levinas never explicitly clarifies why 
Bergson’s philosophy, despite its avowed and repeated definition of intuition as a form of 
knowledge of duration, is capable of making this contribution. For these reasons, though 
Levinas’ texts certainly point the way towards a series of potential problems with Bergson’s 
ethical conception of intuition, their equivocation can only take us so far in establishing why 
the intuition is not quite the immediate opening onto durational novelty that Bergson 
envisages. Hence, for the task that occupies us in this chapter, which is that of articulating 
the ethical feasibility of Bergson’s conception of metaphysical intuition, we are perhaps 
better served by also looking beyond the confines of Levinas’ merely suggestive texts. 
As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, another, more comprehensive critique 
of Bergson’s conception of intuitive knowledge has been developed by Max Horkheimer.166 
Inspired by Walter Benjamin’s claim that Bergson’s is a “deathless” philosophy that remains 
“estranged from history”, Horkheimer’s central contention is that Bergson’s conception of 
intuition remains unhelpfully oblivious of its own historical preconditions.167 This is not to 
suggest that there is nothing commendable in Bergson’s philosophy.168 Indeed, according to 
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Horkheimer, Bergson is to be praised in particular for his foundational theme of “real time, 
[which] is a central category of any thinking of history,” and for his deeply insightful analysis 
of how the intelligence comes to unconsciously adopt certain categories as given.169 As he 
puts it: “Bergson’s work is rich in contributions for uncovering conventional mentality in its 
emergence and thus for comprehending and sublating the reified pictures of thought in their 
dependence on human praxis.”170 In other words, by insisting that our habitual patterns of 
thought find their proper foundation in practical or living activity, Bergson helpfully clarifies 
why the representations that govern the intelligence have come to hold such importance for 
us in society. By showing that those representations always find their condition in the 
concrete ways that society re-produces its living through practical or labouring activity, 
Bergson “has x-rayed one of the most important factors which mediate the dependency of 
ideas on social praxis.”171 He has revealed that the intellectual categories that normally 
dominate our interaction with the world always find their proper condition in a historically 
determined field of actuality.172 In so doing, Bergson has also in part cleared the way for a 
type of philosophy that does not simply reify certain forms of social organisation through its 
unreflective deployment or “absolutisation of categories”.173 He has partly cleared the way 
towards a philosophy that is self-conscious with regards to the social constitution of its own 
knowledge, that is, “conscious of the process of the labour of social knowledge.”174 
But crucially, for Horkheimer, “Bergson only goes half way.”175 Despite providing these 
invaluable insights with regard to intellectual representation, Bergson also fails to submit his 
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tendencies” that, despite not being fully realised or congealed, nonetheless act as real forces 
constituting the social world. BMT 11. 
173 BMT 13. 
174 BMT 13, 16. 
175 BMT 13. 
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own notion of intuitive knowledge to the same level of scrutiny.176 Horkheimer writes: “the 
inclusion of knowledge in the historical context breaks off immediately for Bergson when it is 
no longer science that is being discussed, but metaphysics. He has not recognised that this 
is also dependent on historical conditions and exerts social functions.”177 The issue that 
emerges is that when Bergson begins to speak of intuitive knowledge as a direct and 
immediate contact with duration, he seems to forget that this knowledge too finds its 
condition of possibility in historically determined social arrangements. 178  In so doing, 
Bergson’s philosophy establishes a “myth” that there is an “outside of history (…), which is 
supposed to elude the concepts of humans and only be open to metaphysical immersion.”179 
But for Horkheimer, this myth could not be further from the truth, since both the content and 
function of thought—whether that thought is intuitive or not—are always mediated through 
history, just as they also depend on the concrete position that the thinking subject occupies 
in a given society.180 Yet, by ignoring this basic insight that all processes—including the 
process by which consciousness intuits itself and the world—always occur in the context of a 
historically determined social development, Bergson’s conception of metaphysics shows 
itself as both “antiquated” and underdeveloped.181 As Horkheimer bluntly puts it: “In relation 
to his own absolutization of an isolated moment of knowledge, [Bergson] remains naïve.”182 
On Horkheimer’s reading, this naivety in relation to history creates two central problems 
for Bergson. First, it prevents Bergson from “positing his concrete researches in a fruitful 
theoretical context.” 183 Indeed, while Bergson could have used his method of intuition to 
                                                
176 Theodore Adorno (2013: 45-47) elsewhere repeats elements of this critique of Bergson. 
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178 Echoing Horkheimer’s point here, Adorno (2013: 45-46) writes: “What Bergson calls intuition 
cannot be denied in such experience, but neither can it be hypostatized. The intuitions which 
intertwine with concepts (….) do not constitute an absolute source of knowledge, cut off from 
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181  Even Hegel, Horkheimer argues, understood that “all events, right down to their ‘spiritual’ 
bifurcation, have been co-determined in a preceding history. (….) [But] Bergson fails to connect up 
with this philosophical development, and therefore remains on a level overtaken by it.” BMT 12, 16. 
182 BMT 12; cf. Adorno, 2013: 45. 
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develop “a more differentiated knowledge of the historical context” preventing humanity from 
establishing a true contact with duration, because he fails to reflect on the necessary 
historicity of intuitive knowledge, he in fact fails to do so.184 Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, in refusing this historicity to intuitive knowledge, Bergson also fails to recognise 
that the intuition—insofar as it remains socially mediated—can itself tend towards the 
reification or replication of certain states of affairs.185 In other words, because the intuition is 
never simply an immediate and direct relation to duration, but rather a relation that is always 
mediated historically, the knowledge that it produces not only varies in relation to the social 
situations that make it possible, but also carries within it traces of those same situations—it 
also carries with it traces of the ‘old’, to once again invoke Levinas.186 Now, as Horkheimer 
explains, without recognising this necessary historical mediation, the illusion that we risk 
falling into is that of elevating a contingent and socially defined product of knowledge to one 
that is true irrespective of social context: “What Bergson calls intuition and sympathy plays 
just as much a role in thought as establishing and ordering. Nevertheless, as soon as these 
moments do not reflect themselves in their real function, changing according to the social 
situation, and instead are split up into a single and absolute method, their results become 
just so many phantasms and ideologies.”187 To avoid these problems, Horkheimer further 
argues, Bergson would have to recognise the necessary connection between intuitive 
                                                
184 The complaint that Bergson fails to ascribe a historical specificity to his method of intuition is not 
unique to Horkheimer. Similar concerns can be found in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean 
Hyppolite, with Merleau-Ponty (1964: 187-191, cf. 1970: 26-27) writing that “Bergson did not think 
about history from within as he had thought about life from within.” Hyppolite (2003: 114), for his part, 
writes that “Bergson has not developed this theme [of historical duration], and has not explicitly 
studied historical duration—human duration in general.” A.D. Lindsay (1911: 239), in his influential 
study of Bergson, makes a related, if almost inverse, point: “Bergson has unfortunately paid no 
attention to the nature of historical inquiry, but it admirably illustrates his account of intuition.” 
185 BMT 11-12. 
186 Leon ter Schure (2019: 113) briefly attempts to defend Bergson against Horkheimer’s criticisms by 
arguing that pace the latter, “Bergson’s metaphysics does not imply an adherence to eternal 
metaphysical truths.” This response, however, addresses only one aspect of Horkheimer’s critique, 
and it fails to robustly contend with the latter’s assertion that if the intuition is historically mediated, 
then it also cannot (on Bergson’s own definition of immediacy) function as the immediate contact with 
duration that Bergson envisions. 
187 BMT 17-18. Once again, Adorno (2013: 47) further clarifies the stakes here: “By passing intuitions 
off as the immediate voice of that life which nevertheless continues to live only as mediated, he 
diluted them to an abstract principle that quickly allies itself with the abstract world against which it 
had been devised.” 
 60 
thought and history, for only through that recognition can we find a way to sublate or 
overcome the tendency towards replication that is inherent to all intuitive knowledge qua 
historical. “Not the thought which prescinds from history, but the thought conscious of its 
connection with history (…) is able to manage that knowledge which ‘establishes itself in the 
movement and adopts the very life of things.’”188 Yet, it is just this that Bergson refuses to do 
by classifying the intuition as a direct and immediate contact with duration. And for 
Horkheimer, it is here, in this incapacity to tackle its own tendency towards reification or 
replication, that the second major problem with Bergson’s conception of intuitive knowledge 
lies. 
Now, insofar as Bergson himself saw something valuable in it, Horkheimer’s critique 
clearly deserves careful consideration. In a letter to Charles Bouglé written in 1935, Bergson 
thanks Horkheimer for his “fine” study, praising it especially for showing “a serious fathoming 
of my works and at the same time a very penetrating philosophical sense.”189 That said, in 
this brief response to Horkheimer, Bergson also expresses some serious reservations about 
his objections, particularly as they relate to the method of intuition: those “objections do not 
take sufficient account of the method that I have tried to introduce into metaphysics and 
which consists of (1) dividing [découper] problems according to their natural lines; and (2) 
studying each problem as if it was isolated, with the idea that (…) the solutions will be joined 
together again.”190 In effect, Bergson’s rejoinder to Horkheimer is that the latter has not 
sufficiently understood the methodological dimensions of intuition. He treats the intuition as a 
rapturous immersion in the absolute, whilst failing to heed the repeated warnings that the 
intuition is actually an effort that proceeds through a series of clearly defined methodological 
steps. And perhaps there is something to this Bergsonian retort: in his critique, Horkheimer 
                                                
188 BMT 18; CM 162. 
189 Bergson, 2002: 1491-1492. It is possible that this is only a ‘polite’ response on Bergson’s part. This 
praise does nonetheless demand that more attention be given to Horkheimer’s critique than some 
Bergson scholars—like Lundy (2013: 20), for example, who quickly dismisses it—have hitherto given 
it. 
190 Bergson, 2002: 1491-1492 (emphasis added). 
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explicitly refers to the intuition as a method only once, and then only in passing.191 This 
entails that if Horkheimer’s critique is to serve us in articulating the problems with 
Bergsonian intuition, we must also go further than he does. We must also show that, defined 
as a method, the intuition is at least susceptible to the historicisation that Horkheimer so 
strongly insists upon. For only in this way can our critical reading of Bergson do justice to the 
definition he provides for the intuition rather than simply speaking past it. 
In this context, we must begin by recalling that when Bergson defines the intuition as a 
method, he distinguishes it from mere feeling by stipulating two basic conditions for it: first, 
that the intuition is a series of efforts that possess a certain methodological coherence, and 
second, that the intuition also entertains a set of productive or fecund relations with science. 
On the first of these points, as we saw in the last section, Bergson claims that what enables 
each effortful moment of intuition to coherently relate itself to all others is the fact that the 
knowledge produced by intuition eventually gathers itself into language. As Bergson writes: 
“Whether it be intellection or intuition, thought, of course, always utilises [utilise sans doute 
toujours] language” as a means for its expression, and it is this utilisation of language that 
enables each moment of the method to suggestively relate itself to the others.192 Now, 
clearly Bergson does not see anything amiss in this reliance on or utilisation of language by 
the intuition. That is so because if each instance of intuition relies upon language—if 
“concepts are indispensable to it” as a means of expression—the intuition is still held to be 
prior to, and therefore independent of, its conceptual expression: “it is strictly itself only when 
it goes beyond the concept”.193 Even if the method of intuition relies upon a language that 
has an inherently social function, in itself, it is also irreducible to the ‘merely’ social 
significations that language necessarily carries: “it would be a strange mistake to take for a 
constitutive element of doctrine what was only the means of expressing it.”194 
Yet, on exactly this point, Horkheimer’s qualms begin to once again reassert themselves. 
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For if, as Bergson insists, the method of intuition always relies upon and utilises language, 
how can it also shelter or immunise itself from the sociality that he otherwise so strongly 
equates with the latter? Beyond a repeated reassertion that the intuition is an immediate and 
direct contact with the real, this is precisely what Bergson’s methodological reflections fail to 
explain. Perhaps, one might attempt to provide this explanation by claiming that when 
Bergson speaks of intuition utilising language, this language is not the static language of the 
intellect, but rather a fluid, flexible or mobile language that has already become informed by 
intuition.195 But crucially, this answer will still fail to clarify why a mobile language is any less 
social than a static one—something that becomes especially important when we consider 
that in Creative Evolution Bergson himself defines human language as both “mobile” and 
social.196 On this score, then, Bergson cannot have it both ways: either there is no utilisation 
of language in the method of intuition, or else that utilisation is precisely what contaminates 
the method with the domain of sociality that Bergson is so keen to isolate from metaphysics. 
Now, since Bergson himself repeatedly insists on this utilisation as a feature of the method, 
on this point we are led to agree with Horkheimer that this method cannot but be affected by 
“historical powers, which actually ‘move’ the meaning and content of [its] thoughts”.197 
Because each instance of that intuitive method relies on the ‘suggestions’ that are 
communicated to it by the linguistic crystallisations of previous intuitive instances, and 
because those crystallisations are—on Bergson’s own definition of linguistic—also social, 
the intuition can never simply shelter itself from the social and historical significations that 
are necessarily implied by the latter. As a method that utilises language, the intuition always 
undergoes a process of social or historical mediation that in turn becomes constitutive of its 
fundamental sense—even if this constitutive process of mediation is precisely what Bergson 
is unwilling to recognise in his methodological writings. 
Horkheimer’s concerns also rear their head when we consider the relation Bergson 
                                                
195 cf. CM 141. This is part of ter Schure’s (2019: 115-116) response to Horkheimer’s critique.  
196 “But what characterises the signs of human language is not so much their generality as their 
mobility (....) the intelligent sign is mobile.” CE 174. 
197 BMT 13. 
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posits between metaphysics and science. As we saw above, for Bergson, the intuition not 
only exerts a salutary influence upon science, but also receives from the latter verifications 
and habits of precision that spread from the periphery to its centre. As I phrased it above, it 
is this through this fecund interaction with science that the intuition receives its highest 
expression as a method for precisely knowing duration. Now, if we focus on these points, we 
are once again faced with a similar question: if the method of intuition receives verification 
and habits of precision from science, how does it also immunise itself against the influence 
of the social and practical domain that Bergson elsewhere so strongly equates with science? 
Given the reciprocal relation of fecundity between science and metaphysics, what is it that 
prevents the latter from, for example, operating according to the ‘natural lines’ or ‘divisions’ 
that are established and suggested to it by other scientific systems?198 Once again, it seems 
that it is only by asserting the purity of intuition against the social that Bergson is capable of 
at once holding that “metaphysics cannot get along without the other sciences” and that the 
intuition is in any case shielded from the sociality those sciences imply.199 But it is precisely 
this purity that cannot be maintained if Bergson is also intent on holding that metaphysics is 
verified and receives habits of precision from the sciences. If the intuition receives those 
habits and verification from science—if it receives them, moreover, not only at its periphery 
but also at its centre—then at its very heart the intuition is “also determined”, as we have 
already seen Horkheimer write, “by social and individual impulses and interests.”200 The 
divisions and integrations that the intuition performs, far from following the 'natural lines' of 
the real in their isolation from all social prejudice, are themselves socially determined. 
Indeed, far from being the unconditioned effort that Bergson proposes, to the extent that it 
remains an epistemic method that productively interacts with science, the intuition receives 
at least part of its constitutive sense from those practical, historical and social impulses and 
                                                
198 According to Renaud Barbaras (2010: 271, cf. 259), there is indeed a sense in which Bergson’s 
intuitive philosophy operates under the distinctions of other conceptual systems: “Bergson does not 
approach life on its own terms but instead approaches it solely from the viewpoint of the [Cartesian] 
metaphysical distinction between mind and matter.” 
199 CM 141. 
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forces that also shape and constitute its scientific counterpart.201 
But if by considering these two features of the intuitive method we find additional 
confirmation for Horkheimer’s objections to Bergson, where does this leave the latter’s 
central claim that the intuition provides a direct and immediate knowledge of duration? In 
effect, given that the intuition is a coherent epistemic method that is held together by its 
relation to both language and science, on each occasion, the knowledge that it produces is 
never simply the purely “disinterested knowledge” that Bergson holds.202 Indeed, because 
the intuition finds its “methodological thread” in the relations it entertains with both science 
and language, the knowledge that it creates is also, to once again quote Horkheimer, 
“dependent on historical conditions and exerts social function.”203 The knowledge of duration 
provided by the intuition also has a domain of actuality as its point of support.204 It thus not 
only finds part of its sense in a determined social and historical situation, but also 
necessarily emerges as a contingent expression or reflection of that same situation. In this 
way, we cannot assert, as Bergson repeatedly does, that intuitive knowledge is an 
unrefracted or unmediated contact whose fundamental sense is entirely “freed from those 
conditions of time and place” that determine scientific knowledge or living perception more 
generally.205 Indeed, because intuitive knowledge always finds itself essentially related to a 
determined social field, the contact that it establishes with duration is never purely 
immediate; it never manages to entirely isolate itself from what Bergson dismisses as the 
habits necessary for everyday living.206 Instead, the intuition is a contact with duration that 
always carries within itself traces of the actual domain wherein it arises, and is thus always 
                                                
201 As Barbaras (2006: 54) writes by way of comparison between Bergson and Merleau-Ponty: 
“Henceforth, we cannot, in principle, circumscribe a field of being short of the decisive turn and 
separate the order of intuition from that of action, because the turn has always already been made, 
because experience is originarily production, so that the prehumen or the pretheoretical is not 
something with which one can coincide.” 
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mediated, interposed and constituted by exactly that sociality that Bergson is so keen to 
isolate from ‘true’ metaphysics. 
This also entails that if the intuition is defined as a work of ‘differentiation’, that is, as an 
effort that actively introduces difference and novelty into our lives by establishing a contact 
with the mobility of duration, then that differentiation too cannot be purely or exclusively 
animated by the “great impulse” that carries all life along, as Bergson says.207 Indeed, on this 
point, Bergson is correct to note that in the same way that a gust of wind carries with it “dust 
taking a particular form”, so too, the movement or impulse that is established by an intuitive 
contact with duration always carries with it static elements that “it has collected along its 
way”.208 But what we must recognise here, pace Bergson, is that if the intuition is mediated 
historically due to its relations to language and science, then the static elements that it 
encounters along the way are not merely dispensable or irrelevant aspects its movement. It 
is not the case, to continue Bergson’s metaphor, “that other bits of dust might have as well 
been raised and that it would still have been the same whirlwind.”209 Indeed, if the intuition 
interacts with language and science in the way that Bergson describes, then the movement 
and difference that it creates also finds itself affected by the social debris that it encounters 
along the way; that debris becomes a constitutive feature of the movement itself.210 As such, 
the movement that is engendered by the intuition is never a coincidence with a pure 
durational novelty—if we follow Bergson in understanding that novelty as the unmixed and 
“moving originality of things [la mouvant originalité des choses].”211 We might say, once 
again invoking Levinas, that if the intuition is socially situated, then the movement it 
engenders is indeed less an “immaculate and untouchable” novelty than a novelty that 
always carries within itself traces of the “old”, or which gives itself to the intuitive subject only 
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208 This metaphor appears in Bergson’s 1911 lecture on “Philosophical Intuition” to suggest that a 
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by also retaining aspects of the social and historical domain that it necessarily traverses.212 
In this way, if, as Bergson argues, the intuition can ethically enrich our lives by 
introducing into them temporal novelty and difference, then it does so not purely in function 
of the immediate contact it establishes with the temporal principle of life itself, but also in 
function of its own constitutive immersion or implication in a given social and historical field. 
In the knowledge of duration that it produces, the intuition always retains traces of the 
historical field of actuality from which it attempts precisely to divest or isolate itself. This 
historical implication entails that as an ethical method for knowing or aligning human beings 
with the novelty of duration, the intuition can itself also reify or replicate some of the 
ideological tendencies and phantasms that form part of its surrounding domains of actuality. 
That is to say that insofar as it remains dependent on historical conditions, the intuition itself 
exerts social functions that are not ultimately or neatly separable from that social and 
historical field that Bergson so strongly considers to be a barrier to an enlivening or ethical 
contact with time. Far from necessarily relating us to a temporal depth without the mediation 
of social prejudices, the intuition, insofar as it remains implicated with history, can even be 
said to function as one of the very means by which those prejudices are continued and 
extended. Yet, it is just this that Bergson refuses to acknowledge by repeatedly casting the 
intuition as an immediate contact or vision of duration. And it is here that history becomes a 
problem to be resolved in Bergson’s temporal ethics. If the intuition can replicate those 
social or historical prejudices that Bergson so strongly equates with our habitual separation 
from duration, then the intuition’s implication with history becomes a problem that a temporal 
ethics seeking to relate itself to the temporality of the new must seek to resolve. Once again, 
however, it is precisely this problem that Bergson’s metaphysical writings neither can nor are 
willing to recognise and resolve with their repeated insistence that the intuition functions 
wholly outside or beyond our given social and historical fields of actuality.  
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1.4. Conclusion: the problem of history 
I have argued in this chapter that the ethical method of intuition cannot, pace Bergson’s 
own claims, operate as an unmediated or immediate opening onto duration. Because at its 
constitutive level that method always entertains relations with science and language, it 
cannot entirely immunise itself from the historical impulses that permeate those two social 
formations. Concretely, this means that the intuition, and the knowledge of duration it 
produces, will always carry within itself traces of its surrounding social and historical world. 
Indeed, far from necessarily opening onto the novelty of duration, insofar as it remains 
implicated with history, the intuition can itself tend towards the reification or replication of 
contingent, social and historical states of affairs. 
Now, given that Bergson himself strongly considers social and historical impulses as 
impediments to a true or immediate contact with the novelty of duration, this implication 
between the intuition and the historical, I have also argued, clearly emerges in his 
metaphysical writing as a problem to be resolved. If society and its history are what normally 
separate us from duration, and if the intuition is itself contaminated by history and society, 
then evidently we need to find a means of dissociating that ethical method—or, indeed, 
temporal ethics itself—from those aspects of our lives that usually or habitually separate us 
from temporal novelty. For only through such dissociation, it would seem, could we truly 
maintain the chance of ethically relating ourselves to the new. 
As I indicated in the introduction to this thesis, a resolution to this problem, which is 
indeed a problem of history, can, broadly speaking, take one of two forms. We either find an 
ethical modality for relating ourselves to time that is not implicated with history—as 
Bergson’s metaphysical intuition is—and we accept that perhaps Bergson has not quite 
gone far enough in separating his own temporal ethics from history. Or, we accept that our 
ethical modality for reconnecting with the novelty of time will always remain constitutively 
implicated with history and, in recognition of this fact, also devise a strategic practice for 
negotiating the tendencies towards reification and replication that follow from that 
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constitutive implication between temporal ethics and the historical. 
As I also noted in my introduction to this thesis, if Levinas’ and the early Deleuze’s work 
can be seen as taking up the first of these options for resolving the problem of history that 
emerges in Bergson’s metaphysical writings, the second option seems to be taken up by 
Bergson himself in The Two Sources. Indeed, in that text, Bergson appears to precisely 
historicise his conception of intuition by extensively reflecting on the “support” that the 
intuition (now understood in its mystical guise) can receive from decidedly social and 
historical factors like mechanism and static religion.213 Now, if The Two Sources historicises 
the intuition, then perhaps it also provides a successful resolution to what I have here called 
the problem of history. Perhaps Bergson himself finds a way of negotiating the tendencies 
towards reification and replication that follow from the intuition's involvement with history. But 
is this resolution actually provided in The Two Sources, or does Bergson there continue to 
uphold the primacy and purity of intuition against all history? This is the next chapter’s 
central question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
213 TSMR 309. This historicisation is precisely what the early Deleuze (2004b: 41) finds significant in 
The Two Sources, even if he also warns that we should not overplay its importance: “This text is all 
the more important since it is one of the few in which Bergson accords a specificity to the historical 
with respect to the vital. (….) True, the function of this historical consciousness of difference should 
not be exaggerated. According to Bergson, more than providing something new, it liberates what is 
already there.” 
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2. Bergson II: towards a historicisation of the intuition in The Two 
Sources? 
The last chapter argued that Bergson’s metaphysical intuition remains constitutively 
implicated with socio-historical factors. I also argued that this implication presents a problem 
for Bergson’s philosophy, one that his metaphysical writings are ultimately incapable of 
resolving due to their repeated insistence that the intuition is isolatable from any such 
constitutive involvement with the social. Nevertheless, as I also hinted in conclusion to the 
last chapter, we would not be doing justice to Bergson by maintaining that his thought is 
exclusively guided by a tendency to isolate the intuition from the social. Indeed, while this 
impulse certainly dominates Bergson’s metaphysical writings, his penultimate major work, 
The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, also contains many assertions that together can 
be seen as formulating an alternative tendency. 
In that work, Bergson attempts to show how the intuition—now understood as a certain 
type of mystical experience—can contribute towards the creation of an “open society” that is 
inherently receptive to the temporal force of the new.1 In this new mystical role, the intuition’s 
function is no longer limited to the acquisition of knowledge of duration.2 The intuition now 
begins to play a social or political role as that which enables agents to supersede the 
“closed” or instinctive attachment to moral obligation and religion that has hitherto dominated 
the natural history of humanity. Perhaps more importantly for my focus in this thesis, though 
these intuitive exercises remain understood as “leaps” beyond human history, they are now 
also defined as being in a certain sense dependent on the very history that they attempt to 
surpass.3 More precisely, for Bergson, the mysticism of open societies can be successful 
only if it deploys all-too-human forces, like mechanism, as its support: “Man will rise 
[soulèvera] above earthly things only if a powerful equipment supplies him with the point of 
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support [point d’appui]. He must use matter as a support if he wants to get away from it.”4 In 
these two senses, then, it appears that Bergson’s penultimate work goes much further than 
his metaphysical writings in recognising the reciprocal dependency between the intuition and 
the social. At the very least, that text appears to tend towards another—more thoroughly 
historicised—understanding of the way the intuition operates in relation to its social 
conditions.5 
But does The Two Sources in fact actualise this tendency? Does Bergson go as far as 
maintaining that intuitive mystical experience is constitutively vivified by society, or does that 
experience’s essential force continue to come from elsewhere? This is the question that I 
want to pose in this chapter. This question is crucial, I contend, because only by answering it 
can we decide whether The Two Sources in fact provides an adequate resolution to the 
problem of history that arises in Bergson’s metaphysical writings. If by historicising the 
intuition The Two Sources goes beyond the scope of those writings, then perhaps it also 
offers us valuable suggestions for successfully negotiating the dangerous tendencies that 
can arise from the intuition's constitutive involvement history. However, and despite 
Bergson’s aforementioned claims on mechanism, it remains unclear whether this 
historicisation of the intuition is actually delivered in The Two Sources. The suspicion that it 
is not is initially suggested by Bergson’s repeated claims that it is possible for mystical 
experience to acquire a sense that falls “outside [dehors]” of all socio-historical coordinates.6 
It is deepened by that fact that, while Bergson at several points reminds us that there is 
seldom any purity between mysticism and socio-historical factors, that purity is nonetheless 
sometimes said to be “actually attained.”7 This suggests that though determined social 
forces (like mechanism and static religion) can certainly assist the “success” of mysticism, 
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that assistance is perhaps also not as constitutive to the essential force and sense of the 
latter as some of Bergson’s other claims might lead us to believe.8 
Now, in this chapter, I want to argue that despite that making this thought possible, The 
Two Sources falls short of ascribing to socio-historical factors a constitutive role in the 
practice of intuitively opening oneself to life’s temporal force. As I seek to show, for Bergson, 
although social forces can certainly aid the “diffusion” or “dissemination” of mysticism across 
human societies, the essential sense of mystical experience continues to be derived from 
“elsewhere”.9 Mystical experience continues to be understood in terms of the fundamental 
and immediate relation that human beings are capable of entertaining with the vital impetus 
of life itself—the élan vital. And for Bergson, the crucial aspect of this vital relation is that it 
takes place “beneath” or “below” the “stratifications” of society and history.10 Rather than 
engaging time on the basis of the forms of actuality that surround them, mystics are 
therefore said to intuitively experience vital forces only by going “beyond these 
manifestations”.11 As such, rather than developing a more historicised understanding of how 
we might ethically relate ourselves to the novelty of time, the description of mystical 
experience that emerges in The Two Sources in fact remains fundamentally aligned with the 
ahistorical tendencies of Bergson’s earlier metaphysical writings. In this sense, I contend, 
The Two Sources fails to provide an adequate resolution to the problem of history that arises 
in Bergson’s metaphysical writings.  
I make this argument in three stages. I begin, in section one, by providing a brief outline 
of Bergson’s account of closed societies. In section two, I turn my focus to his account of 
open societies, paying particular attention to the intuition’s role in fostering those alternative 
forms of social organisation. In section three, I concentrate on Bergson’s account of the 
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10 The Two Sources repeatedly describes mystical experience as a search for life that consists of 
digging beneath the stratifications of society: “it has been given only to a chosen few to dig down, first 
beneath the strata of the acquired then beneath nature, and so get back into the very impetus of life.” 
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relation between the intuition and two of the main historical stratifications of closed 
societies—static religion and mechanism—to argue that Bergson’s conception of intuition in 
The Two Sources remains essentially ahistorical. I conclude by reflecting on the implications 
this raises for a resolution of what I have thus far called the problem of history. 
 
2.1. The first source of ethics: closed society 
Bergson begins The Two Sources by providing an extensive account of how obligation 
has become instituted in human societies. Against the moral rationalism of thinkers like Kant, 
for whom moral rules of conduct necessarily follow from the a priori workings of reason, 
Bergson contends that obligation is in the first instance derived from habit.12 As he writes, it 
is impossible to live in society with others without in some way engaging in habitual patterns 
of activity: “From the first standpoint, social life [la vie sociale] appears to us as a system of 
more or less deeply rooted habits, corresponding to the needs of the community.”13 Taken in 
their isolation, each of these habits possesses a relatively limited power to influence the life 
of human beings.14 But because all habits correspond to the needs of a particular community, 
they display a natural tendency to mutually support one another: “they all hang together, 
they form a solid block.”15 Taken in their totality, habits can thus become a powerful force in 
the lives of human beings. To depart from one habitual form of activity, individuals have to 
come up against the combined strength of all social forces.16 And for Bergson, it is as a 
function of this combined force of habit that individuals first feel themselves morally 
obligated.17 The totality of habits “exerts a pressure on our will”, and that explains why we 
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14 Marrati, 2006: 595-596. 
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16 TSMR 14. 
17 As Ansell-Pearson (2018: 117) points out, in making this claim “Bergson is not denying that reason 
intervenes as a regulator to assure consistency between rules and maxims but claiming that [to think 
of obligation purely in rational terms] oversimplifies what is actually taking place in the becoming of a 
moral agent.” 
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feel ourselves compelled to act in certain ways. 18  Far from being determined by the 
requirements of an abstract reason, obligation thus derives from the pressure that the totality 
of habits exerts on human beings: “here you have the totality of obligation for a simple, 
elementary, moral conscience.”19 
For Bergson, this force that habit imposes on human communities is somewhat akin to 
the role that instinct plays in insect societies.20 Just like an ant necessarily and ceaselessly 
works for the good the anthill, so too, the totality of habits seemingly imposes on human 
individuals the necessity to act in ways that uphold the framework of their community.21 
When human beings largely follow this apparent necessity of social obligation, they can be 
said to occupy a “closed” society.22 As Bergson describes them, closed societies are partly 
defined by the work their members perform in upholding a particular form of social 
organisation. In such societies, the individual “is part and parcel of society; he and it are 
absorbed together in the same task of individual and social preservation.”23 This entails that 
closed societies display a strong natural tendency towards stability and invariability. 
Although they can, and most certainly do, undergo changes throughout the course of history, 
they remain in their essential aspect enchained to the task of communal self-preservation.24 
It is, moreover, in terms of this tendency towards collective self-preservation that individuals 
in closed societies come to grasp not only themselves, but also their relation to other 
individuals. As Bergson writes, this type of attachment to the social in a certain sense 
describes our condition as human beings: “Each of us belongs as much to society as to 
himself (….) and it is on the surface, at the point where it inserts itself into the close-woven 
tissue of other exteriorised personalities, that our ego generally finds its point of attachment; 
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its solidity lies in this solidarity.”25 That is not to say that closed society is the only place to 
which subjectivity is capable of attaching itself. In the depths of “our innermost selves, if we 
know how to look for it, we may perhaps discover another sort of equilibrium, still more 
desirable than the one on the surface.”26 For the most part, however, our participation in 
society requires us to relate to ourselves on the basis of the closed interests of our 
community: “To cultivate this social ego is the essence of our obligation to society.”27 And it 
is thus that human life can be said to resemble the life of insect societies. 
As Bergson variously insists, however, we cannot overestimate this comparison between 
human and insect societies. Although these two forms of organisation both actualise a 
“vague ideal” towards social life that inheres in nature itself, there nonetheless remain 
important differences between them.28 Most markedly, whereas insect societies are dictated 
by instinct, human societies are governed by the intelligence. And as Bergson maintains, it 
would be a “great mistake” to consider the cohesive and obligatory character of closed, 
human societies as a by-product of instinct.29 To do so would be to neglect that “in an hive or 
an ant-hill the individual is riveted to his task by his structure, and the organisation is 
relatively invariable, whereas the human community is variable in form, open to every kind of 
progress.”30 To conceive social habit or obligation instinctively would be to ignore that where 
individual insects have a very limited field of autonomy vis-à-vis their community, “individual 
humans have a great deal of social autonomy, and as a result humans can use their 
intelligence to construct a wide range of divergent social systems.”31 Hence, the social 
pressure human beings face is not, despite appearances, an actual necessity.32 By virtue of 
their natural intelligence, human beings always retain a margin of freedom to diverge from 
                                                
25 TSMR 14-15. 
26 TSMR 14-15. 
27 TSMR 15. 
28 TSMR 27. 
29 True, obligation and habit function as a kind of “virtual instinct” in human societies. But this virtuality 
operates, we will see shortly, only through the intelligence. TSMR 28, 100. 
30 TSMR 27-28. 
31 Bogue, 2007: 92; TSMR 266. 
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the demands that social habit and obligation impose on their existence.33 Thus, although the 
intelligence normally operates to maintain those two social forces, in certain circumstances, 
it can also act as a “dissolvent power” in relation to them.34 The flexibility that the intelligence 
introduces can thus also become a cause of instability for the cohesiveness of closed human 
societies.35 
If the cohesion of closed societies is nonetheless actually maintained, this is because 
something in them counter-acts the intelligence’s tendency towards social instability. In 
closed societies, this is precisely the role of static religion. As Bergson explains, one of the 
main functions of religion in closed societies is that of preventing individuals from diverging 
from society’s natural interest in cohesion, stability and closure. Similarly, that religion also 
prevents individuals from focusing too strongly on the inevitability of their own death, just as 
it ensures the continuity between individual action and the effect desired by it.36 Now, to 
achieve these aims, static religion cannot rely upon instinct, for due to the natural course of 
evolution, instinctive forces no longer “directly” affect human beings.37 Instead, static religion 
has had to find ways to deploy the intelligence against itself by creating representations 
that—despite also being of an intellectual origin—are nonetheless capable of tempering the 
anti-social impulses of individual intellectual acts.38 In other words, static religion has had to 
deploy a “myth-making function [fonction fabulatrice]” in order to create illusory or imaginary 
representations that nonetheless have real effects on individual conduct: “failing real 
experience, a counterfeit of experience had to be conjured up.”39 For Bergson, this is how 
religious phenomena as diverse as taboo, mythology and magic must be understood. Rather 
than finding their specificity in given historical or cultural imperatives, such phenomena are 
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merely the surface “manifestations” of a deeper attempt by nature to bind individuals to 
society through a turning of the intelligence against itself.40 Or, as Bergson puts it, the static 
religion of closed societies is “a defensive reaction of nature against what might be 
depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for society, in the exercise of intelligence.”41 
Static religion is one of the means by which closed societies naturally maintain themselves 
as closed, and its products are nothing more than “representations formed naturally by 
intelligence, by way of safeguarding itself, through certain beliefs, against certain dangers of 
[intellectual] knowledge.”42 In this way, we can define closed societies as having two main 
features. First, those societies are defined by the moral pressure that they impose on 
individuals through social obligation. This pressure, which follows directly from natural force 
of habit, is one that compels individuals to continually work—both in their relations with 
themselves and others—towards the common interests of their community. Secondly, those 
societies are also defined by their static religiosity, which, in a similar way, also naturally 
binds individuals to society. Bergson summarises it thus: “This religion, which we have 
called static, and this obligation, which is tantamount to a pressure, are the very substance 
of closed society.”43 
Now, for Bergson, it is important to recognise that though closed societies are natural, 
they by no means provide human individuals with the capacity to engage with the principle 
that is generative of life itself—that is, the élan vital. As Bergson had already explained in 
Creative Evolution, when humanity engages with the world on the basis of the intelligence, it 
displays a “natural inability to comprehend life.”44 Because it works by representing the 
fundamental mobility of life as a series of distinct states, and because it engages with the 
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future only on the basis of the solidities that it can expect and anticipate, the intelligence, 
unlike instinct, finds itself unable to engage “the generative force of life.”45 Returning to The 
Two Sources, we see that the intelligence's dual maintenance of the habitual pressure of 
moral obligation and the illusory representations of static religion also carries with it certain 
ethical consequences. By remaining within the confines of closed societies, human 
individuals find themselves restricted in their capacity for engaging with life’s temporal 
impulse.46 In closed societies, their “attachment to life” always passes through the detour of 
closed society.47 “Static religion, such as we find it when it stands alone, attaches man to life, 
and consequently individual to society, by telling him tales on par with those with which we 
lull children to sleep.”48 Within the confines of closed societies, individuals thus engage with 
life’s creative impetus only on the basis of those intellectual representations that also solidify 
and distort that impetus’ temporal novelty. In this sense, the individuals of closed societies 
remain disconnected from the openness and becoming of life itself: “At once individual and 
social, the soul here moves round in a circle. It is closed.”49 
 
2.2. The second source of ethics: life 
We have seen Bergson claim that one of the two sources of morality consists of the 
natural demands towards self-preservation that closed societies impose upon individuals 
through the combined forces of habit and static religion. We have also seen that these social 
forces effectively divorce humanity from the generative impulse of life itself, and that they 
thus prevent individuals from grasping time “as it really is—uninterrupted creation, the 
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moral obligation not only fundamentally determine our "attention to life" (MM xvii-xix, 173-174). In 
doing so through the intelligence, those habitual social forces also operate as a "diminishing" of our 
perceptive contact with time (45). cf. ME 5. 
47 For an informative account of Bergson’s notion of “attachment to life”, see: Lapoujade, 2018: 59-80. 
48 TSMR 210. 
49 TSMR 38. 
 78 
uninterrupted up-surge of novelty.”50 Now, as Bergson clarifies in the final chapter of The 
Two Sources, this exploration of closed societies would be of “little practical utility if closed 
society had always been so constituted as to shut itself up again after each momentary 
opening.”51 In other words, from an ethical point of view, there would be little to gain from 
defining closed societies if human experience did not also present individuals with a capacity 
for living otherwise than habit and static religion in relation to the temporality of life. 
Fortunately, as Bergson notes, what singles out humanity from the rest of the animal 
kingdom is precisely its capacity for freedom and change in relation to habitual social 
forces.52 Or, as Deleuze writes of Bergson: “man is capable of scrambling the planes [plans], 
of going beyond his own plane as his own condition.”53 And in this factor rests humanity’s 
potential for living beyond the habitual confines of closed societies. By cultivating its rapport 
with the forces of life, humanity can find another means of living; it can find another, more 
dynamic morality that is more closely connected with the temporal force of life in general.54 
For Bergson, we can begin to see how humanity is capable of transcending its condition 
in closed societies by noting that human beings are not necessarily bound to engage with 
the world on the basis of the intellect. We saw a variation of this argument in chapter one, 
where Bergson claimed that beyond the intelligence, humanity is also capable of engaging 
time through the intuition. In The Two Sources, Bergson takes a slightly different route (even 
if, as we will see shortly, this new route remains aligned with the thought of metaphysical 
intuition). There, Bergson insists that beneath and before the operation of intellectual 
representations, human beings are also capable of being affected by feeling (sentiment) or 
emotion (émotion). For Bergson, nothing exemplifies this fact better than the act of listening 
to music: “We feel, while we listen, as though we could not desire anything else but what the 
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music is suggesting to us”.55 In this experience, there is no practical impulse, reflection or 
analysis that mediates our relation to the feelings that are expressed by a musical piece. We 
are “introduced” into those feelings directly, as it were, and it is only “through excess of 
intellectualism that feeling is made to hinge on an object and that all emotion is held to be 
the reaction of our sensory faculties to an intellectual representation.”56 Now, on the basis of 
this example, Bergson contends that we must in fact distinguish between two different types 
of human emotion, or two varieties of feeling by which human beings can become affected: 
In the first case the emotion is the consequence of an idea, or of a mental picture; the ‘feeling’ is 
indeed the result of an intellectual state which owes nothing to it (…). It is the stirring of sensibility 
by a representation, as it were, dropped into it. But the other kind of emotion is not produced by a 
representation which it follows and from which it remains distinct. Rather it is, in relation to the 
intellectual states which are to supervene, a cause [cause] and not an effect [effet]; it is pregnant 
with representations, not one of which is actually formed, but which it draws or might draw from it 
its own substance by an organic development. The first is infra-intellectual (…). But of the other 
we should be inclined that it is supra-intellectual (…): it is just as much a question of priority in 
time [antériorité dans le temps], and of the relation between that which generates [engendre] and 
that which is generated [engendré]. Indeed, the second kind of emotion can alone be generative 
[génératrice] of ideas.57 
If there are two types of emotion, they are clearly not of the same status. One of those 
emotions, the “creative emotion”, is both prior to, and generative of, the emotion that is 
capable of being conveyed by intellectual representation.58 As it follows a process of organic 
development, this creative emotion does, to be sure, tend to become materialised, 
incorporated or even crystallised into intellectual representations.59 But it becomes involved 
with intellectual representations in this way only insofar as it also remains the vital cause 
(and not the effect) of those same representations. As Bergson writes a couple of pages 
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later: “It is the [creative] emotion above all which vivifies [vivifie], or rather vitalises [vitalise], 
the intellectual elements with which it is destined to unite”.60 Crucially, moreover, this type of 
emotion, despite being prior to intellectual representations, is not simply an ideal limit 
towards which human experience continually tends. Just like the intuition is in principle 
accessible as a faculty to everyone, so too, Bergson contends, almost “anyone” can “feel the 
difference between an intelligence left to itself and that which burns with the fire of an 
original and unique emotion”.61 Thus, although individuals in closed societies most generally 
act in accordance with intellectual representations, they are all, nonetheless, also capable of 
being moved by another force. They are also capable of being directly affected by an 
impulse or emotion that is the very cause of intellectual representations themselves. 
True, for Bergson, this immediate experience of creative emotion still requires a 
sustained “effort” on the part of individuals.62 It is also the case that the majority of people fail 
to attain this effort. Nevertheless, since the potentiality for an immediate experience of 
creative emotion exists, “it was not impossible that some [individuals], specially gifted, 
should reopen that which was closed and do, at least for themselves, what nature could not 
possibly have done for mankind.”63 Put differently, what the experience of creative emotion 
heralds for humanity is a break from the circle of natural tendencies that constitute closed 
societies. Beyond the static morality and religiosity of closed societies, the creative emotion 
signals a very different type of social organisation, one that is more closely aligned with the 
creative impetus of emotion and which is thus more closely “attached [rattache] to life in 
general”.64 
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This alternative form of social organisation is what Bergson calls the open society. In 
contrast to closed societies, the open society is not primarily structured around the pressure 
of habit. As Bergson clarifies, though there is still something of moral obligation in the open 
society, that obligation is no longer simply the effect of the combined force of habitual forms 
of social activity. Instead, in the dynamic morality of the open society, “obligation is the force 
of an aspiration or an impetus, of the very impetus which culminated in the human species, 
in social life, in a system of habits which bears a resemblance more or less to instinct”.65 Put 
differently, dynamic morality receives its moral direction from the temporality of life itself. If 
its individuals feel themselves moved to act in a certain way, this is because the direction for 
this activity is set by their direct exposure to that creative impetus which is generative of the 
“merely social” manifestations of closed societies.66 Rather than merely going around in the 
circle of obligation and static religiosity, individuals in the open society thus feel themselves 
carried by “the enthusiasm of a forward movement”; they begin to feel and act in accordance 
with the very “progress” of the élan vital.67 In this way, the natural impulses towards social 
cohesion and self-preservation no longer drive the morality of the open society forward. 
Neither can it be said that dynamic morality remains defined by the ready-made or 
intellectual representations that constitute static forms of religiosity. As Deleuze puts this 
point: “This [morality] no longer has anything to do with the pressures of society, nor with the 
disputes of the individual. It no longer has anything to do with an individual who contests or 
even invents, nor with a society that constrains, that persuades or even tells stories.”68 In an 
open society, it is life itself, understood as the élan vital, that operates as the source of 
ethics: “the primitive impetus here comes into play directly [directement], and no longer 
though the medium [l’intermédiaire] of the mechanisms it had set up, and at which it had 
provisionally halted.”69 
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Bergson specifies the content of the aspiration that propels the open society in terms of a 
love for humanity.70 This love cannot be reduced to the social solidarity that pervades closed 
societies. In closed societies, social solidarity always has a determinate object as its point of 
focus: “a people, a nation, a community, and so on.”71 Moreover, the distinctions between 
such objects are always carved up in function of those societies’ interest in self-preserving 
activity. By contrast, the solidarity that is established in the open society, because it is 
directly propelled by a creative impulse that admits of no such distinctions, takes a much 
wider ‘object’ as its focal point.72 This solidarity extends to the whole of humanity, and it may 
even, Bergson claims, “extend to animals, to plants, to all nature.”73 Now, for Bergson, the 
important point to grasp here is that this love for humanity is not generated by a quantitative 
process of expansion: we do not arrive at a love of humanity by merely broadening out the 
circles of the family and the social groups to which we naturally belong.74 As he writes, an 
individual’s attachment to “the family and the social group are the only ones ordained by 
nature, the only ones corresponding to instinct”, but the “love of humanity is a very different 
thing. It is not the extension of an instinct.”75 The love of humanity, which is also a form of 
“fraternity”, consists of “a leap beyond nature [bond hors de la nature]”.76 More accurately, it 
consists of a leap beyond nature as it has already become constituted, solidified or stratified 
as the manifestations of closed societies: “in passing from social solidarity to the 
brotherhood of man, we break with one particular nature, but not with all nature. It might be 
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said, by slightly distorting the terms of Spinoza, that it is to get back to natura naturans that 
we break away from natura naturata.”77 
This emphasis on the love of humanity also reveals that the difference between open 
and closed societies is not one of degree but one of kind. As Bergson writes, “between the 
society in which we live and humanity and general there is, we repeat, the same contrast as 
between the closed and the open; the difference between the two objects is one of kind and 
not simply one of degree.”78 More concretely, though both of these types of societies operate 
under the guidance of ideals and principles that are in language the same (such as, for 
example, “charity” and “justice”), the force that sustains them is in each case radically 
different.79 In closed societies, as repeatedly noted, it is the force of natural society that 
determines how an ideal will become socially or politically established. That ideal is received 
via natural means as a ready-made concept, and what is left out of this process is precisely 
the vital force of the new.80 In the open society, by contrast, the application of political 
principles does not consist of a repetition of the old. Because that application is in each 
instance invigorated and driven forward by the force of the élan vital, the result is always the 
creation of a “new social atmosphere” where humanity is itself stamped with a renewed 
vitality.81 Rather than being determined by the “state of mind of a society at a given period of 
its history”, in the open society humanity becomes progressively determined in function of 
the vital process of production of the new.82 And once again, the difference here is not one 
of degree: “The two things are not of the same essence.”83 
But given that for Bergson we mostly inhabit closed societies, and given that the natural 
impulses of those societies are generally “co-extensive” with the structure of our species, 
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how can we make the qualitative transition from the closed to the open?84 How can we begin 
to inhabit an open society that is more receptive and welcoming of the temporal force of the 
new? On Bergson’s reading, as I have already hinted, although a direct exposure to the élan 
vital is in principle accessible to everyone, it remains the case that, at least initially, the 
transition between the closed and the open must be engendered by the efforts of a few 
“exceptional” individuals.85 These individuals are classified by The Two Sources as mystics. 
On this account, mystics are those individuals who are capable of engendering “the 
establishment of a contact [contact], consequently of a partial coincidence [coïncidence 
partielle], with the creative effort which life itself manifests.”86 Put differently, mystics are 
those human individuals who are capable of raising themselves above the intellectual and 
habitual representations of closed societies, to engage with that creative or vital emotion that 
is the generative force of all life in general. True mystics, Bergson claims, directly expose 
themselves to the élan vital, and they thereby experience its force “in its immediacy 
[d’immédiat], apart [dehors] from all interpretation.”87 “True mystics simply open [ouvrent 
simplement] their souls to the oncoming wave.”88 Moreover, it is through this process of 
opening—through this immediate coincidence that mystics establish with the élan vital 
beyond the representations of closed societies—that they become capable of bringing about 
a spiritual change in the condition of humanity.89 In effect, by establishing an immediate 
contact with the temporal impetus of life, mystics create themselves as points of rupture and 
openness for the closure of closed societies.90 They begin to invigorate those societies with 
the powers of time, and it is through their “genius” that “the impetus of life, traversing matter, 
wrests from it, for the future of the species, promises such as were out of the question when 
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the species was being constituted.”91 It is through the medium of mystical souls that closed 
societies become open and finally begin to express, through the ever-forward movement 
that the élan vital now brings to bear upon them, the very force of the new.92 
But how is this direct experience of the élan vital reached by mystical souls? How are 
mystical souls able to divorce themselves from those intellectual representations or 
interpretations that bind them to closed societies? On Bergson’s account, this process finds 
at least part of its possibility in in the fringe of intuition that lingers around the intelligence.93 
As Bergson explains with reference to his earlier writings, if the intuition is capable of playing 
a role in allowing us to “realise the continuity of our inner life, a deeper intensification might 
carry it to the roots of our being, and thus to the very principle of life in general. Now, is this 
not precisely the privilege of the mystical soul?”94 A few pages later, Bergson provides a 
more direct answer to this question: “if the fringe of intuition surrounding [the] intelligence is 
capable of expanding sufficiently to envelop its object, that is the mystic life.”95 In other 
words, mystical souls are able to play an opening role for humanity because they effectively 
seize and extend the capacity for intuition that pertains to all human beings. Mystics intensify 
the intuition to the point where it becomes contact with the élan vital itself, to the point where 
it becomes “mystical intuition.”96 Now, as Bergson describes it, this type of intuition certainly 
shares some features with the metaphysical intuition. Like metaphysical intuition, mystical 
intuition “consists in working back from the intellectual and social plane to a point” that is 
beyond the manifestations of closed societies. 97  Indeed, just as metaphysical intuition 
“detaches” itself from all those objects and distinctions that might serve a practical purpose 
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in every day life, so too, the mystical intuition operates as a type of “detachment from each 
particular thing”.98 In both cases, we are dealing with more than that which merely interests 
us as a practical member of a closed society.99 In moving beyond the manifestations of 
closed societies, mystical intuition can also become a means of resolving some of the “false 
problems”—like the status of the existence of nothingness or of God—that have hitherto 
troubled humanity.100 As Bergson writes, for the mystical soul (as for the metaphysician 
exercising the intuition), “these questions simply do not exist, they are optical illusions 
arising, in the inner world, from the structure of human intelligence, they recede and 
disappear as the mystic rises superior to the human point of view.”101  
This is not to suggest that mystical intuition is in all respects similar to metaphysical 
intuition. Even if it simply ‘expands’ or ‘intensifies’ metaphysical intuition, mystical intuition is 
not simply, or no longer, a form of knowledge or vision of duration.102 Bergson specifies that 
what “above all” distinguishes mystical from metaphysical intuition is the fact that the former 
is consummated “in action.”103 Put differently, unlike metaphysical intuition, which merely 
gave us a knowledge or grasp of duration, mystical intuition results in a type of activity or 
creation that effectively modifies the shape of humanity. True mystics, for Bergson, do not 
content themselves with merely contemplating the continuity of duration. 104  In moving 
beyond the manifestations of closed societies, they also strive to modify humanity and to 
bring a change into it via activity. But this activity, Bergson clarifies, is unlike the practical 
activity that we undertake in everyday life; it is no longer simply a function of the practical 
interests that govern a closed society. Because it flows from the mystic soul’s direct 
exposure to the élan vital, this activity is no longer of the order of the stratifications and 
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representations of closed societies: it is a “divine activity” that immediately “flows from a 
spring which is the very source of life.”105 Thus, if mystics are moved into action by their 
intuitive practices, we should not confuse this activity with that which takes place at the level 
of habitual forms of social interaction: “Shaken to its depths by the current which is about to 
sweep it forward, the soul [here] ceases to revolve around itself and escapes for a moment 
from the law which demands that the species and the individual should condition one 
another.”106 Through mystic intuition, the soul begins to be moved by “a unique emotion, an 
impulse, an impetus received from the very depths of things.”107 
In its mystical guise, the intuition therefore begins to play a political or social role as that 
which enables the progressive creation of an open society. Mystical intuition becomes the 
means by which closed societies become invigorated with the force of a creative emotion, 
and thus progressively determined in function of the élan vital. True, this ‘progression’ does 
not have a clearly defined goal or ideal towards which it tends. As Bergson writes, “a mystic 
society, embracing all humanity and moving, animated by a common will, towards the 
continually renewed creation of a more complete humanity, is no more possible of realisation 
in the future than was the existence in the past of human societies functioning automatically 
and similar to animal societies.”108 Nevertheless, with each mystical act, humanity is capable 
of feeling itself moved towards the aspiration of the open society; it is capable of moving 
another step outside of the circle of closed societies towards a form of social organisation 
that is more attuned to the force of the new. As Paola Marrati summarises this point: “The 
force of [the] feeling [that is produced by the mystical intuition] has to do with this power to 
open us up to the new: the mystical source of morality and religion lies in this force; instead 
of being derived from social pressure, it is aspiration.”109 In giving the intuition a central role 
in the creation of the open society, Bergson therefore insists that it is possible for humanity 
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to open itself to the living force of time otherwise than via the stratifications of closed society. 
All that is required is a sustained effort, on the part of a few privileged individuals, to move 
beyond those stratifications. When that effort is accomplished, we can be under no doubt as 
to whether society is still revolving around the circle of the same: “A soul strong enough, 
noble enough to make this effort would not stop to ask whether the principle with which it is 
now in touch is the transcendent cause [transcendante cause] of all things or merely its 
earthly delegate [délégation terrestre].”110 
 
2.3. Mysticism, static religion and mechanism 
To recapitulate, for Bergson, humanity can find its organising principle in two radically 
different sources. On the one hand, humanity can become organised in function of the 
habitual interests and intellectual representations of closed societies. When it is guided by 
this source, humanity remains stuck in a circle of resemblance and similarity; its activity 
remains essentially divorced from the temporal force of the new. On the other hand, 
because humanity is also capable of seizing the fringe of intuition and emotion that lingers 
around the intelligence, it can like become guided by the force of life itself. Through the 
exercises of mystical intuition undertaken by privileged souls, humanity can begin to 
immediately expose itself to the radical novelty of the élan vital and it can thereby 
progressively determine itself in function of that impulse’s creative force. 
Now, framed in these terms, there seems to be a strict opposition between these two 
sources that are capable of guiding humanity. However, Bergson also repeatedly hints that 
these two sources have “been constantly intermingled”, and that they may indeed “support” 
and “complement” one another.111 This thought is clarified by Bergson's insistence that, 
unlike in the general evolution of life, where the material form that divergent tendencies have 
historically assumed prevents them from “reuniting to bring back again, stronger than it was” 
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the original tendency from which they originally departed, the same does not apply to the 
evolution of social life.112 In social life, two divergent tendencies are capable of simultaneous 
coexisting or developing “in the same individual, or in the same society.”113 And this means 
that the uninterrupted progress of one tendency does not necessarily have to lead to a 
complete dissolution of the other. Nor indeed does the unbridled pursuit of one tendency 
over another prevent them from bringing about a stronger return of the original tendency 
whence they both emerged—that is, the élan vital. In fact, Bergson argues, “a tendency on 
which two different views are possible can put forth its maximum, in quantity or quality, only 
if it materialises these two possibilities into moving realities, each one of which leaps forward 
and monopolises the available space, while the other is on the watch unceasingly for its own 
turn to come. Only thus will the content of the original tendency develop”.114  
In terms of Bergson’s distinction between closed and open societies, this means that the 
tendencies towards intellectual representation and self-preserving activity that characterise 
the former are not necessarily a hindrance to the latter’s efforts to bring about forms of life 
that are more attuned to the temporality of the new.115 Those tendencies towards closure 
might even serve as a “support” for the aims of mysticism to return to the force of the vital 
impetus.116 And indeed, when in the final two chapters of The Two Sources Bergson comes 
to consider the role that two of the central historical manifestations of closed societies—
namely, static religious language and mechanism—might play in the propagation of 
mysticism, this is precisely how the interaction between those two sources is apparently 
framed.117 As he writes with regard to mechanism in particular, it was the creation of 
machines (and the historical, socio-political organisations that they involve) that enabled a 
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"burning, active mysticism" to make its appearance in the world: 
with the advent of machines (...), with the advent also of political and social organisations which 
proved experimentally that the mass of people was not doomed (...) deliverance became possible 
in an entirely new sense; the mystical impulse, if operating anywhere with sufficient power, was 
no longer going to be stopped short by the impossibility of acting (...) instead of turning inwards 
and closing, the soul could open wide its gates to a universal love. Now these inventions and 
organisations are essentially Western; it is they who, in this case, have enabled [permis] 
mysticism to reach its end [d’aller jusqu’au bout de lui-même].118 
Similarly, when Bergson considers the relation between mysticism and the linguistic forms 
that static religion takes, he not only that claims that “mysticism and religion are mutually 
cause and effect [se conditionnent]” of each other, but also that "pure mysticism (...) must be 
taken together with the substance [which expresses it], to be regarded as practically 
inseparable from it, if it is to be observed in an active state—since it was in this state that it 
finally imposed its sway upon the world.”119 In these passages, Bergson appears to claim 
that mysticism (and the intuitive activity it involves) itself owes something of its possibility to 
those historically determined forms of static organisation that it nonetheless attempts to 
escape. Although mysticism continues to be defined by Bergson as a leap beyond nature as 
it has already become constituted or stratified in closed societies, it appears that those 
stratifications might nonetheless have something to contribute to the success of mysticism 
itself. 
These types of suggestions by Bergson have led recent commentators—like Frédéric 
Worms—to argue that The Two Sources in fact develops “a sort of politics of the in-between 
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that is neither metaphysical nor without any metaphysical implications.”120 Put differently, 
Bergson’s text can be seen as articulating the possibility for an open ethics that does not rely 
on any appeal to a transcendent or rapturous experience. Because for Bergson the 
possibility and success of mystical intuition is itself sustained by “reason, science and 
political will and organisation,” there is little sense in reading that intuition as requiring an 
abandonment of all that humanity has historically achieved in the domain of closed 
societies.121 The superiority of humanity to open itself to the new is in fact prolonged and 
extended by the mechanisms of closed societies.122 On this reading, although Bergson does 
perhaps have a tendency to express himself in this way, the opening of the mystical soul 
does not in fact require a complete turning away from all those political and social 
stratifications within which human beings normally find themselves implicated. On the 
contrary, by insisting that mysticism requires mechanism and static religion for its success, 
Bergson can be seen as recognising that “there is something immediately ethical and 
political in the experience of life.”123 He can be seen as arguing that even for the mystical 
soul, whose goal is to establish a contact with the élan vital, there is never a complete 
abandonment of the constitutive irreducibility of human history and politics. 124  Worms 
summarises it thus: “mysticism [for Bergson] is a compelling phenomenon that pulls us 
towards the limit of our conscious and moral experience without at any time leaving the field 
of human history for that of a transcendent metaphysics.”125 
Now, as I wrote at the outset of this chapter, the question of whether The Two Sources 
attributes a constitutive role to socio-historical factors in the exercise of mystical intuition is 
of the utmost importance for reading of Bergson that I developed in this thesis’ first chapter. 
As I argued there, one issue that arises in Bergson’s metaphysics is its failure to contend 
with the intuition’s constitutive implication with determined forms of sociality. Now, if one 
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follows the reading proposed by scholars like Worms, it is precisely this implication that The 
Two Sources can be seen as acknowledging. According to this reading, by conceiving the 
relation between mystical intuition and static forms of sociality as one of mutual support and 
inseparability, Bergson seems precisely to be emphasising that mystical intuition is always in 
a certain sense historically determined. He seems to appreciate, that is, that the intuition 
finds at least part of its possibility and sense in determined socio-historical situations. In this 
way, perhaps, Bergson also provides us with a means to resolve the problem that followed 
from that implication, that is, the intuition’s tendency—as a faculty that relies on history—to 
replicate the ideological phantasms of its surrounding social domain. 
But is this historicisation actually concretised in The Two Sources? This is the question 
that I want to consider for the remainder of this chapter. For if readings like Worms’ are 
certainly appealing, they are also somewhat hard to square with Bergson’s repeated claims 
that ‘true’ mystics, when they engage in the intuition, find themselves separated—even if 
only for a moment—from the concrete political demands of closed societies.126 Moreover, it 
is also the case that when Bergson considers what the manifestations of closed societies 
might bring to the success of mysticism, he often defines this success not in terms of the 
benefits that individual intuitive acts might themselves receive from the impulses of closed 
societies, but rather in terms of what function those impulses might serve in “propagating” 
and “disseminating” mysticism across humanity as a whole.127 In this context, it remains to 
be decided whether, for Bergson, the mystical intuition is in fact regarded as receiving its 
possibility and sense from historically determined states of affairs. And to settle this 
question, I propose to focus the remainder of this chapter explicating just what Bergson 
takes the relation between mystical intuition and the manifestations of closed societies to be. 
Let us begin by focusing on the relation between mystical intuition and the language of 
static religion. As noted above, Bergson’s discussion of this relation culminates in the idea 
that mysticism and static religion are mutually cause and effect of each other. Now, Bergson 
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opens this discussion by providing a brief genealogy of the main mystical movements that 
have appeared in human history: the pagan mysteries, ancient Greek philosophy, and Hindu 
and Buddhist thought.128 On Bergson’s reading, although each of these movements further 
opened the door to mysticism, none managed to attain “the ultimate end” of mysticism, that 
is, “the establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative 
effort which life itself manifests.”129 Only the great Christian mystics attained this ultimate 
end.130 But even they faced challenges, and the central obstacle they faced “is the same 
which prevented the creation of a divine humanity. Man has to earn his bread with the sweat 
of his brow; in other words, humanity is an animal species, and, as such, subject to the law 
which governs the animal world and condemns the living to batten upon the living.”131 
Otherwise said, even the great Christian mystics had to contend with the fact humanity is 
embodied and that its great moral transformation into an open society demanded certain 
preparatory steps. Christian mysticism could succeed in spreading itself and transforming 
the whole of humanity, “only by passing on, from one man to another, slowly, a part of 
itself.”132 But how could it do that, Bergson asks? It could do so by one of two methods. The 
first option would consist of intensifying intellectual work to such an extent (in the form of 
increasing mechanisation) that humanity would thereby liberate itself from its embodied 
demands.133 But this method, which Bergson admits carries with it "certain risks", could only 
be utilised much later, with the advent of industrialism.134 Thus, early Christian mystics were 
left with no choice but to follow an entirely different method: “This consisted not in 
contemplating a general and immediate spreading of the mystic impetus, which was 
obviously impossible, but in imparting it, already weakened though it was, to a tiny handful of 
privileged souls which together would form a spiritual society; societies of this kind might 
multiply; (…) thus the impetus would be preserved and continued until such time as a 
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profound change in the material conditions imposed on humanity by nature should permit, in 
spiritual matters, of a radical transformation.”135 
As Bergson himself argues, however, this general account simplifies a great deal, for it 
assumes that mystic societies were not themselves thoroughly imbued with the forms and 
language of static religion.136 But this was not in fact the case: “the men to whom [the 
mystical soul] spoke already had their religion, the same, moreover, as his own. If he had 
visions, these visions showed him, in the form of images, what his religion had impressed on 
him in the form of ideas.”137 If mysticism initially found its expression in mystical societies, 
then it also became imbued with the abstract or linguistic teachings of those religious orders. 
In this context, the crucial question that emerges is whether these “abstract teachings are 
not at the root of mysticism, and if the latter has ever done more than go over the letter of 
the dogma, in order to retrace it in characters of flame.”138 Now, for Bergson, to answer this 
question we must recall that “the teaching of religion, like all teaching, is meant for the 
intelligence, and anything of a purely intellectual order can be brought within the reach of all 
men.”139 The linguistic teachings of religion are of an intellectual kind, and that is precisely 
what enables them to achieve a wide reception across human societies. Because humanity 
is well-equipped to receive intellectual messages, it was capable of acquiring, through the 
linguistic form of religion, “a little of what a few privileged souls possessed in full.”140 Through 
religion, humanity became capable of receiving a crystallised “extract” of that experience 
that the mystical soul undergoes when it engages the mystical intuition.141 
But was this crystallised extract itself a ‘cause’ or ‘origin’ of mystical experience for those 
who received it? Not exactly, for as Bergson argues, an intellectual “doctrine which is but a 
doctrine has a poor chance indeed of giving birth to the glowing enthusiasm, the illumination, 
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the faith that moves mountains.”142 In other words, although the linguistic form of religion 
was capable of aiding mysticism in spreading to humanity an intellectualised extract of 
mystical experience, that outline, because it remained intellectual, was not in itself sufficient 
to cause the individuals who received it to become mystical souls.143 For the extract that was 
propagated by religious language to become the enthusiasm of mystical experience, for it to 
become the activity and warmth of creative emotion, something more than religious 
language was still needed.144 As Bergson writes, “mysticism means nothing, absolutely 
nothing, to the man who has no experience of it, however slight [à celui qui n’en a pas 
éprouvé quelque chose].”145  And this means that for the individuals who received the 
message of religion to be turned into open souls, they would still have to attempt, in isolation 
from that religious language, to engender or “experience” in themselves the opening of 
mystical intuition.146 They would still have to find ways to engage themselves with the 
creativity of the élan vital if what they received from linguistic religion was to be turned into 
more than a “broad outline” of the openness that is experienced by the mystical soul.147 In 
this sense, if the linguistic expression of religion is capable of ‘causing’ a diffusion of 
mysticism across human societies, it is by no means a ‘cause’ of the essential quality or 
sense of mystical experience itself. Apart from its religious expression, mystical experience 
continues to “possess an original content [contenu original], drawn straight from the very 
well-spring of religion [puisé independentement à la source même de la religion], 
independent of all that religion owes to tradition, to theology, to the Churches." 148 
Independently of the intellectuality of religious language, what continues to ensure the 
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quality, content, and sense of mystical experience is the intuitive capacity that human beings 
possess for removing themselves—even if only for a moment—from those social and 
intellectual imperatives within which they historically find themselves implicated. 
Does this mean that Bergson is simply contradicting himself when he writes that 
“mysticism and religion are mutually cause and effect” of each other?149 Not at all, but to see 
why this is not a contradiction, we must recognise that when Bergson speaks of a mutual 
relation of causation between mysticism and religious language, he does not take this 
relation to be one of strict reciprocity. Indeed, as Bergson reminds us in a passing 
discussion of William James’ thought on mysticism, when we speak of mystical experience 
the notion of causation encompasses many different senses.150 While that notion can refer to 
“the efficient and sufficient cause” of a given effect, it can also be understood, less strongly, 
as the “occasion” for an effect that might have developed out of its own tendency.151 And 
when Bergson speaks of the relation between religious language and mysticism, he seems 
to be deploying both of these senses of causation. Indeed, it is clear from Bergson’s account 
of this relation that mysticism ‘causes’ religion in the same way that the creative emotion 
causes intellectual representations. Here, mysticism, or rather mystical experience, is the 
‘efficient and sufficient cause’ of religious representations: the former generates the latter. 
As Bergson writes, just like the creative emotion eventually crystallises into intellectual 
representations, so too, religious language is “the crystallisation, brought about by a 
scientific process of cooling, of what mysticism had poured, while hot, into the soul of 
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man.”152 But while the fierce glow of mysticism generates the linguistic crystallisations of 
religion, those crystals are not themselves generative of the fiery emotion whence they 
derived. As we saw Bergson note, the difference between the creative emotion and 
intellectual representations is that of what “generates and that which is generated.”153 This 
entails that when Bergson speaks of religion ‘causing’ mysticism, we should understand this 
relation in terms of the second, or weaker, sense of causation that Bergson finds in James. 
In this sense, what religious language ‘causes’ in mysticism is merely the “occasion” for it to 
make a wider appearance in the world.154 Religious expression provides mysticism with the 
opportunity to make itself felt more widely across humanity.155 But the language of religion is 
not, by itself, the ‘effective and sufficient’ cause of mystical emotion: that stronger cause 
continues to have its source in the fundamental experience that “mysticism unalloyed [à 
l’état pur], apart from [dégagé] the visions, the allegories, the theological language which 
express it” is capable of reaching in the mystical intuition.156 Hence, we might say that 
though religious language ‘causes’ mysticism to become “capable of marching onto the 
conquest of the world”, the essential quality of mystical experience continues to be derived 
from the attention that it turns towards the heavens.157 The truth of mystical experience 
continues to be derived from the immediate contact that it establishes with the divine force 
that the élan vital expresses in isolation from its terrestrial manifestations.158 
If Bergson’s thought on the relation between religious language and mystical experience 
continues to be premised on the purity of mystical experience, can the same be said of 
mysticism’s relation to mechanism? As I previously indicated, here things are less clear, for 
Bergson does claim that the advent of machines ensured the deliverance of mysticism in an 
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“entirely new sense.”159 But if mechanism is capable of bringing this change about, what 
central obstacle to mysticism does it, in turn, overcome? As mentioned, for Bergson, this 
obstacle is essentially related to humanity’s embodiment. Though humanity, as an animal 
species, is both “intelligent and free”, it must nonetheless feed itself in order to survive.160 
The issue that has emerged for humanity historically, however, is that even its most 
essential needs have seldom been fulfilled within the domain of closed societies: “Millions of 
men never get enough to eat. There are some who starve to death.”161 In part, this issue is a 
function of the natural tendency towards closure and self-preservation that defines closed 
societies. Those societies tend to cater only for basic needs of their own population, and 
they often neglect to economically interact with other societies even where this activity might 
prove beneficial for all.162 According to Bergson, this is how the persistence of war across 
human history is to be explained.163 The incapacity of closed societies to cater for more than 
their own self-interest “means war.” 164  Under these conditions, it is unsurprising that 
individuals have generally failed to feel themselves drawn towards the aspiration of a love 
for all humanity. Because closed societies have historically failed to attain a sovereignty over 
things, the history of humanity has not only been dominated by material misery, but it has 
also resulted in a resulted in a displacement of humanity’s natural freedom in favour of a 
sovereignty of man over man.165 
On Bergson’s reading, the advent of machines introduces the opportunity for an 
overcoming of these issues that have historically plagued humanity. As he writes,  
machines which run on oil or coal or ‘white coal’, and which convert into motion a potential energy 
stored up for millions of years, have actually imparted to our organism an extension so vast, have 
endowed it with a power so mighty, so out of proportion to the size and strength of that organism, 
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that surely none of all this was foreseen in this structural plan of our species: he was a unique 
stroke of luck, the greatest material success of man on the planet.166 
The invention of machines—specifically, industrialised machines—has enabled humanity to 
potentially relate to its material conditions in a radically different way. With the creation of 
agricultural implements that radically increase the yield of the earth’s soil, machines have 
provided humanity with the potential to greatly develop its means of satisfying real needs.167 
Machines have provided humanity with the chance to liberate itself from its state of misery 
and helplessness. Thus, machines have also created the potentiality for the impetus that 
guides mysticism to no longer be “thwarted by material conditions”.168 Unlike the ancient 
Indian mystic who felt, through famine and starvation, that he was “crushed by nature”, the 
modern soul has at its disposal the potential to liberate itself from its material constraints.169 
It has the opportunity of no longer focusing its undivided attention on the earth with a view to 
fulfilling its basic material needs. Humanity is thus presented with the opportunity to turn its 
attention towards the heavens and to thereby achieve a vision of itself that is no longer 
simply determined in function of the natural impulses of closed societies. With machines, 
“the soul could open wide its gates to a universal love.”170 And it is in this sense that we 
should understand Bergson’s famous claim that “the mystical summons up [appelle] the 
mechanical.”171 What mysticism requires in order to “radiate” and “spread” itself across 
humanity is a historically determined state of affairs ensuring that humanity is no longer 
crushed by its material constraints.172 As Bergson neatly summarises it, “mysticism cannot 
be disseminated without encouraging a very special ‘will to power.’ This will be a dominance 
not over men, but over things, precisely in order that man shall no longer have so much 
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dominance over man.”173 
Once again, however, Bergson recognises that in reality things are not so simple. For if 
the advances of mechanism have created the potential for a liberation of humanity from its 
material needs, it is also the case that, historically, this potential has not always been 
actualised. As Bergson remarks, one of the issues with increasing mechanisation is that it 
has “created a mass of new needs; [but] it has not taken the trouble to ensure for the 
majority of men, for all if that were possible, the satisfaction of old needs.”174 Historically, 
mechanism has most often been deployed in closed societies as a way of fulfilling 
humanity’s desire for the superfluous and inessential, that is, for comfort and luxuries. It has 
also been profoundly aligned with interests of war and imperialism, as Bergson repeatedly 
noted in his speeches during the First World War.175 But it has not generally improved 
humanity’s lot with regards to its most essential needs. Yet, as Bergson maintains, we 
should not see these issues as forming part of mechanism’s “essence.”176 Although it is true 
that mechanism has historically tended to produce effects that are contrary to the flourishing 
of humanity, these are at worst only the expression of one of the tendencies that mechanism 
can follow.177 This entails that those negative effects, insofar as they actually exist, “can all 
be corrected, and then the machine would be nothing but a great benefactor.”178 That is, 
mechanism can still play the function that mysticism calls upon it to perform; it can still 
liberate humanity from its material constraints and thus enable it to open itself to the 
temporal force of the élan vital. But for mechanism to play this role, Bergson insists, we 
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cannot rely on the unconscious forces of history.179 What is needed instead is conscious 
human initiative.180 “What we need are new reserves of potential energy—moral energy this 
time.”181 It is only when this moral energy is used to guide and regulate the impulses of 
mechanism that the latter can begin to play an effective function in spreading and radiating 
mysticism across humanity. 
Whence does this moral energy derive? Does it arise from politically determined states 
of affairs, from the same affairs that have historically sustained the negative effects of 
mechanism, or does it, indeed, emerge from elsewhere? In the final pages of The Two 
Sources, Bergson leaves us with no doubt with regard to this question: “Let but a mystic 
genius appear, he will draw after him a humanity already vastly grown in the body, and 
whose soul he has transfigured. He will yearn to make of it a new species, or rather deliver it 
from the necessity of being a species”.182 In other words, it is through the activity of the 
mystical soul that the occasion or opportunity that is afforded by mechanism can become a 
reality for humanity at large.183 Indeed, as Bergson famously puts it, “mechanism demands 
[exigerait] mysticism.” 184  This means that if mechanism is finally capable of liberating 
humanity from its material necessity, if its opportunity is finally capable of becoming a reality 
for all, this is only insofar as the sense for that opportunity is determined by the mystical 
soul’s experience of the élan vital. Without that experience, without the guidance and 
direction that is provided by the mystical soul’s intuitive activity, mechanism would perhaps 
never expand beyond its dominant historical function as an instrument for the production of 
luxuries and war. By contrast, when its sense is provided by the mystical intuition, 
mechanism can find its “true vocation again”; it can become a great benefactor for the whole 
of humanity.185 It can become the material “support [point d’appui]” by which humanity at 
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large begins to rise above earthly matters to experience for itself the temporal force of the 
new.186 
But if this “alliance” that Bergson envisions between mechanism and mysticism enables 
the former to acquire a new sense on the basis of the latter’s activity, is the inverse also 
true?187 Does mystical experience itself now become redefined in terms of its constitutive 
relation to the mechanical? This is the crucial question that Bergson’s analysis of the relation 
between mysticism and mechanism never explicitly clarifies. For if Bergson suggests that 
humanity can succeed in looking heavenwards only “through [par]” mechanism, it is less 
clear whether he also believes that this passage changes anything about the essential 
quality of mystical experience.188  Of what would this change consist? Well, given that 
Bergson strongly equates mechanism with the order of history, and in particular with the 
negative effects that it has historically tended to produce, then perhaps this change might 
consist of a certain historicisation of mystical experience. Put differently, if mystical 
experience were to veritably start passing through a system of machines that themselves 
have a particular history, then perhaps its essential quality would now also become modified 
in accordance with the implicit tendencies of the technological history to which those 
machines belong. Perhaps, through this passage, the activity of mystical experience would 
now become more susceptible to encouraging not only the opportunities but also the risks 
and dangers that mechanism has manifested historically, that is, the production of luxuries, 
war and imperialism.189 
Yet, it is precisely this possibility that Bergson denies at the end of The Two Sources. In 
a brief but nonetheless significant response to Ernst Seillière, Bergson argues that true 
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mysticism is incompatible with imperialism. 190  To clarify, Bergson is here replying to 
Seillière’s concern that any moral doctrine that premises itself too strongly on mystical as 
opposed to rational impulses carries with it “the risk of abuse by an ‘excessive will to 
power.’”191 In short, Seillière worries that mysticism can lead to imperialism. In response to 
this, Bergson contends that mystical experience can lead to imperialism only if it becomes 
“garbed” in the language and images of static religion and nationalism.192 Only when it is 
counterfeited or distorted in the symbolism of closed societies can mysticism become 
imperialism. “So that if we keep to true mysticism, we shall judge it incompatible with 
imperialism.”193 But if in its alliance with mechanism mysticism passes through machines 
that have themselves historically tended towards the promotion of imperialist ends, how can 
it immunise itself from those negative tendencies? How can mystical experience shelter itself 
from the risks and dangers that its alliance with mechanism presents? Once again, it seems 
that for Bergson mystical experience can shelter itself from the worst excesses of 
mechanism only because its essential quality remains irreducible to the historical 
dimensions of the latter. Thus, even if in allying itself with mechanism mystical experience 
now begins to pass ‘through’ a set of historical machines, its fundamental sense is in no way 
altered by that act of passage. So long as it does not become garbed in the language and 
symbolism of closed societies, true mysticism carries no danger of falling into the excesses 
that mechanism has historically manifested.  
In this sense, if there is an alliance between mechanism and mysticism, this alliance is, 
much like the alliance between mysticism and religious language, composed of two unequal 
partners. Just like the fundamental sense of mystical experience is not shaped by the 
transmission that it receives in religious language, so too, there is no mystical experience 
that is fundamentally shaped by the socio-historical impulses of the mechanism that helps to 
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diffuse it. True, the success of mysticism in spreading itself across humanity is still 
determined by the relation that it assumes to mechanism: “mysticism cannot be 
disseminated without encouraging a very special ‘will to power.’” But the goal of mystical 
experience, its essential quality or sense as a contact with the élan vital, is by no means 
mediated mechanically. Just like there is no linguistic experience of the élan vital, so too, 
there is no machinic mystical experience for Bergson. In both cases, the intuitive activity of 
the mystical soul remains irreducible to, and purified of, those social or historical impulses 
that help spread it across humanity as a whole and with which it is inevitably led to interact. 
The ‘truth’ of true mysticism is never derived or determined politically or historically. In the 
final analysis, the truth of mystical experience is always determined as a function of the 
unalloyed contact that it establishes with the élan vital. The relation that mystical experience 
establishes with the temporality of the new always finds its fundamental sense beyond the 
manifestations of history and politics. It always derives its essential sense from elsewhere. 
 
2.4. Conclusion: beyond Bergson 
I have argued in this chapter that despite appearances The Two Sources does not in fact 
develop a thoroughly historicised conception of temporal ethics. True, many of Bergson’s 
assertions—particularly those on mechanism—can be seen as tending in that direction. 
Nevertheless, as I demonstrated above, in continuing to premise the purity and immediacy 
of intuition against those historical forces that nonetheless supplement the diffusion and 
expansion of mysticism, The Two Sources cannot, pace Worms, be said to concretise a 
model of temporal ethics that does not abandon “the field of human history for that of a 
transcendent metaphysics.”194 As Merleau-Ponty pithily summarises the issue, in The Two 
Sources, “man’s relation to [a] Super-nature is still the direct relationship the previous books 
found between the intuition and natural being.”195 Indeed, like the metaphysical intuition, the 
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mystical intuition of The Two Sources continues to find its essential sense and vitality from a 
source that is ‘beyond’ or ‘elsewhere’ than the historical manifestations of society. In the final 
analysis, therefore, that text’s model of temporal ethics remains ahistorical.196 What Bergson 
does not arrive at is the recognition that—as involved with determined historical forces—the 
intuition, and the ethical relation to time it generates, always finds itself constitutively 
affected by history. 
In this particular sense, I contend, The Two Sources also fails to provide an adequate 
resolution to the problem of history that emerges in Bergson’s metaphysical writings. Indeed, 
because Bergson does not ultimately accept that the intuition finds itself constitutively 
affected by historical phenomena, he also fails to contend with the fact that the intuition—as 
so affected—may tend itself towards the replication or reification of some of the violent 
tendencies that form part of its surrounding domain of actuality. This failure is clearly 
reflected in Bergson’s insistence that true mysticism is incompatible with imperialism, when it 
is precisely that compatibility that would (for better or for worse) be otherwise necessitated 
by mysticism’s constitutive involvement with the historical. Had Bergson recognised this 
constitutive involvement, he might have advocated a strategy for negotiating these dangers. 
But it is precisely this task that The Two Sources neglects. 
None of which is to suggest that the problem of history remains unresolvable. Its 
resolution does, however, require more than Bergson’s philosophy is capable of offering. 
This is why I want to spend the rest of this thesis going beyond Bergson, assessing 
specifically whether Levinas and Deleuze’s own models of temporal ethics provide a more 
fitting resolution to this problem that initially suggests itself in Bergson’s writings. As I 
suggested in the introduction to this thesis, the respective solutions provided by Levinas and 
the solo Deleuze differ in kind from the one we have just considered in relation to The Two 
Sources. Indeed, far from framing temporal ethics as potentially historical, both authors 
argue that an ethical relation to time must be immediate and, as such, must also differentiate 
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itself from any empirical or historical content.197 The question before us in the next three 
chapters of this thesis is whether Levinas and the solo Deleuze are indeed capable of 
divorcing their temporal ethics from all sense of the historical—or indeed, whether in failing 
to do so, they merely repeat and extend the problem of history that inheres in Bergson’s 
writings. 
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3. Levinas I: the temporal ethics of alterity in Totality and Infinity 
Having considered how the problem of history manifests itself in Bergson's philosophy, in 
this chapter I want to begin to turn my attention to Levinas to consider to what extent his own 
conception of temporal ethics offers a successful resolution to that problem. As I suggested 
in the introduction to this thesis, Levinas’ ethical philosophy potentially offers a resolution to 
the quandaries of Bergsonism because it insists that temporal ethics can take place entirely 
“beyond history”.1 For Levinas, the possibility of entering an ethical relation to time that is not 
implicated in history remains a live one. But for this relation to the novelty of time to be truly 
thought and given, we cannot content ourselves (pace Bergson) with valorising the intuitive 
praxis by which a lone subject establishes a contact or communion with a differential 
temporality. To think an ethical relation to time that effectively goes beyond history, Levinas 
argues, we must move past Bergson’s philosophy and recognise that far from being intuitive, 
that ethical relation can only consist of the metaphysical or social relation between the 
subject (or the I, Moi) and the Other (Autrui). For Levinas, only this exposure to the Other—
or, more accurately, only this exposure to the infinity that is expressed by the linguistic 
dimension of the Other’s face—can provide the subject with an immediate relation to time 
that is not contaminated or limited by history.2 
If one follows Levinas on these points, then perhaps his ethics provides a fruitful route 
out of the problems of Bergsonism. Indeed, if Levinas is correct in saying that the linguistic 
relation to the Other truly bypasses history, then perhaps resolving the Bergsonian problem 
of history simply involves giving more attention to what Levinas calls the metaphysical 
relation with the Other. Of course, all this hinges on Levinas being justified in making these 
claims. However, as I argue in this chapter, there is good reason to doubt that Levinas’ 
proposed ethical relation with the Other truly effects a clean rupture with the historical. 
Focusing on Levinas’ overall description of this relation in Totality and Infinity, in this 
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chapter I want to argue that his conception of temporal ethics remains more implicated with 
the order of history than he would perhaps like to admit. In Totality and Infinity, as section 
one of this chapter will show, Levinas describes the metaphysical relation to the Other as the 
most quintessential or “absolute experience” that the subject can have of the novelty of time: 
“The absolutely new is the Other.”3 In line with his broadly phenomenological approach, 
Levinas also argues that though this experience is absolute for the subject, it nonetheless 
finds (like all experience) its condition of possibility (or grounding) in certain ontological 
structures.4 Namely, Levinas argues that for this experience of time to be given to the 
subject, that subject must not only be ontologically individuated as an I, but must also find 
itself constituted by an ontological condition that effectively predisposes it to respond to the 
time of the Other. As I seek to show in section two, these ontological conditions, which 
Levinas respectively calls interiority and fecundity, are what effectively ground the ethical 
relation to an infinite time that he seeks to describe; without them, Levinas claims, “the time 
(…) behind visible history would be impossible.”5 
Taking up and extending Derrida’s famous reading of Totality and Infinity in “Violence 
and Metaphysics”, in this chapter’s third section I argue that the problem of history 
reinscribes itself in Levinas’ temporal ethics at the level of the second of these conditions: 
fecundity. As we will see in what follows, Levinas frames this condition in terms of paternity, 
that is, in terms of the familial relation that emerges between a father and his son. It is this 
familial relation with the child, Levinas argues, that “establishes relationship with the 
absolute future, or infinite time.”6 However, I contend in section three that if Levinas wants to 
base his conception of temporal ethics on this familial relation, then his ethics is not as 
removed from history as he would have us believe. For the family is nothing more than a 
historically defined complex. In this precise sense, I contend, Derrida is correct to insist that 
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Levinas’ temporal ethics in Totality and Infinity remains involved with the order of history. 
However, unlike Derrida, I do not see this involvement as being caused only by Levinas’ 
conception of language. On my reading, Levinas’ conception of temporal ethics in Totality 
and Infinity remains implicated with history in part precisely because it continues to base 
itself on what can only be seen as a concrete historical situation: the family. 
 
3.1. Time and the Other 
In the writings that precede the publication of Totality and Infinity, one of the major 
criticisms that Levinas levels at the history of philosophy concerns its inability to adequately 
think time. According to this early Levinas, traditional philosophy has “remained with the 
conception of a time taken to be purely exterior to the subject, a time-object, or taken to be 
entirely contained in the subject.”7 This inadequate conception of time clearly emerges in 
Heidegger’s analyses of Dasein in Being and Time.8 As Levinas writes in Time and the 
Other: “All the analyses of Being and Time are worked out either for the sake of the 
impersonality of everyday life or for the sake of solitary Dasein.”9 But what Heidegger’s 
analyses miss in taking this solitary approach is the fact that time is never “the achievement 
of an isolated and lone subject.”10 Indeed, for Levinas, these analyses fail precisely to 
explain how a subject who remains riveted to itself, and who “discloses to itself its own 
authentic Being”, is capable of receiving the novelty of time without simultaneously 
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collapsing that novelty into the framework of the same.11 What this approach fails to grasp is 
the fact that “the absolute alterity of another instant cannot be found in the subject, who is 
absolutely himself.”12 The irreducible alterity of time "is an original form of exteriority that 
takes us beyond the categories of unity and multiplicity which are valid for things, that is, are 
valid in the world of an isolated subject, a solitary mind.”13 Yet, it is just this temporal 
irreducibility that Heidegger continually fails to thematise. 
The early Levinas develops a similar criticism of Bergson. Indeed, if, as we saw in the 
first chapter, Levinas continues throughout his career to insist on the importance of the 
novelty-oriented aspects of Bergsonian duration, in his early writings he criticises Bergson 
for also falling short of going beyond the perspective of the lone subject. It must be asserted, 
Levinas holds, that “the Bergsonian conception of freedom through duration tends toward” 
an understanding of time as absolutely other and new.14 Bergson recognises that “time adds 
something new to being, something absolutely new.”15 However, two basic problems remain. 
First, Bergson’s conception of duration, with its emphasis on continuity, continues to posit 
the future as something that can be “grasped [saisi]” by a form of subjective “anticipation” or 
“projection”.16 But for Levinas, this notion overlooks the fact that in order to retain its status 
as absolute novelty, the future cannot be given as that which is capable of being grasped by 
means of subjective activity: “the future is what is not grasped, what befalls and lays hold of 
us.”17 For the future to be given as absolute novelty, there must be “a rupture of [the] 
continuity” that a subjective practice can establish with time.18 However, it is precisely this 
rupture that Bergson remains in the first instance incapable of thinking.19 Secondly, and 
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relatedly, Levinas contends that Bergson’s philosophy fails to think time beyond the 
restricted perspective of the isolated subject. While, as the first chapter noted, Bergson 
certainly affirms the existence of other durations, those durations nevertheless remain “in a 
certain sense interior to us.”20 Once again, however, this conception remains deficient.21 
What Bergson cannot admit is that if there are other durations, “the subject’s identity by itself 
is incapable of yielding [donner] this.”22 Indeed, it seems to Levinas “impossible to speak of 
time in a subject alone, or to speak of a purely personal duration”, as Bergson tends to do.23 
To approach the novelty of time, we must therefore move beyond Bergson’s metaphysical 
category of duration and the essentially subjective perspective it implies. We have to think 
time not on the basis of the “work” that a subject does in relation to it, but rather in terms of 
“an opening [ouverture] onto a mystery” that is always already presupposed by any such 
subjective activity.24 
This opening onto the absolutely new must be thought in terms of what Levinas calls the 
social relation. As Existence and Existents rhetorically affirms, pace Bergson’s equation of 
the social with intellectual representation: “Is not sociality something more than the source of 
our representation of time: is it not time itself?”25 Against Bergson, we have to recognise that 
the social relation does not have a merely “sociological” or “anthropological” import: “It is not 
a matter of saying how time is chopped up and parcelled out thanks to the notions we derive 
from society how society allows us to make a representation of time.”26 This is not to suggest 
that this social relation should be understood in terms of the community or commonality that 
emerges between two beings in relation to a third term.27 Indeed, as Levinas confirms, the 
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social relation that he envisages is not “set up around a third term which serves as 
intermediary, which supplies what is common in the communion.”28 Such communion across 
a third term inevitably collapses the irreducibility of the temporal opening that Levinas seeks: 
it establishes the social relation as the “reciprocal relationship of two interchangeable 
terms.”29 To take shape as a temporal opening onto the absolutely new, this social relation 
must therefore be configured as an asymmetry and lack of reciprocity that contrasts strongly 
with any possible "contemporaneousness" between the beings in relation.30 Far from being 
reducible to the status of “just another relation, one that can be produced in being”, this 
relation must be treated as being’s “ultimate event.”31 
Totality and Infinity begins to take these early observations further by casting the social 
relation as the metaphysical relation between the I (Moi) and the Other (Autrui).32 As Levinas 
describes it, his text aims to describe “a relationship with the other that does not result in a 
divine or human totality, that is not the totalisation of history but the idea of infinity. Such a 
relationship is metaphysics itself.”33 Unlike Bergson’s conception of that enterprise, however, 
this metaphysics does not take shape as the progressive aggregate of intuitive knowledge 
that the I can achieve of the temporality of the Other.34 Indeed, as Levinas argues, in order 
to retain its status as an opening onto temporal novelty, this metaphysical relation cannot be 
configured as knowledge, for knowledge signifies “a way of approaching the known being 
such that its alterity with regard to the knowing being vanishes.”35 In metaphysics, the I is “in 
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relation with what it cannot absorb, with what it cannot, in the etymological sense of the term, 
comprehend.”36 Instead, this metaphysical relation must be taken as a “desire [that] tends 
towards something else entirely, toward the absolutely other [absolument autre].”37 This 
desire is not a yearning for a lost essence or being, since it “desires beyond everything that 
can simply complete it.” 38 The metaphysical relation is rather a desire for what the I cannot 
ever hope to encompass or capture within its own subjective coordinates: “Desire is desire 
for the absolutely other.”39 And for Levinas, this desire must be conceived in terms of the I’s 
exposure to the absolute strangeness of the Other human person. “The absolutely other 
[Autre] is the Other [Autrui]. He and I do not form a number. (….) Neither possession nor the 
unity of number nor the unity of concepts link me to the Stranger, the Stranger who disturbs 
being at home with oneself. (….) Over him I have no power. He escapes my grasp by an 
essential dimension”.40 Metaphysical desire, or the social relation, is the “epiphany” of the 
absolutely new that is produced in the I by means of the strangeness and destituteness that 
the Other’s human alterity expresses.41  
For Levinas, this metaphysical relation between the I and the Other is ethical.42 “The 
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and possessions, is 
precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics.”43 This does 
not indicate that the metaphysical relation takes shape as a morality, that is, as “a series of 
rules relating to social behaviour and civic duty.”44 Ethics refers instead to “the extreme 
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exposure and sensitivity of one subjectivity to another”.45 It refers to the unpredictable and 
unforeseeable “teaching” that the I receives from the Other—a teaching that is irreducible to 
Socratic maieutics in that it “comes from the exterior” and brings the I more than it can 
contain in itself.46 Further distinguishing this relation as ethical is the fact that it does not take 
place at the level of ontology. As Levinas famously states, “metaphysics precedes ontology 
[la métaphysique précède l’ontologie].”47 This means that the ethical teaching the I receives 
from the Other does not concern the latter’s existence as merely an existent within Being. To 
receive from the Other only in function of their insertion in a wider, impersonal Being is to 
unduly determine the content of their ethical teaching; “it is to subordinate the relation with 
someone, who is an existent (the ethical relation), to a relation with the Being of existents, 
which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of 
knowing)”.48 As ethical, the metaphysical relation between the I and the Other is thus not 
accomplished through a third, neutral term (Being) which would unite the two beings in 
relation.49 Indeed, that relation is ethical in the precise sense that it precedes the shared 
immersion of the I and the Other in Being. Ethics also precedes ontology in that the Other 
already ‘speaks’ before the I can even begin to comprehend the Being which the Other, as 
an existent, is.50 In Levinas’ summary: “this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this 
relation with an existent—precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation in Being. Ontology 
presupposes metaphysics.”51 
To say that ethics precedes ontology is not to say that ethics is never enacted in being. 
But for Levinas, this enactment takes on a very precise shape: “Such a situation is the gleam 
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of exteriority or of transcendence in the face [visage] of the Other.”52 In other words, the 
exposure of the I to the Other’s irreducible temporality is always configured in terms of its 
relation to the Other’s face: “The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the 
idea of the other in me, we here name face.”53 Now, although the term face (vis-age) might 
appear to indicate the modality of vision, Levinas explicitly warns us against such an 
interpretation. Vision always presupposes the insertion of the related beings into a “space” 
and a “light” that equalises or reduces their fundamental alterity.54 “Light is that through 
which something is other than myself, but already as if it came from me.”55 Equally, “[s]pace, 
instead of transporting beyond, simply ensures the condition for the later signification of 
things within the same.”56 Thus, for Levinas, the fundamental locus of the face is not that of 
vision: “Vision is not a transcendence. (….) It opens nothing that, beyond the same would be 
absolutely other, that is, in itself.”57 Instead, Levinas argues, the face must be taken as being 
essentially related to language: “The ‘vision’ of the face is inseparable from [the] offering 
[that] language is.”58 The work of language is entirely different from that of vision: “it consists 
in entering into a relationship (…) having meaning by itself, καθ’αυτο, signifying before we 
have projected light upon it”, or before its immersion in an empty space.59 Indeed, in 
language, terms become related not on the basis of the neutral ontological medium that 
unites or subtends them, but in terms of their transcendence or irreducibility to one 
another.60 “In other words, language is spoken where community between the terms of the 
relationship is wanting, where the common plane is wanting or is yet to be constituted.”61 
And this explains why the face’s essential domain is that of language, or discourse. “The 
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face speaks.”62 And that is so because, unlike vision, language requires no homogeneous, 
spatial or illuminated milieu to serve as its condition of possibility.63 Language operates 
entirely across alterity; it introduces “a dimension of transcendence, and leads to a relation 
totally different to experience in the sensible sense of the term.”64 To that extent, Levinas 
tells us, language can also “be defined as the very power to break the continuity of being or 
of history.”65 Language shatters the I’s historical and ontological continuity with itself, and as 
such, introduces an irreducible temporality into the interiority of the I. Discourse with the 
Other “opens time.”66 
Language effects this opening not as communication but as expression.67 Indeed, for 
Levinas, discourse is not principally defined by the possibility it creates in allowing beings to 
exchange information regarding their “interior and hidden world.”68 Such a communicative 
conception of language still presupposes the modality of manifestation; it still insists that 
language works to divulge a previously concealed substantiality. By contrast, a conception of 
language that prioritises expression recognises that language is not “analogous to the 
sensation presented to the eye.”69 It recognises that what expresses itself does so “contrary 
to all the conditions for the visibility of objects.”70 Expression, Levinas contends, is καθ’αυτο, 
that is, it proceeds “by itself and not by reference to a system” of luminosity and spatiality.71 
Through expression, then, the Other presents himself to the I as “starting from himself” and 
without reference to a third term that would neutralise that presentation.72 Indeed, “the first 
content of expression is the expression itself”, as opposed to the modification or 
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thematisation that might be imposed upon it after the fact.73 This entails that when the Other 
faces the I, it does so immediately. There is no possible interposition of thematisation or 
abstraction in the face-to-face relation: “The immediate [immédiat] is the face to face.”74 As 
expression, the face is therefore the immediate imposition of alterity on the I: “it is 
preeminently the presence of [an] exteriority” that exceeds the interiority and sameness that 
the I, left to itself, cannot evade.75  The face’s expression opens the I to the Other’s 
irreducible temporality, doing so immediately and without reference to a system that would 
only limit and dissimulate “the shock of the encounter of the same with the other.”76 
With this description of the face as language and expression, Levinas also begins to 
specify the nature of the temporality that is opened by the Other. As he writes: “To approach 
the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, (…). It is therefore to receive from 
the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity.”77 
This reference to infinity represents Levinas’ laudatory engagement with Descartes, in 
whose third mediation Levinas finds a model for describing the teaching that is brought 
about by the Other.78 According to Levinas, in this meditation Descartes describes an 
irreducible situation where the finite I thinks and receives an idea of infinity that cannot, 
properly speaking, ever proceed from itself alone.79 “In thinking infinity the I from the first 
thinks more than it thinks.”80 In this situation, subjective thought finds itself exceeded via its 
relation with an infinite being that it cannot ever hope to grasp or contain: “[t]he idea of 
infinity, the overflowing of finite thought by its content, effectuates the relation of thought with 
what exceeds its capacity”.81 And for Levinas, we cannot overlook the ethical significance of 
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this situation described by Descartes.82 Alongside Plato’s notion of a Good that stands 
wholly beyond being, Descartes’ reflections on infinity constitute one of the rare glimpses of 
absolute alterity to be found in the history of philosophy.83 “Descartes, better than an idealist 
or realist, discovers a relation with a total alterity irreducible to interiority”.84 On the basis of 
his meditation on infinity, Levinas argues, we can also begin to more precisely define the 
irreducible temporality that is introduced by the Other. We can specify that temporality as 
precisely infinity, that is, as the disruptive ‘moment’, which, always coming from beyond the 
power of the I, shatters and disrupts the continuity of any possible egological interiority.85 We 
can define the Other’s temporality as a “not yet” that, properly speaking, never arrives for the 
I because it always remains beyond its grasp as an ungraspable and unforeseeable moment 
of futurity.86 It is this infinity, or futurity, that the I receives from the Other and that it cannot 
ever hope to receive from itself: “through the face filters the obscure light coming from 
beyond the face from what is not yet, from a future never future enough, more remote than 
the possible.”87 Insofar as it expresses itself as infinitude, the face thus turns the I “into a 
being whose very existence consists in this incessant reception of teaching, in this incessant 
overflowing of self (which is time).”88 In other words, the face, qua infinity, teaches the I the 
time of the absolutely new: “The introduction of the new into a thought, the idea of infinity, is 
the very work of [the face]. The absolutely new is the Other.”89 
As the expression of infinity, the face calls into question the primacy of the same and the 
present. It causes those two essentially subjective modalities to ‘overflow’ and ‘surpass’ 
themselves. But this surpassing and overflowing, Levinas warns, should not be understood 
in spatial terms: “This overflowing is to be distinguished from the image of a liquid 
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overflowing a vessel, because this overflowing presence is effectuated as a position in face 
of the same.”90 Instead, the face's expressive overflowing should be understood as the 
temporal surplus or excess that the Other introduces into being, “the surplus that is 
produced by the society of infinity, an incessant surplus that accomplishes the infinitude of 
infinity.”91 As infinity, the face introduces the excessive temporality of the new into being. In 
this way, the face also obligates the I to contend with a time that is never its own. Indeed, for 
Levinas, by introducing the temporal dimension of infinity, the face also calls the I to 
responsibility and enjoins it to respond to a future temporality that is always beyond its reach: 
“the Other faces me and puts me in question and obliges me by his essence qua infinity.”92 
In this sense, the face is not simply “the beginning of a true experience of the new.”93 As 
infinity, the face also in part determines the I to respond to the temporal novelty that is 
expressed by the Other: “in discourse I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and 
this urgency of the response—acuteness of the present—engenders me for responsibility; 
as responsible I am brought to my final reality.”94 
The temporal infinity of which Levinas speaks is not a Hegelian infinity, whose nature is 
to actualise itself within history and to become present in the ‘here and now.’95 Indeed, for 
Levinas, to treat the infinite as Hegel does, that is, as “the term of a history”, is to reduce the 
infinite’s exteriority to the play of the same, to treat it only in function of its role within an 
impersonal totality.96 The temporality of history, Levinas writes, “is set forth in the visible.”97 
This means that the temporality that governs history is not that of infinity, but only a 
chronology that is “temporalised relative to a present situated in itself and identifiable”.98 
Furthermore, in history, what counts is not “the position of the I before the other in which the 
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other remains transcendent”, but only the impersonality of the works that individual subjects 
produce.99 History primarily concerns itself with the economic exchange or commerce of 
these impersonal works.100 But in this economic exchange, neither the singularity of the 
Other nor that of the I is taken into account; historically, each becomes “congealed into a 
personage interpreted on the basis of his work.”101 At its heart, therefore, history displays a 
certain “cruelty and injustice” with regard to the alterity of the Other—something that is 
clearly reflected in the fact history necessarily tends towards war.102 “But across the gold that 
buys him or the steel that kills him the Other is not approached face to face”.103 That is, 
history can only lead to a violent ignorance of what is ethically significant in the Other’s 
alterity. “Existence in history consists in placing my consciousness outside of me [into works] 
and in destroying my responsibility.”104 Hence, for Levinas, the time of infinity is never, 
properly speaking, reducible to the order of the historical. Indeed, to receive the teaching or 
the infinity that the Other's face expresses means precisely to go “beyond the totality or 
beyond history.” 105 Because history cannot but reduce the alterity of the Other to the 
impersonality of their works, it also cannot operate as the site where the I truly receives the 
infinite time of the Other. “When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted [arraché] 
from history.”106 
Levinas is clear that this uprootedness from history is by no means the result of a 
practice (intuitive or otherwise). Nevertheless, and in line with his broadly phenomenological 
method in Totality and Infinity, Levinas contends that for I’s exposure to the Other's alterity  
"to be realised, it is not enough that an infinite time be given."107 Indeed, as an experience of 
the absolutely new—albeit an absolute experience—the I's exposure to infinity always finds 
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its condition of possibility in certain structures. For a start, as Levinas repeatedly warns 
throughout Totality and Infinity, the I’s exposure to the Other’s infinity presupposes the 
separation between the two terms: “To have the idea of Infinity it is necessary to exist as 
separated.”108 This means that to fully explicate the ethical relation between the I and the 
Other, we cannot content ourselves with simply describing the ‘effects’ of the Other on the I. 
We also have to provide an account of how the I itself comes to be an I, doing so in 
recognition of the fact that for alterity to be produced in being “an I is needed”, that “[a]lterity 
is possible only starting from me.”109 Additionally, or secondly, we also have to account for 
how that I, in the context of its own egological interiority, finds itself predisposed to respond 
to the Other.110 The I’s position as a responsible subject, Levinas cautions, “consists in being 
able to respond to this essential destitution of the Other”.111 However, as a separated being, 
the I is also capable of irresponsibility, that is, of “shutting itself up against the very appeal 
that has aroused it.”112 “Henceforth”, Levinas tells us, “the independence of the I and its 
position before the absolutely other can figure in a history and a politics”—with the 
subsequent destruction of responsibility that this entails. 113  In the context of these 
specifications, Levinas’ conception of temporal ethics will not be complete until he can also 
show how the I’s responsible openness to the Other is itself possible. To show how the I can 
truly relate itself to infinity beyond history, Levinas' philosophy must also detail “the condition 
for both goodness and the transcendence of the face.”114 
As I read his text, Levinas provides an exposition of these two conditions, respectively, in 
Sections II and IV of Totality and Infinity. In Section II, entitled “Interiority and Economy”, 
Levinas provides an ontological description of how the I comes to acquire its own inner 
temporality or interiority, with a view to then describing, in Section III, the rupture that is 
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effected by the Other through the face. In Section IV, Levinas attempts to describe—by 
means of the ontological concepts of love and fecundity—the conditions in which “the 
phenomenon of the ‘not yet’ is rooted.”115  Without this ontological notion of fecundity, 
Levinas tells us, “the time necessary for the manifestation of truth behind visible history [that 
is, the time of infinity] would be impossible.”116 It is therefore to these two conditions that we 
must turn in order to understand the ontological grounding of Levinas’ temporal ethics in 
Totality and Infinity.117 The question we will have to determine, in the final stages of this 
chapter, is whether these conditions mange to entirely absolve themselves from the order of 
history, whether the creation of the I’s responsible exposure to Other’s temporality does 
indeed refer “to horizons more vast than history, in which history itself is judged.”118 Before 
we attend to these questions, however, it will be important to clarify just what Levinas means 
by these conditions. 
 
3.2. The ontological conditions of the Other: interiority and fecundity 
It has become a truism to say that Totality and Infinity is an ethical as opposed to an 
ontological work. And as the last section began to clarify, it is of course undeniable that the 
bulk of Levinas’ analyses in that text focus on describing the nature of the ethical relation 
between the I and the Other. Nevertheless, it also cannot be said that Totality and Infinity 
entirely shuns ontological concerns. 119  As Tom Sparrow has recently argued, Levinas 
remains interested in providing “a materialist account of subjectivity.”120 Crucially, as I began 
to suggest at the end of the last section, this ontological account of subjectivity is also a 
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constitutive part of Levinas’ ethical effort in Totality and Infinity. When Levinas asks what is 
perhaps the central ethical question of his work, namely, “how can the same, produced as 
egoism, enter into a relationship with an other without immediately divesting it of his alterity”, 
we cannot fail to notice Levinas’ emphasis on the production of egoism.121 This production of 
the I as an egoist being remains an essential moment of the ethical relation that Levinas 
wants to describe: “Egoism (…) and the whole dimension of interiority—the articulations of 
separation—are necessary for the idea of Infinity, the relation with the Other”.122 Indeed, for 
Levinas, the ethical relation between the I and the Other can be “radical only if each being 
has its own time, that is, its interiority, if each time is not absorbed into [a] universal time.”123 
To fully account for the temporal opening of ethics, Levinas must therefore also explain how 
the same is ontologically produced or individuated as an I with its own unique form of 
temporal interiority. 
In the second section of Totality and Infinity, Levinas begins to approach this task by 
describing what he calls “the fundamental phenomenon of enjoyment [jouissance].”124 For 
Levinas, the primordial relation between an existent and its surrounding world should not be 
understood in terms of the “utilitarian schematism” of tools and implements, as Heidegger 
would have it.125 In the first instance, that relation must be conceived as one of enjoyment. It 
must refer to the simple fact that an existent primordially lives from and is nourished by the 
elemental world that surrounds it: “It is wind, earth, sea, sky, air” that the existent first finds 
itself involved with.126 Primordially, the existent derives nourishment and invigoration from 
these elemental aspects by transmuting them into itself.127 But this transmutation is not yet a 
vision or a handling of things: it is “simply play or enjoyment of life.”128 In this sense, Levinas 
argues, if we are to speak of an ‘intentionality’ of enjoyment, this intentionality is not that of 
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the Husserlian objectifying act: it does not project itself outwards towards the exteriority of an 
object to become represented by an act of reflection. 129  As an immediate form of 
nourishment or “living from…” the elements, enjoyment is rather the ontological process by 
which the existent begins to distinguish itself as unique by virtue of the happiness that it 
derives from its transmutation of the elemental.130 “Happiness is a principle of individuation”: 
it is the ontological process by which the existent begins to separate itself from the elemental 
to acquire its own inner temporality.131 
By itself, however, enjoyment remains insufficient as an explanation for inner temporality, 
since to possess its own temporal interiority, Levinas argues, “the separated being must 
[also] be able to recollect itself”.132 In order to truly have its own time, the separated being 
must also be able to remove itself, or take refuge from, the more generalised and 
anonymous temporality of the elemental—or what Levinas calls the indeterminate 
temporality of the “there is”.133 And this condition is “produced concretely [only] as habitation 
in a dwelling or a Home”, for only the home brings an existent its required distance from the 
elemental.134 In this particular sense, Levinas continues, the home is not purely an object 
among objects. Phenomenologically, the home's significance lies in the ability it endows the 
subject to carve out its own interiority and to thus open onto the world from a concretised 
position of inwardness: “Man abides in the world as having come to it from a private domain, 
from being at home with himself.”135 Hence, it is as proceeding from its home—from its 
dwelling—that the existent is concretely produced as “a being absolutely closed over upon 
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itself”.136 Put simply, "dwelling accomplishes separation."137 
This production of a separated interiority is not the home's sole function. As well as being 
a site of closure from the elements, the home also presents the subject with the opportunity 
to open itself up to its outside.138 Now, this opening that the home makes possible has at 
least two senses, for Levinas. The first of these is ontological, and it refers to the possibility 
that the home creates in allowing the separated being to contemplate ‘the world outside’: 
“the subject contemplating the world presupposes the event of dwelling”.139 The second, 
more important, of these senses is ethical, and it refers to the possibility that the dwelling 
creates in allowing the separated subject to relate itself to the exteriority of the Other.140 The 
home, for Levinas, is not exclusively a site where the individuated I can remove itself from 
the elements. It is also the site where the I first encounters another human Other: the 
woman.141 As Levinas puts this point: 
The interiority of recollection is a solitude in a world already human. Recollection refers to a 
welcome. (…) And the other whose presence is discreetly an absence, with which is 
accomplished the primary hospitable welcome which describes the field of intimacy, is the 
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Woman. The woman is the condition for recollection, the interiority of the Home, and 
inhabitation.142 
The home, being inhabited by the woman and the field of intimacy she establishes, instils in 
the separated I the possibility for an ethical opening because it forces it to confront a form of 
human alterity (that is, femininity) already at the level of interiority. Indeed, by placing the 
dwelling I in relation with a form of otherness that is not simply that of the elemental world, 
the home, despite being a site of separation, already “includes all the possibilities of the 
transcendent relationship with the Other.”143 In this sense, the dwelling not only enables the I 
to fully individuate its own form of temporal interiority, but also presents it with the unique 
possibility for ethics: “The relation with infinity remains as another possibility of the being 
recollected in its dwelling. The possibility for the home to open to the Other is as essential to 
the essence of the home as closed doors and windows.”144 
It is thus with the phenomenology of dwelling that Levinas begins to ground his 
conception of temporal ethics. But at the level of dwelling, Levinas insists, this elaboration 
remains incomplete, for “habitation is not yet the transcendence of language.”145 Although 
the domestic meeting with feminine alterity already prepares the I for an encounter with an 
absolute temporal alterity, this encounter can be fully concretised only beyond the level of 
interiority of the home.146 The meeting with feminine alterity in the dwelling, Levinas stresses, 
is not yet the full exteriority of language, because the woman’s face expresses only “a 
language without teaching, a silent language (….) a truncated, stammering, still elementary 
language.”147 As such, the domestic encounter with feminine alterity still contains with it the 
risk that the I will let itself become “deceived” by its elemental enjoyment and its immersion 
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in the historical world of visible phenomena.148 Now, as Levinas continually argues, this risk 
is one that can never be fully overcome, since, as noted, the I can welcome alterity precisely 
only on the basis of its interiority and dwelling: “‘I welcome the Other who presents himself in 
my home by opening my home to him.”149 This risk can, nevertheless, be attenuated by the 
ethical intervention of “the indiscreet face of the Other that calls me into question”, that is, by 
the concrete “surpassing of phenomenal or inward existence” that the Other brings about in 
the I.150 
At this point in the analysis, however, Levinas has still not quite explained how the Other 
is capable of attenuating the I’s egoistic tendencies. But clearly this task cannot be ignored, 
for, as Levinas frequently cautions, without the concrete intervention of the Other “the I 
returns to itself, finds itself again in the same despite all its recommencements, falls back on 
its feet again solitary, delineates but an irreversible fate.”151 To repeat, this return must 
always remain as a possibility for the separated I; the process of egoist individuation always 
“leaves room” for this kind of egoist return.152 But this incessant return to itself is not the only 
meaning that can be attributed to the I’s existence, because, as previously noted, its position 
as I also consists of its capacity to respond responsibly to the radical temporality of the 
Other.153 “The acuity of the problem [therefore] lies in the necessity of maintaining the I in the 
transcendence with which it has hitherto seemed incompatible.”154 Otherwise said, in order 
to account for the temporal opening of ethics we also need another notion—one that goes 
beyond the egoist movements of interiority—to show how the I is capable of receiving the 
infinite time of the Other. We must provide an account of how the I’s uprootedness from 
history finds its grounding condition in a phenomenon that is not itself historical.155 In 
Levinas’ words, “we must indicate a plane both presupposing and transcending the epiphany 
                                                
148 TI 179-180. 
149 TI 171, cf. 216. 
150 TI 171, 183. 
151 TI 270. 
152 TI 216. 
153 TI 215. 
154 TI 276. 
155 TI 247.  
 128 
of the Other in the face, a plane where the I bears itself beyond death and recovers also 
from its return to itself. This plane is that of love and fecundity, where subjectivity is posited 
in function of these movements.”156 In short, it is on the ontological planes of love and 
fecundity that we must search for the condition of the face’s temporal epiphany.157 
Properly speaking, love (eros) provides an entry into this plane beyond egoism because 
in the erotic relation the I is never purely involved with itself.158 As Levinas puts this point: 
“Eros delivers from this encumberment, arrests the return of the I to itself”, because it always 
begins with the interest for an-Other.159 Additionally, the erotic relation is not governed by 
visibility; its basic modality is that of the caress, and for Levinas, “what the caress seeks is 
not situated in a perspective and the light of the graspable.”160 The caress is a carnal relation 
between beings that “does not see.”161 In these two senses, then, love stands as an 
important moment in the I’s divestment from itself and its own egoism: “the transcendence of 
discourse is bound to love.”162 In isolation, however, love remains incapable of concretising a 
deliverance from egoism. For Levinas, love remains a relation where the subjective 
modalities of egoism are still very much possible. “I love fully only if the Other loves me”, 
which entails that “to love is also to love oneself in love, and thus to return to oneself. Love 
does not transcend unequivocably—it is complacent, it is pleasure and dual egoism.”163 In 
other words, although love begins to point towards that dimension where the I irrevocably 
divests itself of its egoism, love is still not quite this condition. “The metaphysical event of 
transcendence—the welcome of the Other, hospitality—Desire and language—is not 
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accomplished as love.”164 
Metaphysics or ethics can be established only through the “ontological category 
[catégorie ontologique]” of fecundity, which according to Levinas consists of the relationship 
between the father and his son.165 Now, fecundity is able to play this grounding function for 
ethics in part because it is not eros.166 Like eros, to be sure, fecundity enables the I to 
transcend the world of visibility and light.167 However, in fecundity, “subjectivity no longer has 
the same meaning” that it had in the erotic relation.168 If the erotic relation could still tend 
towards double egoism, “the inevitable reference of the erotic to the future in fecundity 
reveals a radically different structure”.169 As Levinas defines it, fecundity, or 
Paternity is a relation with a stranger who while being Other (…) is me, a relation of the I with a 
self which yet is not me. In this ‘I am’ being is no longer Eleatic unity. In existing itself there is a 
multiplicity and a transcendence. In this transcendence the I is not swept away, since the son is 
not me; and yet I am my son. The fecundity of the I is its very transcendence.170 
Levinas’ basic idea here is that fecundity or paternity establishes a relation where the I is 
both itself and not itself at the same time. In a certain sense, the father is his son: “I do not 
have my child; I am my child.”171 Yet, simultaneously, the child is a stranger to its father; the 
child is not its father because it retains its own individuality and a power over its own future. 
This entails that in fecundity, the child presents itself as the I simultaneously divorced from 
itself: “He is me a stranger to myself.”172 The sense of this fecund estrangement is not purely 
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psychological.173 Indeed, for Levinas, the familial situation of fecundity, far from referring only 
to the father’s conception of his son, assumes an ontological significance in that it 
effectuates a veritable break or rupture within being itself—that is, with being understood in 
its Parmenidean sense, where “[u]nity alone is ontologically privileged.”174 Through paternity, 
being is no longer produced as a unified or continuous succession of moments that remain 
indifferent to one another: “Being is no longer produced at one blow, irremissibly present. 
(….) Infinite being is produced as times, that is, in several times across the dead time that 
separates the father from the son.” 175  In other words, fecundity creates precisely that 
ontological discontinuity or rupture that is required for the I to receive the time of absolute 
alterity: “Being is [here] produced as multiple and as split into the same and other; this is its 
ultimate structure.” 176  Rather than arriving as something that belongs to the I’s future 
projects and possibilities, time now “comes to me across an absolute interval whose other 
shore the Other absolutely other—though he be my son—is alone capable of marking.”177 
And it is in this sense that the familial relation of fecundity “articulates [articule] the time of 
the absolutely other.”178 Rather than receiving the futurity of time only on the basis of its 
egoism, in fecundity the I becomes “capable of another fate than its own”.179 Paternity 
“opens up a plane where the I is divested of its tragic egoity, which turns back to itself, and 
yet is not purely and simply dissolved to the collective.”180 Indeed, because in paternity the I 
breaks free of itself, “without thereby ceasing to be an I, for the I is its son”, fecundity 
describes precisely that condition through which the I can receive the time of infinity.181 It 
describes the condition where the I can at once remain itself whilst simultaneously receiving 
an absolutely other time from a stranger who is not itself.182 
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The rupture that paternity effects in being does not assume an exclusively biological 
sense. “Biological fecundity is but one of the forms of paternity. Paternity, as a primordial 
effectuation [effectuation] of time can, among men, be borne by the biological life, but be 
lived beyond it.”183 This means that the ethical significance of fecundity is not to be reduced 
to the actual or “biologically empirical” relations that pertain between biological fathers and 
their sons.184 Because fecundity is an ontological category, it carries a sense that is wider 
than mere “biological paternity which is but its empirical expression.”185 In a similar way, 
familial fecundity should not be understood historically.186 Indeed, for Levinas, fecundity 
must be taken as precisely a break or rupture with the historical: “The rupture of historical 
and totalised duration, which dead time [or fecundity] marks, is the very rupture that creation 
operates in being.”187 This entails that far from operating at the level of the I’s immersion in 
the visible and economic temporality of history, the “deepening of the inner life” that 
fecundity accomplishes is not “guided by the evidences of history.”188 Fecundity does not 
indicate “a history and events that can occur to a residue of identity, an identity holding on by 
a thread, an I that would ensure the continuity of the avatars.”189 As the ontological situation 
that effectuates a rupture in egoist being, fecundity refers to “horizons more vast than history, 
in which history itself is judged.”190 And if, as Levinas explicitly states, “[f]ecundity continues 
history”, this is only in the restricted sense that fecundity enables the I to retain a sense of 
itself through the very rupture that it undergoes in the familial situation of paternity.191 
Properly speaking, however, that rupture or discontinuity is not itself historical: “History is 
worked over [travaillée] by the ruptures of history”.192 Hence, if time can be given in the 
ethical relation as infinite and as beyond history, this is because that infinity “presupposes 
the relation of the I with the Other and, at its basis [à son base], fecundity across the 
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discontinuous which constitutes time.”193  In short, fecundity is precisely the ontological 
condition that enables the I to finally uproot itself from history and to thus truly relate itself to 
the Other’s infinite temporality.194 “The relation with the child—that is, the relation with the 
other that is not a power, but fecundity—establishes relationship [met en rapport] with the 
absolute future, or infinite time.”195 
 
3.3. The problem of history in fecundity 
We have seen Levinas frame his temporal ethics in terms of the metaphysical or social 
relation between the I and the Other. We have also noted that though this ethical relation is 
in a certain sense a concrete experience for the I, it nonetheless finds its proper condition in 
certain ontological structures—namely, the individuation of the I in interiority and its 
‘subsequent’ rupturing in fecundity.196 Without these two conditions, the temporal ethics that 
Levinas envisages would not be possible. Without them, there would be no absolute future 
or infinite time beyond history, and “the I would remain a subject in which every adventure 
would revert into the adventure of a fate.”197 Now, the question that I want to pose in the 
remainder of this chapter is whether the ethical framework that Levinas presents in Totality 
and Infinity is in fact capable of absolving itself from all implication with the order of history. 
As repeatedly noted, it is precisely this kind of implication with the historical that Levinas 
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continually denies in his text: not only does the ethical relation consist of man’s 
uprootedness from history, but so too, the ontological category that properly speaking 
grounds this relation (fecundity) is itself said to constitute a rupture with the historical. But 
how credible are Levinas’ assertions on these points? This is the question I now want to 
tackle as a way of exploring whether Levinas' temporal ethics can indeed provide a 
successful resolution to the problem of history that appears in Bergson's philosophy. 
This question is vital, I contend, not simply because, like Bergson before him, Levinas 
repeatedly frames his temporal ethics as operating beyond history. In a real sense, the 
question of history is also one that Derrida repeatedly asks of Levinas in his substantive and 
hugely influential reading of Totality and Infinity: “Violence and Metaphysics”.198 In this text, 
Derrida admires Levinas’ effort to describe the ethical relation as “the only possible opening 
[ouverture] of time, the only pure future, the only pure expenditure beyond history as 
economy.”199 There is a kind of unique audacity to Levinas’ ethical enterprise, an audacity 
that can make us tremble, Derrida says.200 At the same time, we must question the extent to 
which Levinasian ethics can actually and credibly position itself as outside of all history.201 
Faced with Levinas’ definition of history as an economic blindness to the Other, Derrida 
writes, “[o]ne wonders whether history itself does not begin with this relationship to the other 
which Levinas places beyond history.”202 One wonders not only whether the ethical relation 
to the Other is not more implicated with history than Levinas would like to admit, but also, or 
more broadly, whether—via this implication—the ethical relation does not itself take up a 
historical aspect, whether the metaphysical transcendence Levinas speaks of is not itself 
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“history, and not beyond history.”203 This question regarding history, furthermore, is not 
merely incidental from the perspective of Levinasian ethics. Indeed, given the importance 
that Levinas himself clearly attaches to the distinction between ethics and history, Derrida 
argues, “[t]he framework of this question should govern the entire reading of Totality and 
Infinity.”204 
For Derrida, this question on the relation between ethics and history is primarily 
prompted by Levinas’ conception of language as a break with the historical. Derrida clarifies 
that the questions he asks of Levinas—including that of history—“are all, in several senses, 
questions of language: questions of language and the question of language.”205 The main 
issue, as Derrida conceives it, is that in positioning the face as a temporal opening that 
breaks with the conceptual modalities that have traditionally dominated the history of 
Western philosophy (e.g. ontology, knowledge and visibility), Levinas has not sufficiently 
considered the extent to which his own language remains contaminated by that very tradition. 
This is not a matter of simply accusing Levinas of introducing logical contradictions and 
incoherencies into his ethical system.206 It is rather a matter of showing that the very 
conceptual heritage that Levinas attempts to escape with his description of the face 
necessarily inscribes itself into his ethics as a consequence of his own linguistic act of 
description.207 As an example of this process of inscription, Derrida cites Levinas’ frequent 
use of the term ‘exteriority’.208 He notes that as well as using this term abundantly, “Levinas 
also intends to show that true exteriority is not spatial, for space is the Site of the Same.”209 
In using exteriority negatively in this way, however, Levinas has not sufficiently considered 
the extent to which his usage continues to precisely invoke that spatiality and visibility that 
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the term—in its strictly non-spatial sense—is meant to exceed. “Why is it necessary still to 
use the word ‘exteriority’ (which, if it has a meaning (…) obstinately beckons toward space 
and light) in order to signify a nonspatial relationship? (….) To say that the infinite exteriority 
of the other is not spatial, is non-exteriority and non-interiority, to be unable to designate it 
otherwise than negatively—is this not to acknowledge that the infinite (…) cannot be 
stated?”210 What Derrida is illustrating with these two rhetorical questions is the fact that any 
philosophical language, insofar as it belongs to a system of languages in general, always 
necessarily bears within it an “original and irreducible” tendency to spatialise and 
illuminate.211 To succeed, a philosophical project hoping to exceed space and visibility 
through language must therefore necessarily contend with this irreducible problem. In 
Derrida’s own words: “the attempt to achieve an opening [percée] toward the beyond of 
philosophical discourse, by means of philosophical discourse, which can never be shaken 
off [s’arracher] completely, cannot possibly succeed within language (…) except by formally 
and thematically posing the question [problème] of the relations between belonging and the 
opening, the question of closure [le problème de la clôture].”212 Yet, it is precisely this formal 
and thematic analysis of language’s necessary implication with the conceptuality that it 
presumably exceeds that Levinas fails to provide in Totality and Infinity.213 
The issue is compounded, Derrida argues, because “when confronted with these 
classical difficulties of language, Levinas cannot provide himself with the classical resources 
against them.”214 Indeed, unlike Bergson, who, as chapter one highlighted, positions the 
spatiality and conceptuality of language in strict opposition to the immediacy of intuition, 
Levinas effectively reverses this formula. In so doing, however, Levinas also disavows the 
best weapon against Derrida’s questions on language: “disdain of discourse.”215 Derrida puts 
the point thus: 
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Bergson had the right to announce the intuition of duration, and to denounce intellectual 
spatialisation, within a language given over to space. It was not a question of saving, but of 
destroying discourse within ‘metaphysics’, the science which allegedly ‘does without symbols.’ 
(….) Language being defined as a historical residue, there was no contradiction in utilising it, for 
better or for worse, in order to denounce its own betrayal, and then to abandon it to its own 
insufficiency as a rhetorical refuse, speech lost to metaphysics. Like negative theology, a 
philosophy of intuitive communion gave itself the right (correctly or incorrectly, another problem) 
to travel through philosophical discourse as through a foreign medium. But what happens when 
the right is no longer given [as in Levinas], when the possibility of metaphysics is the possibility of 
speech? (…) And if the speech which must inaugurate and maintain absolute separation is by its 
essence rooted in space, which cannot conceive separation and absolute alterity?216 
Derrida’s answer to these last two questions is that if we accept both Levinas’ claim that only 
discourse (and not intuitive contact) is ethically righteous, and the idea that “all discourse 
essentially retains within it space and the Same”, then the discourse that Levinas privileges 
from an ethical perspective is itself violent.217 Even in its ethical function—that is, as an 
opening onto absolute temporal alterity—discourse carries within it an irreducible tendency 
to do injustice to that very alterity: “language can only indefinitely tend toward justice by 
acknowledging and practicing the violence within it. Violence against violence. Economy of 
violence.”218 Furthermore, Derrida insists, if, like Levinas, we want to continue to equate 
violence and economy with history (and for Derrida, “this is the legitimate truism from which 
Levinas always draws inspiration”), then the ethical opening that Levinas describes is itself 
historical.219 “If speech is a movement of metaphysical transcendence”, and if speech, in its 
essential spatiality and visibility, always perpetuates an economy of violence, then 
Levinasian ethics or metaphysics “is history, and not beyond history.”220 As such: “History is 
not the totality transcended by eschatology, metaphysics, or speech. It is transcendence 
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itself.”221 
In the remainder of “Violence and Metaphysics”, Derrida arrives at a similar conclusion 
via a detailed analysis of the relation between Totality and Infinity and Husserl and 
Heidegger’s thought. These analyses are long and complex, and we do not need to 
familiarise ourselves with their entire richness. Suffice it to say here that in these passages 
Derrida attempts to demonstrate that just as Levinas’ metaphysics remains “unable to 
escape its ancestry in light”, so too, it “always presupposes a phenomenology in its very 
critique of [Husserlian] phenomenology”, just as it supposes and practices “the thought of 
precomprehension of Being” even as it directs itself against Heideggerian ontology.222 For 
Derrida, these analyses contain a clear upshot regarding the relation between Levinasian 
ethics and history. Once again, if, like Levinas, we want to continue to equate ontology and 
phenomenality with the play of visibility and the same—in a word, with history—then 
Levinas’ own ethics, in presupposing the articulations of phenomenology and ontology in its 
presumed rupture away from them, remains inevitably caught up with the order of the 
historical. Indeed, if phenomenality and ontology continue to contaminate Levinas’ 
conception of the ethical opening, then the ‘beyond history’ that Levinas equates with the 
Other cannot be reached or stated “except through violence. This infinite passage through 
violence is what is called history.”223 This continued imbrication between ethics and history 
also has implications for the temporality that the Other’s face is said to open up, according to 
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Derrida. Indeed, if, as Levinas claims, temporal ethics moves beyond history by exposing 
the I to the time of infinity, and if history is nothing more than that infinity merely 
temporalised in accordance with an identifiable present (as we have already seen Levinas 
argue in Totality and Infinity), then it is only in and through the present that “all temporal 
alterity can be constituted and appear as such (…) [that is, only] in the unity and actuality of 
my living present.”224 This entails that far from being the immediate relation of the I with a 
time that is absolutely beyond history, the ethical relation not only finds itself situated and 
rooted in history, but also encompasses within it the violence that its historical presence 
necessarily implicates. “In the last analysis, if one wishes to determine violence as the 
necessity that the other not appear as what it is (…) then time is violence.”225 
In a certain sense, Derrida argues, this complex implication between temporal ethics, 
history and violence is both inevitable and intractable. A metaphysics like Levinas’—which 
privileges language as its primary ethical modality—always involves a necessary violence.226 
But this is not to suggest that metaphysics cannot ever hope to avoid all kinds of violence. 
Indeed, according to Derrida, though violence is always necessary to a discursive ethics, it is 
not inevitable that ethics always succumb to the worst kind of violence, that is, to that 
violence that consists of silencing or repressing the alterity that discourse can also 
express.227  But for ethics to tackle this worst violence, Derrida insists, it must remain 
ethically vigilant to its own implication in history and to the violence that this implication 
necessarily entails: “This vigilance is a violence chosen as the least violence by a philosophy 
that takes history, that is, finitude, seriously; a philosophy aware of itself as historical in each 
of its aspects (…), and aware of itself, as Levinas says in another sense, as economy.”228 
Such vigilance also involves recognising that history need not be exclusively equated with 
the visible or economic totality of the Same; it involves acknowledging that history can—
even if it remains violence against alterity—also function as a site where that alterity 
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expresses itself.229 However, in this context, the problem with Totality and Infinity is that 
because it stays silent on the implication between its own ethics and history, it also fails to 
avail itself of the opportunity to vigilantly tackle its own violent tendencies. “This secondary 
war [against ethical violence], as the avowal of violence, is the least possible violence, the 
only way to repress the worst violence, the violence of primitive and prelogical silence”.230 
Yet, it is precisely this secondary war against violence that Totality and Infinity cannot enter 
into by refusing to acknowledge the implication between temporal ethics and history. If the 
I’s ethical exposure to temporal alterity always implies a certain violence, then by refusing to 
acknowledge and avow this very implication, Levinas also provides us with no ethical means 
by which to resist and negotiate it. 
What are we to make of Derrida’s reading of Levinas? It is clear that this reading remains 
a vital resource for articulating how Levinas’ temporal ethics in Totality and Infinity remains 
caught up with the very history that it presents itself as eschewing and escaping. In effect, 
Derrida alerts us to that fact that if Levinas moves away from the ethical modalities that 
operated in Bergson’s temporal ethics, he does not, by those same means, necessarily 
overcome the problem of history that continued to haunt that intuitive philosophy. Indeed, by 
asking his series of questions on language, Derrida shows us that Levinas’ ethics is more 
rooted in history than the latter is willing to admit. However, while Derrida’s resolute focus on 
language remains valuable, it also leads him to overlook some other, equally significant and 
problematic aspects of Levinas’ temporal ethics. As I attempted to show in the last section, 
Levinas’ conception of ethics in Totality and Infinity is not limited to an account of the 
‘effects’ that the Other—as interlocutor or face—exerts on the I. That conception also 
contains important descriptions about the ontological conditions that make those effects 
possible in the first place, that is, interiority and fecundity. Now, it is true that “Violence and 
Metaphysics” does not claim to provide more than a “very partial” reading of Totality and 
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Infinity.231 Specifically, Derrida limits his reading of Levinas to the latter’s description of the 
face, leaving aside any detailed consideration of what I have thus far called the ontological 
conditions for that experience.232 In this regard, Derrida even goes as far as confessing his 
“total deafness” to Levinas’ assertions on fecundity.233 Yet, by Derrida’s own admission, this 
deafness or partiality remains both perplexing and problematic.234 For in the process of 
telling us that he will not focus on Levinas’ analyses of those conditions, Derrida also reveals 
that he considers those analyses to be quite free as regards traditional conceptuality. He 
writes: “These analyses are not only an indefatigable and interminable destruction of ‘formal 
logic’: they are so acute and so free [libres] as concerns traditional conceptuality, that a 
commentary running several pages would betray them immeasurably.”235 But if, as we have 
seen, the point of Derrida’s reading is to demonstrate that Levinas’ ethics remains caught up 
with the conceptuality (and, by implication, with the history) that it attempts to evade, then is 
it not precisely at the level of these analyses that are “so free as concerns traditional 
conceptuality” that we must also seek to determine how far Levinas’ ethical thought 
manages to uproot itself from history?236 Is the importance of this task not, moreover, 
reinforced by Levinas’ own claim that the ontological condition of fecundity—as dead time—
is not historical? Indeed, it seems that to fully confirm Derrida’s broad contention that 
Levinas’ temporal ethics remains caught up with history, we also have to go beyond the 
scope of the former’s partial focus on language. We also have to ask how fecundity—as the 
‘first’ ontological condition of the I’s exposure to the Other—might itself function to root 
Levinas’ temporal ethics in the domain of the historical.237 
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It might not immediately be clear how fecundity implicates Levinas’ temporal ethics with 
history. If we take Levinas at his word that fecundity is not historical, we seem to be left with 
no ground on which to stand. But I contend that we should not simply take Levinas at his 
word here. For if Levinas is perhaps right to insist that fecundity—as a familial situation 
between the father and his son—does not bear an exclusively biological sense, it is a much 
greater stretch to suggest that this situation is also completely removed from the domain of 
history. As even Hegel—to whom Levinas of course refers in the process of outlining his 
conception of fecundity—recognises in the Philosophy of Right, though the family is perhaps 
an immediate ethical situation that becomes “objective” only in the relation between parents 
and their children, it is not, by that same token, completely extricated from the domain of 
history.238 On Hegel's conception, not only does the relation between parents and their 
children find itself externally affected by historically constituted norms and institutions, but so 
too, its “self-subsistent” unity always finds itself beckoned by “the tremendous power [of an 
economic civil society] which draws people into itself and claims from them that they work for 
it”.239 In a more contemporary key, Deleuze and Guattari likewise insist that the family is not 
to be regarded as a foundational structure that ‘precedes’ any and all involvement with 
economic history. Indeed, according to the authors’ famous analysis of the family in Anti-
Oedipus, the family is never prior to history and politics: “The father, the mother, and the I 
[moi] are at grips with, and directly coupled to, the elements of the political and historical 
situation—the soldier, the cop, the occupier, the collaborator, the radical, the resister, the 
boss, the boss’s wife (…). In a word, the family is never a microcosm in the sense of an 
autonomous figure, even when inscribed in a larger circle that it is said to mediate and 
express.”240 Or, as Claire Colebrook summarises this conception of the family: “Deleuze and 
Guattari use history in Anti-Oedipus to show that the linguistic and familial subject of 
modernity is the consequence of a contingent history (….) Not only is there no such natural 
kind as ‘man’, or even ‘the family’—such selections occur only when an array of complex, 
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varying and radically different genetic variations are [politically] coded as belonging to 
certain groups or territories.”241 
If one accepts such historical definitions of the family, then Levinas’ ethics is not as 
removed from the domain of history as he would have us believe. If the family has a history, 
if the familial relation between, say, a father and his son is determined historically, then that 
relation cannot play the role of a grounding condition for ethics without at the same time 
firmly placing that ethics within the horizon of history. But what reason do we have for 
accepting these as opposed to Levinas’ own definition of the family as a break with the 
historical? If the family was historical, should we not expect to find at least a trace of this 
history in Levinas’ own conception, which purports precisely to be ahistorical? Indeed, we 
should. And in my view, the best indication that the familial structure Levinas describes is 
historical can be gleaned from its explicit prioritisation of masculinity as the essential sense 
of fecundity. As the last section showed, Levinas’ discussion of fecundity explicitly privileges 
the masculine figures of the father and his son: it is the estrangement that the father feels in 
relation to his son that functions as the rupture in being that is required for infinite time. To 
be sure, the figure of the mother is not completely removed from this picture, since, as 
Levinas claims, the mother must be introduced to account for the son’s relation with the 
father across fecundity.242 Nevertheless, from the perspective of time, it is the relation 
between the two masculine beings (father-son) that remains determinant: “The [father’s] 
relation with [its masculine] child (…) establishes relation with the absolute future, or infinite 
time.”243 
Now, leaving aside the issue that maternity perhaps provides a more apt metaphor for 
the kind of self-estrangement that Levinas intends the concept of fecundity to capture, one of 
the key questions that emerges from Levinas’ basic account of that concept is how the 
content, distribution, and significance of the basic familial triad (father-mother-child) can be 
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determined if not historically.244 How, starting from the familial triad (and assuming that 
families are triadic), can we decide, for example, that the relation between father and son is 
the one that is most significant for ethics if not by implicitly appealing to a range of 
historically defined norms that continue to operate in Western societies? How can we insist 
on the importance of the masculine relation over all others without simultaneously rooting 
ourselves on an ideological state of affairs dictating that the masculine should take ethical 
precedence over the feminine, that the masculine relation is more apt for the ‘exteriority’ of 
ethics than the ‘domesticity’ of its feminine counterparts? As Stella Sandford points out, 
within the general framework of Levinas’ ethics, “these words ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ are 
not discrete and interchangeable linguistic elements but ideological signs with a history”.245 
Indeed, insofar as it privileges the masculine relation between the father and his son, 
Levinas’ conception of fecundity—despite positioning itself as ahistorical—continues to find 
at least part of its sense in a concrete historical situation, that is, in an ideological or 
patriarchal state of affairs that affirms the ethical priority of masculine relations over and 
above the ethical insignificance of their feminine counterparts. As Eric Severson notes, 
Levinas’ conception of time in Totality and Infinity is “partly born out of his understanding of 
the family”, but that understanding, far from remaining neutral with regards to historically 
determined forms of actuality, not only bears “unfortunate emblems of patriarchal models” 
but also is “conditioned by various cultural and religious forces to think in particular ways 
about the feminine.”246 This suggests that Levinas’ conception of temporal ethics is not as 
completely removed from the horizon of history as he would have us believe. Indeed, insofar 
as it continues to base itself on a familial situation, Levinas’ temporal ethics in Totality and 
Infinity remains—ab initio—implicated with the history by which the relational significance of 
familial terms like ‘father’, ‘son’, ‘mother’ and ‘daughter’ is both configured and distributed. 
But at this stage the objection might arise that this argument attaches undue significance 
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to Levinas’ merely metaphorical use of the notion of fecundity. Should Levinas’ assertions 
that fecundity is not biological not alert us to the fact that this condition for ethics finds no 
necessary referent in “the empirical presence of a human being of the masculine sex”?247 In 
this sense, is fecundity not simply a “metaphor” (as Levinas himself calls it) that refers not to 
an actual or empirical father-son relation, but to the more general phenomenon of “seeing 
the possibilities of the other as your own possibilities, of being able to escape the closure of 
your own identity”?248 Under this more general—or metaphorical—definition, can fecundity 
not arise in the relation between the mother “and the daughter too”, as Levinas himself 
explicitly indicates in a late interview with François Poirié?249 It is perhaps true that if one 
takes this wider, metaphorical sense of fecundity, then that concept could perhaps also 
describe the rupture in being that arises in the relation between a mother and her daughter. 
However, as Robert Manning notes, this does not alter the fact that in Totality and Infinity 
Levinas continues to deploy the patriarchal language of masculine privilege to describe the 
ontological condition of fecundity.250 More crucially from our perspective in this chapter, this 
wider definition would also not do away with the fact that, as familial, a mother-daughter type 
fecundity would remain immersed in a particular history. Indeed, even if fecundity described 
the ontological opening that is effected in the relation between a mother and her daughter, it 
would still refer, as a condition for temporal ethics, to the history by which the ethical 
significance of those two subject positions are determined and configured. To be sure, this 
history would perhaps not be the patriarchal history that Levinas’ conception—as it stands—
continues to rely upon for its sense and direction. But even as a mother-daughter relation, 
fecundity would remain dependent on a history, for as Deleuze and Guattari insist in Anti-
Oedipus, the subject positions of ‘mother’ and ‘daughter’, as much as those of ‘father’ and 
‘son’, remain implicated, or “directly coupled to, the elements of [their surrounding] political 
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and historical situation”.251 Metaphorical or not, so long as fecundity remains a familial 
situation, it will continue to have its anchoring point in an empirical history that partly 
determines the content and significance of the familial terms that it deploys. 
Where, then, does this leave Derrida’s analysis of Levinas in “Violence and Metaphysics”? 
In a certain sense, Derrida is of course correct to insist that Levinas’ temporal ethics in 
Totality and Infinity remains caught up in the order of history—that metaphysics is history. 
However, pace Derrida, this immersion in the historical is not simply, or not exclusively, a 
question of language. It is not exclusively because Levinas’ temporal ethics privileges 
discourse or language as its central modality that the problem of history inscribes itself—as 
a kind of formal necessity—within it. The problem of history also inscribes itself on Levinas’ 
temporal ethics because that ethics continues to premise itself on what can only be seen as 
a concrete historical condition: the familial situation of fecundity. Indeed, if, as Deleuze and 
Guattari show, the family is nothing but a historically defined complex, and if Levinas’ ethics 
of the face continues to find its condition of the concrete familial relation between the father 
and his son (fecundity), then that ethics does—Levinas’ claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding—remain caught up and rooted in the order of history. Far from referring to 
horizons beyond the historical, Levinasian temporal ethics thus continues to find its sense 
and condition in a concrete historical situation. And if that implication with history attaches 
the possibility of violence to Levinas’ temporal ethics, then this violence is not simply, or not 
exclusively, as Manning notes, “Derrida’s anonymous violence of language itself.”252 It is a 
violence that derives from Levinas’ choice to ground his temporal ethics in a historically 
determined, patriarchal state of affairs whilst simultaneously disavowing the determinant role 
that such a state of affairs plays in his ethics. In this sense, if Derrida is right to insist that 
there is a certain violence to Levinas’ temporal ethics—that time is violence—then once 
again, pace Derrida, this is not simply, or not exclusively, because that ethics privileges a 
language that is necessarily visual and spatial—as is all language ‘in general’. That violence 
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also derives, in concreto, from Levinas’ decision to ground his temporal ethics in an actual 
historical situation (without the simultaneous recognition that this situation is, properly 
speaking, historical). 
 
3.4. Conclusion: beyond fecundity 
I have argued in this chapter that Levinas' temporal ethics in Totality and Infinity remains 
constitutively implicated with the historical. Though Levinas' ethical framework certainly 
distances itself from Bergson's emphasis on the intuition, because it thinks an immediate 
ethical relation to novelty on the basis of the ontological category of fecundity, it continues 
(like Bergson's ethics) to receive part of its essential sense from a concrete historical 
situation. Indeed, far from uprooting ethics from history and the violence the latter entails, 
insofar as it remains premised on the ontological relation between a father and his son, 
Levinas' temporal ethics not only remains constitutively implicated with history, but also 
remains complicit with the violence (towards the feminine) which that history, in its Western 
manifestation, has traditionally involved. 
In this sense, I suggest, the temporal ethics of Totality and Infinity cannot quite fulfil its 
promise of formulating a successful 'resolution' to the problem of history that makes an 
apparition in Bergson’s ethical philosophy. Indeed, far from dispelling that problem, Levinas' 
temporal ethics in that text merely convokes it anew. To be sure, the problem has here 
changed shape somewhat: it no longer refers to the intuition's constitutive implication with 
those historical systems of knowledge that have traditionally done violence to the novelty of 
time (qua duration), but refers instead to the constitutive implication of an immediate ethical 
relation with that history that has traditionally done violence to the novelty of time (qua 
feminine Other). In both cases, however, a constitutive implication with history presents a 
problem that neither Bergson nor Levinas have quite been able to resolve: the problem, that 
is, of showing how an immediate temporal ethics can become strategically dissociated from 
its tendency to remain complicit, or to replicate, those dangers and violence that can be 
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associated with the historical. 
Now, perhaps, Levinas could have avoided re-invoking the problem of history by 
grounding his conception of temporal ethics on something other than the metaphorics of 
fecundity. And as we know, this is precisely one of the decisive shifts that occur between the 
publication of Totality and Infinity and Levinas' second major work, Otherwise than Being. 
Indeed, in the latter text, we not only see Levinas significantly revise his conception of 
language in response to Derrida's "Violence and Metaphysics"; we also see Levinas develop 
a more thoroughly 'ethical' (that is, less ontological) grounding for his temporal ethics that no 
longer relies on the problematic notion of fecundity. With these revisions, Levinas claims he 
can now truly offer an immediate conception of temporal ethics that is in no way recuperable 
by the presence of history.253 But once again, how credible are Levinas' assertions on these 
points? How far does Otherwise than Being truly remove itself from the problem of history? 
These are the questions the next chapter will consider. 
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4. Levinas II: the anarchic temporal ethics of Otherwise than Being 
Having explored the temporal ethics of Totality and Infinity, in this chapter, I want to turn 
my attention to Levinas’ second major work, Otherwise than Being, to consider to what 
extent it offers a more promising resolution to the problem of history that persisted in the 
earlier text. As is well known, Otherwise than Being revises many of the central themes of 
Totality and Infinity. Specifically, Levinas now drops much of “the ontological language” that 
still pervaded the earlier work.1 Conceptually, this abandonment of ontological language is 
cashed out in two ways. First, Otherwise than Being develops a more nuanced conception of 
language. Language is no longer simply equated with expression, but is itself split into the 
dimension of “the said [le dit]” and “the saying [le dire]”, where the former refers to the 
articulations of the presence, simultaneity, and history that occur within traditional 
conceptuality and syntax, and the latter—saying—signifies the ethical interruption of all the 
modalities of the said.2 Secondly, where Totality and Infinity had spoken of fecundity as one 
of the ontological conditions for the ethical relation to the Other, Levinas now holds that this 
condition for ethics must itself be given a wholly ethical explanation; it must refer to the 
fissuring of subjectivity that takes place, as it were, wholly before or otherwise than being 
and its history. 
In line with this broad turn away from ontology, Levinas now also argues that an ethical 
relation to the temporality of the Other is best framed in terms of the notion of proximity. This 
account of proximity, as this chapter's first section will show, somewhat shifts the focus away 
from the futurity that was taken as being expressed by the Other’s face in Totality and 
Infinity.3 Levinas now argues that in proximity, the subject becomes radically exposed to the 
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face as the "trace of an immemorial past”, to the trace, that is, of a past that was never 
present and that no order, synchronicity or memory is ever capable of recapturing.4 It is this 
anarchic dimension of proximity that now constitutes the ethical relation wherein the subject 
is exposed to a temporality that is not its own: the unforeseeable temporality of the Other. 
And once again, Levinas tells us that this ethical relation is by no means reducible to the 
temporality of history. Proximity, Levinas argues, places the subject in relation with a "non-
historical, non-said time, which cannot be synchronised in a present by memory and 
historiography".5 
In conjunction with this new focus on proximity, as section two will show, Otherwise than 
Being also drops all mention of fecundity, choosing instead to frame the condition for 
proximity in terms of the wholly ethical notion of substitution. Substitution, for Levinas, is the 
ethical process whereby the subject’s “pre-originary susceptiveness” to the Other is 
formulated.6 In other words, substitution is that process—wholly beyond being and history—
where the subject becomes constituted as predisposed to the radical temporality of the 
Other in proximity. Far from being grounded on the ontological relation between a father and 
his son, the ethical relation now takes as its 'basis' this ethical process that is wholly beyond 
ontology and history.7 
Given that it displaces an emphasis on the ontological relation of fecundity—a relation 
that, as the last chapter argued, must be taken as historical—it would seem that Otherwise 
than Being, more so than Totality and Infinity, has the potential to liberate Levinas' temporal 
ethics from any implication with history. This reading would certainly find support in Levinas’ 
repeated assertions that his model of temporal ethics in that text truly effectuates a “break 
with being and history.”8 However, as I argue in this chapter’s third section, while it cannot 
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be denied that Levinas provides a new ‘basis’ for his temporal ethics, it is less credible to 
assert that this ethics is now wholly removed from the historical. The issue, as I conceive it, 
is that despite turning away from the language of fecundity, Levinas continues to frame his 
temporal ethics in terms of a series of gendered terms (like maternity, fraternity and illeity) 
that speak precisely to the implication of his ethics with the historical. Once again with the 
help of Derrida, I argue that Levinas’ temporal ethics in Otherwise than Being continues to 
bear a trace of that patriarchal history that provides some of the sense for Levinas’ emphasis 
on fecundity in Totality and Infinity. In this way, I contend that far from finding itself wholly 
beyond history, Levinas’ temporal ethics in Otherwise than Being continues to find itself 
contaminated by it at its most constitutive level. But once again, like in Totality and Infinity, 
Levinas refuses to accept this constitutive contamination between ethics and the historical. 
And in this particular sense, I conclude this chapter by saying, Levinas’ temporal ethics 
shows itself as no more capable than Bergson’s philosophy of providing an adequate 
resolution to the problem of history. 
 
4.1. Time beyond being: language and proximity 
Among the principal innovations of Otherwise than Being is its abandonment of the 
classical phenomenological structure of Totality and Infinity.9 Where the earlier text sought to 
expound its temporal ethics by strata—that is, by beginning with the description of the I’s 
individuation in interiority, before proceeding to describe the ethical temporality of the face 
and, finally, examining its grounding in a realm beyond the face—the order of presentation of 
the later text is both more diffuse and less clearly structured. Rather than clearly presenting 
it, Otherwise than Being “coils” around its central problematic of “exposing” subjectivity as 
the fundamental locus of an interruption of being.10 At critical junctures, the subsequent text 
also drops the descriptive neutrality of Totality and Infinity by engaging in explicit 
                                                
9 Cohen, 1998: xxi. 
10 OB: 14. 
 151 
thematisations about what it means for a philosophical work to claim to break with the 
encompassing power of linguistic closure—or what Levinas calls the event of being—from 
within language.11 As Critchley notes, these stylistic changes are not insignificant.12 Indeed, 
in many ways, they reflect Levinas’ continued commitment to ethically breaking with the 
orders of visibility and phenomenality whilst responding to Derrida’s reservations regarding 
philosophy’s ability to achieve such an opening through the traditional medium of 
discourse.13 
Levinas begins this attempt to think the opening of ethics by introducing a distinction 
between “the saying [le dire]” and “the said [le dit]”.14 As he explains this distinction, the 
saying is that ethical excess, or remainder, which of necessity refuses to be contained by 
any linguistic proposition or statement that operates at the level of monstration or of truth 
and falsity.15 This latter level, or this modality of language where things are adequate to their 
representation, is what Levinas calls the said; it is the dimension of language where an entity 
becomes “fixed, assembled in a tale, is synchronised, presented, lends itself to a noun, 
receives a title.”16 The said is “not simply a sign or an expression of a meaning”, but is rather 
the linguistic site where entities and things become identified and comparable: the said 
“proclaims and establishes this as that.”17 In other words, the said is the plane of language in 
which not only identification but also essence become established through techniques such 
as naming and apophansis: “Essence is not only conveyed in the said, is not only 
‘expressed’ in it, but originally—though amphibologically—resounds in it qua essence.”18 In 
the said, entities are not only “illuminated in the memorable time of essence”, but their being 
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is also thereby upheld as “the very resonance of being”.19 And it is in this sense, Levinas 
maintains, that language can be conceived (qua said) as a system of identification, 
designation and, more importantly, history.20  In visibility and manifestation of the said, 
entities manifest themselves as historical, they “become history [se font histoire], are 
delivered over to writing, in which the time or narrative, without being reversed, 
recommences. They become states of affairs”.21 
But language also contains another dimension that is irreducible to the temporality of 
essence and history in the said.22 Indeed, according to Levinas, if Western philosophy has 
hitherto contented itself with operating at the level of the said, there is also “behind being 
and its monstration (…) [the] resonance of other significations, which now solicit our 
inquiry.”23 This alternative signification beyond being—or “signifyingness itself”—Levinas 
calls the saying.24 This saying cannot, unlike the said, be entirely reduced to the play of 
essence or being: “Signification, saying (…) cannot be understood as a modality of being.”25 
Instead, the saying is to be described as the “primordial enigma” of language that escapes 
the epos of both essence and being.26 It is the “irreducible disturbance [dérangement]” of 
language that refuses to be contained by the synchronicity or simultaneity of essence and 
history in the said.27  Understood as an “immemorial, pre-historical” disturbance that is 
“antecedent to the said”, the saying constitutes what Levinas calls the diachrony of language: 
“It is the impossibility of the dispersion of time to assemble itself in the present, the 
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insurmountable diachrony of time, a beyond the said.”28 This means that the saying is the 
“refusal of conjunction” or “the non-totalisable” within language itself.29 The saying is a “non-
historical, non-said time” that always comes to fissure the temporal stability of the said, 
without every finding itself wholly captured by the said’s drive to assemble all things into a 
memory and history.30 Indeed, as the rupture or diachrony that is ‘antecedent’ to the said, 
the saying never finds itself entirely encapsulated by the synchronisation that the latter—as 
a historically constituted system of language—performs.31 Saying is that anarchic temporal 
lapse that always repudiates the assembled or historical time of the said.32 
Under this conceptual backdrop, one of the central questions that Otherwise than Being 
asks itself is how the saying can be made to resonate in thought given that much of Western 
philosophy already appears, historically, to take place at the level of the said. 33 
“Phenomenality, the exhibition of being’s essence in truth, is a permanent presupposition of 
the philosophical tradition of the West.”34 How, then, can we speak of a saying that is 
beyond or antecedent to the said? For Levinas, it would not be possible to speak of “the 
beyond essence if this history of the West did not bear, in its margins, the trace of events 
carrying another signification”.35 However, it cannot be the case that this trace simply 
‘shows’ itself in the said, for that exposition would “still give an ontological said, in the 
measure that all monstration exposes an essence.”36 Instead, Levinas contends, the “echo 
of the otherwise” can be heard in thought only through a “reduction” whereby the saying is 
“extracted” from the said in which it always already leaves its mark as an otherwise.37 As 
Levinas explains, this reduction is in one sense not unlike that of Husserlian phenomenology, 
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“insofar as it signifies the locating of notions in the horizon of their appearing, a horizon 
unrecognised, forgotten or displaced in the exhibition of an object.” 38  In contrast to 
Husserlian phenomenology, however, Levinas’ reduction does not direct its attention to a 
structure or “mode of being showing itself in a theme.”39 Instead, that reduction directs itself 
to the saying that can never be described or captured in the manifestation and visibility of 
the said: “the reduction is reduction of the said to the saying beyond the logos, beyond being 
and non-beyond, beyond essence, beyond true and non-true.”40 This reduction does, to be 
sure, still require the presence of the said, since “one can go back to [the saying] through 
reduction only of what shows itself.”41 But this is not to attribute a priority to the said over the 
saying, for, properly speaking, the saying is always prior to the said and its history.42 Neither 
is the ‘result’ of the reduction to be equated with the order of the said. Indeed, in reality, what 
the reduction ‘uncovers’ is that ethical modality where it is the saying that determines the 
ultimate meaning and significance of the said, where “saying states and thematises the said 
(…) with a signification that has to be distinguished from that borne by words in the said.”43 
What the reduction ‘finds’ by reducing the saying from the said is a notion of subjectivity that 
functions as “the ethical interruption of essence.”44 
This ethical interruption of essence that is uncovered by the reduction is what Levinas 
terms “proximity”.45 Proximity is a relation with the other that “is quite distinct from every 
other relationship, and has to be conceived as a responsibility for the other; it might be 
called humanity, or subjectivity”.46 This proximity cannot be described as the cognition of 
another, since in knowing the primordial contact with alterity signified by proximity is already 
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“in a certain sense an abstraction.”47 In knowing, “being shows itself to itself”, and contact is 
still posited on the basis of a solitary for-itself.48 But for Levinas, proximity, qua responsibility, 
cannot be reduced to this play of being, to this play of the for-itself.49 Responsibility is not 
cognition but exposure.50 But again, this exposure is not simply the susceptibility to being of 
a “subject complacent in itself and positing itself for itself.”51 Instead, proximity must be 
understood as the immediate exposedness to another that functions even ‘before’ the ego’s 
self-enjoyment of the elemental. Properly speaking, even this egoistic enjoyment already 
bears the trace of alterity, such that there can be no worldly immediacy that is not always 
already responsibility or proximity for-the-other.52 Hence, if Totality and Infinity speaks of the 
face-to-face encounter as the immediate, in Otherwise than Being the face’s immediacy now 
carries the additional sense of a proximity that is prior even to the I’s natural identification 
with itself: “the immediacy of the other [autre], more immediate still than immediate identity in 
its quietude as a nature—the immediacy of proximity.”53 As an immediate relation, proximity 
is the “extreme exposure to the assignation of [responsibility] by the other” that functions, as 
it were, even before the subject's representations of itself and the Other.54 Indeed, as 
Levinas puts it: “The obligation aroused by the proximity of the neighbour is not to the 
measure of the images he gives me; it concerns me before or otherwise.”55 
The immediacy of proximity is also not reducible to spatiality and its associated modality 
of vision.56 Indeed, for Levinas, to conceive proximity as the spatial or visible distance 
between two beings is to attribute to it a merely derivative meaning in relation to a system of 
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simultaneity and “absolute coexistence.”57 We should thus not speak of proximity as a 
spatial contiguity, but rather as a relation of "disparity [disparité]" between same and Other 
where “nothing can be conceived as a correlation, that is, as a synchronisation of a temporal 
succession, whose losses would be recuperated.”58 For Levinas, 
It is then not enough to speak of proximity as a relationship between two terms, and as a 
relationship assured of the simultaneity of these terms. It is necessary to emphasise the breakup 
of this synchrony, of this whole, by the difference between the same and the other in the non-
indifference of the obsession exercised by the other [Autre] over the same.59 
For proximity to retain its status as an ethical interruption, it must be conceived as the 
obsession of the same by the Other. But this obsession does not consist of the “reciprocity 
of handshakes, caresses, struggle, collaboration, commerce or conversation.”60 Indeed, the 
same is obsessed by the other precisely to the extent that it is passively affected by alterity 
prior to its encounter with any actual Other.61 There is a radical passivity involved in the 
obsession of proximity, a passivity that is radical because it is ‘older’ and even “more 
passive” than the sensible receptivity that the history of philosophy has hitherto taken as the 
ultimate model of passivity.62 As Levinas puts it, “the neighbour concerns me before all 
assumption, all commitment consented to or refused. (…) I am bound to him before any 
liaison contracted. He orders me before being recognised.”63 Passive obsession therefore 
occurs before any agreement; it occurs even before the subject is fully present to itself.64 In 
the passivity of proximity, the same is thus “as it were ordered from the outside, traumatically 
commanded, without interiorising by representation and concepts the authority that 
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commands [it].”65 
This obsessional nature of proximity signifies not only its difference from spatiality but 
also its irreducibility to the synchrony of the present. As Levinas explains, since in proximity 
alterity affects the same before all commitment and before all recognition, its temporality is 
never that of the said: “The neighbour strikes me before striking me, as though I had heard 
before he spoke. This anachronism attests to a temporality different from that which scans 
consciousness.”66 In proximity, the subject is exposed to a temporality that is other than that 
which proceeds by the modalities of identification, presence and simultaneity. Since the 
obsessive responsibility aroused in proximity is never contracted into, proximity can only be 
described as a “signification irreducible to the presents and presences, different from the 
present.”67 Rather than being the meeting point between well-identified things and beings, 
proximity is thus a relation with temporality which “concerns me before or otherwise” than 
being and its presence to itself.68 Indeed, proximity is precisely that rupture, disturbance or 
saying that always comes to fissure the time of the said: “The proximity does not enter into 
the common time of clocks, which makes meetings possible. It is a disturbance. (….) 
Proximity is a disturbance of the rememberable time.”69 As the obsession that orders the 
subject before any recognition and accord, proximity is thus the ethical relation where the 
subject finds itself affected by a temporality that is never its own. But this temporality never 
affects the subject in the manner of a past present.70 The temporality of proximity always 
affects the subject “as though from an immemorial past, which was never present.”71 The 
traumatic obsession and exposure of proximity cannot therefore be located in a former time, 
epoch of principle. The temporality of proximity is an-archic: it designates the way in which 
the subject finds itself affected by another’s time without that affection having a 
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rememberable or identifiable origin as its governing principle.72 But this anarchy, Levinas 
contends, is not simply the absence of order, just as it does not merely designate another 
order.73 The anarchy of proximity “troubles being over and beyond these alternatives. It 
brings to a halt the ontological play which, precisely qua play, is consciousness, where being 
is lost and found again, and thus illuminated.”74 As the anarchical obsession of the Other, 
proximity constitutes an ethical relation where the subject finds itself affected by a 
temporality that is wholly beyond or otherwise than being and its play. To that extent, 
Levinas argues, we can speak of proximity as that ethical relation which “opens [ouvre] the 
distance of a diachrony without a common present”.75 
By taking shape as an ethical relation that goes wholly beyond the present, proximity is 
ultimately also irreducible to the temporality of history. Because it does not devolve from a 
commitment that the subject has entered into in ‘its’ past, Levinas argues, the relation of 
proximity not only “exceeds every actual [actuel] or represented present.” 76  Ultimately, 
because proximity also places the subject into contact with an alterity that is essentially 
unrepresentable, proximity also signifies that relation whereby the subject is opened to an 
anachronous temporality that “takes apart the recuperable time of history and memory in 
which representation continues.”77 The relation with alterity that the subject enters into in 
proximity is therefore not only “unconvertible into history”.78 More accurately, proximity can 
even be described as the ethical relation whereby the subject irrevocably goes beyond—or 
breaks with—the time of history: 
One can call that apocalyptically the break-up of time. But [proximity] is a matter of an effaced but 
untameable diachrony of non-historical, non-said time, which cannot be synchronised in a present 
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by memory and historiography (….) Such is the sense of the non-phenomenality of the face.79  
In this way, though proximity carries additional significations that might at first sight appear 
historical (such as the signification of fraternity), its ultimate sense always derives from an 
anachronic temporality that “no present, no historiography, could assemble”.80 Indeed, even 
though in proximity the subject finds itself affected by the Other as its brother (“The 
neighbour is a brother”), the ethical sense of that fraternity can never be explained with 
reference to the presumed unity between subjects that is postulated—for political 
purposes—in certain historical contexts or systems. 81  “Proximity is fraternity”, but this 
“human fraternity [is] outside of any preestablished system.”82 This means that fraternity in 
proximity does not refer to the shared immersion of the brothers within a historical field of 
“society, the State and its institutions, exchanges and work”.83 In its “absolute and proper 
meaning”, fraternity can be understood only in terms of the subject’s exposure to the 
anachronic temporality of the Other.84 But again, this exposure remains irreducible to the 
passing of the present in a given historical context.85 Indeed, if anything, for Levinas, it is the 
historical world and its presence that is “comprehensible out of [the fraternity] of proximity.”86 
Although Otherwise than Being introduces a range of concepts—like proximity and the 
saying—that exceed the temporal ethics of Totality and Infinity, in their orientation to history 
the two texts therefore remain fundamentally aligned. The sense of temporal ethics as a 
movement towards the irreducible temporality of the Other, Levinas continues to claim, “is 
not a ‘sense of history’ (…), for the irresistible orientation of history already makes 
meaningless the very fact of the movement, since the Other would already be inscribed in 
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the Same, the end in the beginning.”87 On this score, the only significant difference that 
emerges between the two texts concerns the way in which the Other’s face signifies an 
irreducible temporality beyond history to the same. As well as being understood in terms of 
the obsessional nature of proximity, Levinas tells us, the face should now be taken as 
absolute with regard to history not just because it expresses itself, but also, or rather, 
because the “face is trace of itself.”88 As Levinas explains in “Meaning and Sense”, for the 
face to be a trace of itself is for it to signify the absolutely other in a way that is not simply a 
“modulation” of the being, presence, and history of entities.89 “A trace”, Levinas writes, “is a 
presence of that which properly speaking has never been there, of what is always past.”90 In 
this sense, the trace of the face should not be confused with the material vestiges that a 
historian discovers in the ancient civilizations that form the horizon of present society.91 That 
kind of material vestige, though ancient, still has its place in the order of the world; it still 
refers to a preceding actuality.92 “But a real trace”, like that of the face, “disturbs the order of 
the world.”93 And it does so because it “does not simply lead to the past, but is [rather] the 
very passing toward a past more remote than any past and any future which are still set in 
my time—the past of the other (…) an absolute past which unites all times.”94 That is to say 
that the trace is the enigmatic way—beyond being and essence—in which the face in 
proximity gives the infinite temporality of the Other (saying) to the subject.95 But though the 
face’s way of giving this temporality is enigmatic, this enigma “does not signify an 
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indeterminate phenomenon; its ambiguity is not an indetermination”.96 Indeed, according to 
Levinas, the enigmatic way in which the face gives an irreducible temporality to the subject 
can be precisely determined as a “He” [Il]: “We hear this way to signify—(…) this way of 
leaving the alternatives of being—under the third-personal pronoun, under the word He [Il]. 
The enigma comes to us from Illeity [Illeité].”97 That is to say that the face signifies a 
temporality beyond being and history because, as illeity, it is never simply collapsible into the 
temporality of those other two modalities.98 “Illeity (….) indicates a way of concerning me 
without entering into conjunction with me.”99 For Levinas, it is thus as illeity that the face in 
proximity signifies the temporality of infinity to the subject: “in the trace of illeity, in the 
enigma, the synchronism falls out of tune, [and] totality is transcended in another time.”100 
In Otherwise than Being, the emphasis on illeity thus provides the full sense of the 
ethical relation to time that is produced in the anarchic “proximity of a face”.101 But as in 
Totality and Infinity, this emphasis by no means completes Levinas’ conception of temporal 
ethics. Just as Totality and Infinity posited fecundity as the 'basis' for the I's relation to the 
face's absolute novelty, so too, Levinas claims in Otherwise than Being, we must still explain 
how the obsession of proximity can "take place and have its time in consciousness."102 
Otherwise said, having explained the sense of proximity as the ethical relation that exceeds 
and interrupts the temporality of history, we must still provide an account of how that relation 
becomes possible for the subject. Yet, and in accordance with Otherwise than Being's 
general attempt to think ethics wholly beyond being, it is clear that the ontological category 
of fecundity can no longer provide this account.103 For proximity to remain the ethical 
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interruption of essence, Levinas claim, its grounding can no longer be thought in ontological 
terms. The grounding of proximity must instead receive a wholly ethical treatment: “The 
mode in which a face indicates its own absence in my responsibility requires a description 
that can be formed only in ethical language.”104 This means, in part, that proximity must be 
explained by recourse to “the ethical terms accusation, persecution and responsibility for the 
others.” 105  But it also means that insofar as ethics continues to require a subjective 
condition—and for the late Levinas, the infinite does have “glory only through subjectivity”—
then that subjective condition must itself be given an ethical explanation.106 The I that is the 
subject of temporal ethics must itself be understood as undergoing an ethical (as opposed to 
an ontological) individuation in responsibility. For as Levinas explicitly warns, “[i]t is only in 
this way that the absolutely exterior other is near to the point of obsession.”107 But what 
concept in Levinas’ text provides this account of the I’s individuation in responsibility? This is 
what we must now articulate. 
 
4.2. The ethical ‘basis’ of proximity: substitution 
We have seen Otherwise than Being describe temporal ethics in terms of the anarchic 
obsession of proximity, an obsession that is irreducible to the temporality of history and the 
common sense time of clocks, meetings and the present. We also noted that for Levinas, 
this ethical relation must ultimately be explained in terms of a notion of subjectivity that no 
longer retains a ‘foothold’ in the ontology of being and its essence.108 Now, in Otherwise than 
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Being, Levinas is much less clear on what concept could play this founding role in his text. 
That said, Levinas’ aforementioned claim that proximity must be explained by a notion of 
subjectivity that itself has recourse to the ethical terms of accusation and persecution 
already provides us some clues. Levinas’ insistence on these requirements reveals that 
“substitution” is the only concept that can play this grounding role in Otherwise than Being.109 
Simply stated, substitution is precisely Levinas’ attempt to explain how the subject can be 
“unique and chosen” as someone who is both persecuted and accused by the Other—as a 
hostage.110 In this sense, substitution provides the explanation beyond being of the subject’s 
“entry into the proximity of the neighbour.”111 In Levinas’ text, substitution emerges as “the 
otherwise than being at the basis [au fond] of proximity”.112 But how exactly does substitution 
play this role? 
According to Levinas, we can begin to answer this question by distinguishing substitution 
from a more traditional account of subjectivity qua identification. Philosophy, Levinas 
contends, has traditionally limited itself to describing subjectivity as an ontological event or 
adventure whose main figure—the subject—can always, by virtue of its self-possession and 
certainty, be sure of coinciding with itself.113 This tendency to think subjectivity solely within 
the remit of the ontological event of being and its self-coincidence is clearly evident in the 
philosophies of Hegel and Sartre, both of whom think subjectivity in terms of the power and 
freedom that a subject can exercise over itself and its world: the for-itself.114 With their 
respective emphases on the for-itself as the power that the subject possesses for remaining 
equal to itself and in possession of itself, Levinas argues, both Hegel and Sartre take 
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subjectivity (or the “oneself”) to “be reducible to a turning back of essence upon itself, a 
return of essence as both subject and condition of the identification of the Same.”115 But this 
approach, Levinas tells us, “must be placed into question.”116 It must be questioned in part 
because it contrasts too strongly with the anarchic relation of proximity: “The obsession we 
have seen in proximity conflicts with this figure of a being possessing itself in an equality, 
this being ἀρχή.”117 Perhaps more crucially, this approach also fails to grasp what is truly 
distinctive about the condition of subjectivity: “consciousness, knowing of oneself by oneself, 
is not all there is to the notion of subjectivity.”118 
At its core, Levinas argues, subjectivity consists not of the subject’s self-discovery but of 
what can be called the “recurrence to oneself.” 119  This recurrence, Levinas claims, is 
something like a rhythm or pulsation that functions prior to the subject’s recognition and 
consciousness of itself.120 “The ego is in itself like a sound that would resound in its own 
echo, the node of a wave which is once again consciousness.” 121  But this rhythmic 
resounding of oneself in recurrence is not, Levinas warns, a melodic line that retains each of 
its ‘moments’ in a continuous and harmonious way. “The uncancellable recurrence of the 
oneself in the subject is prior to any distinction between moments which could present 
themselves to a synthesising activity of identification and assemblage to recall or 
expectation.”122 Instead, the recurrence refers to the pulsating discomfort that the subject (or 
the ego, or self) feels in its own skin: “The ego is not in itself like matter, which, perfectly 
espoused by its form, is what it is; it is in itself like one is in one’s skin, that is, already tight, 
ill at ease in one’s skin.”123 In other words, recurrence is the “irritability, susceptibility and 
exposure to wounds” that incessantly beats, without any rest, as the heart of subjectivity.124 
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Recurrence is the pulsation of a vulnerability that shatters or dis-joins the unity and 
coincidence of the subject with itself.125 It is the “breakup, fission, [and] openness” of the self 
to its outside.126 This openness, Levinas tells us, operates ‘before’ the time of consciousness 
and the said: “The oneself comes from a past that could not be remembered, not because it 
is situated very far behind, but because the oneself, incommensurable with consciousness 
which is always equal to itself, is not ‘made’ for the present.”127 Indeed, if anything, what this 
pre-reflexive recurrence is ‘made’ for is the “assignation” of the subject with a time that is not 
its own but the Other’s, saying: “The recurrence of ipseity, the incarnation, far from 
thickening and tumefying the soul, oppresses it and contracts it and exposes it naked to the 
other to the point of making the subject expose its very exposedness (…) to the point of 
making it an uncovering of self in saying.”128 
Levinas’ claim is that this notion of recurrence “coincides” with the task of explaining the 
obsession of proximity precisely because it reveals how the subject ‘is’ always already 
accused by an otherwise than being.129 Since the assignation of the self in recurrence is like 
“an attachment that has already been made, [or] something irreversibly past, prior to all 
memory and recall”, the self is always “prior to the play of being.”130 The self is always in 
contact with—or accused by—an otherwise than being because it always bears an 
attachment to that otherwise simply by virtue of inhabiting its own skin.131 In its recurrence, 
the subject is vulnerable and subjected to everything: “It is a being divesting itself, emptying 
itself of its being, turning itself inside out, and if it can be put thus, the fact of ‘otherwise than 
being.’”132 And it is for this reason, Levinas contends, that the recurrence of the self is 
ethically significant: 
The subject is in the accusative, without recourse in being, expelled from being, (…) without a 
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foundation, reduced to itself, and thus without condition. In its own skin. Not at rest under a form, 
but tight in its skin, encumbered and as it were stuffed with itself, suffocating under itself, 
insufficiently open, forced to detach itself from itself, to breathe more deeply, all the way, forced to 
dispossess itself to the point of losing itself.133 
In recurrence the self feels uneasy with itself in its own skin, and it is forced, by that very 
pulsation, to leave or to depart from itself, to become accused or persecuted by its outside. 
"The self, the persecuted one, is accused beyond his fault before freedom"134 That is, in 
recurrence, the self becomes accused as responsible for the Other even ‘before’ it can 
consciously recognise that accusation as its own. And for Levinas, this movement whereby 
the self becomes persecuted by a responsibility that is otherwise than being is precisely the 
ethical event of substitution.135 It is the event whereby, in its own skin, the self departs from 
itself not towards being, but towards the Other as a kind of inspiration. In its own skin, the 
self substitutes its coincidence with itself for an ethical contact with the Other: “I exist 
through the other and for the other, but without this being alienation: I am inspired (….) in the 
form of incarnation, as being-in-one’s-skin, having-the-other-in-one’s-skin.” 136  The 
accusation of the otherwise in recurrence is thus the ethical event whereby the self becomes 
a hostage to the Other, where it replaces or substitutes itself for the Other and becomes, in 
its skin, already-for-the-other, responsible.137 
This ethical event of substitution signifies not only the self’s persecution by its 
responsibility for the Other, but also the very fact of its ethical individuation. Indeed, for 
Levinas, these two aspects of substitution are intricately connected, since, as he explains, 
the persecution of responsibility cannot be understood as an accident that happens to an 
already-constituted subject.138 The self is already responsible for the Other in its own skin, 
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that is, prior to any consciousness or presence.139 The persecution of responsibility is thus 
“not something added to the subjectivity of the subject and his vulnerability; it is the very 
movement of recurrence.”140 Before any consciousness, intentionality or activity, the self 
already feels itself responsible for the Other in the very tension of its skin: “I have not done 
anything and I have always been under accusation—persecuted.”141  And according to 
Levinas, it is also in this movement of recurrence or substitution that the self emerges as an 
ethically individuated subject—that is, as a subject who is “unique and chosen” for ethics.142 
This individuation occurs, Levinas explains, because “it is I, I and no one else, who am a 
hostage for the others (….) and it is through this substitution that I am not ‘another’, but 
me.”143 In other words, it is by feeling the responsibility for others in own its skin that the 
subject is able to say “me”, or “here I am [me voici]”.144 But this ‘here I am’ of substitution, 
Levinas argues, is not the presence to itself of a subject that remains capable of shutting 
itself off from the Other’s saying; it is not “like the expression of a mute, or the discourse of a 
stranger shut up in his maternal language [langue maternelle].”145 The ‘here I am’ is the 
subjectivity of a subject who is always already turned towards Others: “the ‘here I am’ 
signifies me in the name of God, at the service of men [des hommes] that look at me.”146 In 
this way, the accusation or persecution of the self in substitution is also the way in which the 
subject becomes individuated, beyond being, as ethical.147 Because substitution enables the 
subject to say ‘here I am’ without having recourse to the conatus essendi of beings, it 
effectuates the ethical “individuation or superindividuation” of the subject. 148  In the 
recurrence of its own skin, the subject becomes “unique and chosen as a responsibility and 
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a substitution.”149 
And it is as this joint upsurge of the self’s responsibility and uniqueness that substitution 
functions as the ‘basis’ of proximity. As Levinas puts it: “It is through the condition of being 
hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and proximity—even the 
little there is, even the simple ‘After you, sir.’”150 It is, in other words, because the self is 
already in its skin for-others, because it is already a hostage to this substitution, that the 
Other is able to obsess it and thereby open it to a diachrony without present. Without this 
substitution, the subject might have found itself in a world where the “imperialism of the ego” 
would reign.151 But for Levinas, this world is impossible, since in the very course of its 
individuation as a self, that self becomes a ‘here I am’ who is responsible and susceptible to 
the temporality of the Other.152 To that extent, substitution can be described as the subject’s 
“assignation to proximity”: it is the way in which the subject is compelled, according to an 
individuating susception that cannot be assumed, to approach the neighbour and to thereby 
undergo the opening of proximity. 153  “It is only in this way”, that is, on the basis of 
substitution, “that the absolutely exterior other is near to the point of obsession. Here there is 
proximity”—or, we might add, temporal ethics.154 Substitution is, in other words, the ethical 
basis in subjectivity for the opening of temporal ethics itself: 
It is with subjectivity understood as a self, with the exciding and dispossession, the 
contraction, in which the ego does not appear, but immolates itself, that the relationship with 
the other can be communication and transcendence, and not always another way of seeking 
certainty, or the coinciding with oneself.155 
But significantly, this opening is no longer entered into on the basis of ontological categories, 
as it was in Totality and Infinity.156 Indeed, if substitution is, as Levinas claims, “my entry into 
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the proximity of the neighbour”, then this entry is itself ethical.157 Substitution is an entry into 
temporal ethics that is no way reducible—or that no longer belongs—to the structures and 
systems that Western thought usually seeks as a “sure harbour” for its reflections.158 
But if Otherwise than Being departs from Totality and Infinity in its theorisation of the 
condition for ethics, on that same point, the two texts remain aligned in one crucial sense. 
For if substitution is not exactly equivalent to the dead time of fecundity, to the relation 
between a father and his son, it remains—like that ontological category—essentially 
irreducible to the temporality of history.159 Indeed, as the ‘here I am’ that is entirely beyond 
being, Levinas argues, substitution is also removed from, or outside, the historical: “the I is 
itself, [and] does not belong to Being or history”.160 This means that when Levinas speaks of 
the I's ethical individuation and accusation in substitution, we should not read these as 
events that in any way reflect the sense and order of history. 
These are not events that happen to an empirical ego, that is, to an ego already posited and fully 
identified, as a trial that would lead it to being more conscious of itself, and make it more apt to 
put itself in the place of others. What we are here calling oneself, or other in the same, where 
inspiration arouses respiration, the very pneuma of the psyche, precedes this empirical order, 
which is a part of being, of the universe, of the State, and is already conditioned in a system.161 
Properly speaking, the recurrence of the self, or substitution, can be classified only as a 
“‘prehistory’ [‘préhistoire’]”, since it refers to a dimension of subjectivity that is prior to any 
empirical dimension, prior to any actuality. 162  Indeed: “The upsurge of the oneself in 
persecution, the anarchic passivity of substitution, is not some event whose history we might 
recount but a conjunction which describes the ego.”163 As such, though substitution carries 
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some significations that might at first glance appear historical—like that of maternity, which 
for Levinas “suggests to us the proper sense of the oneself”, or “the ultimate sense of [the] 
vulnerability” of substitution—these significations by no means belong to the domain of 
history.164 Maternity here refers not to the historically defined relation between a mother and 
her child, nor even to the natural aspect of that relation, but simply to the bearing of 
responsibility for the Other that the subject undergoes, prior to any history, in substitution: “In 
maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point of substitution for others 
and suffering from both the effect of persecution and from the persecution itself in which the 
persecutor sinks. Maternity, which is bearing par excellence, bears even responsibility for 
the persecuting by the persecutor.”165 In this sense, if maternity provides an apt metaphor for 
the ethical event of substitution that conditions temporal ethics, that metaphor, Levinas 
claims, also bears no reference or reflection to any historically defined complex. 166 
“Whatever be its psychological, social, or philological history, the beyond which a metaphor 
produces has a sense that transcends this history.”167 Thus, temporal ethics, or the exposure 
to the illeity of the face in proximity, as a relation that is grounded in the ethical event of 
substitution, remains, for Levinas, not only wholly otherwise than being, but also wholly 
otherwise than history. 
 
4.3. History at the basis of proximity 
We have noted that Otherwise than Being conceives temporal ethics in different terms 
than Totality and Infinity. In distinction to the earlier emphasis on the face and its expression, 
the later text conceives temporal ethics in terms of the anarchic trace of illeity (or saying) 
that the face leaves on the subject in the obsessional dimension of proximity. This ethical 
relation, moreover, is no longer made possible by the ontological relation between a father 
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and his son, but is rather based on the ethical individuation of the subject in the susceptibility 
of substitution. As Levinas puts it, the anarchic obsession of the Other in proximity is a 
command that “only a ‘here I am’ can answer”.168 But if substitution replaces fecundity as 
Levinas’ proposed basis for temporal ethics, we must also ask whether the former concept is 
able to overcome all of the latter’s problems—particularly as they relate to history. This 
interrogation is crucial not simply because Levinas—despite continuing to use a range of 
gendered metaphors (like fraternity and maternity) that might, prima facie, suggest an 
involvement of ethics with history—remains insistent that his temporal ethics functions 
wholly beyond history. Importantly, as I hinted in the introduction to this chapter, in his 
response to Otherwise than Being (“At This Very Moment…”), Derrida argues that Levinas’ 
later ethics in a certain sense remains contaminated by some of the very things from which it 
attempts to tear itself away.169 To be sure, in this response, Derrida pays no particular 
attention to the question of history, as he does in “Violence and Metaphysics”.170 But since 
history remains, as we have just seen, one of the very things from which Levinas’ ethics 
attempts to tear itself away, and since Derrida’s response hinges in part on Levinas’ usage 
of gendered categories, it is worth considering this response to see what it might tell us 
about the potential implication of Levinas’ late conception of temporal ethics with the very 
history that it attempts to escape. This is my effort in this section. 
Now, like “Violence and Metaphysics”, “At This Very Moment…” pursues a double 
reading of Levinas that begins with a moment of faithful commentary.171 In this first moment, 
Derrida attempts to describe how Levinas’ writing (his work, or ouvrage) creates a 
movement of the same towards the Other—that is, a Work (Œuvre)—within language 
                                                
168 OB 142. 
169 ATVM 152. 
170 On Peter Osborne's (1995: 224n19) reading, because Otherwise than Being does not significantly 
revise Levinas' "treatment of history—most of the substance of ["Violence and Metaphysics"] 
continues to apply." My remaining argument in this chapter coheres with this view. 
171 Derrida’s frames his reading as a gift to Levinas—a gift “beyond all restitution” and displaying an 
ingratitude to its recipient—that operates in the first instance “in conformity with what [Levinas] will 
have said”. ATVM 146. 
 172 
itself.172 Here, Derrida is particularly interested in how Levinas himself deploys language in 
Otherwise than Being as a way of letting the trace of the saying inscribe itself in his said, that 
is, in the grammatical presence of his own writing.173 Derrida begins this investigation by 
having one of the two voices that play a role in “At This Very Moment…” recite a lengthy 
passage from Otherwise than Being that refers to the ‘here I am’ of substitution.174 The first 
textual voice notes of this passage that it significantly exemplifies the “complicated” 
presence of Levinas’ ‘here I am’.175 Indeed, although in this passage Levinas seemingly 
speaks of the ‘here I am’ in the present tense (writing, for example, that the ‘here I am’ “is 
the subjectivity of a man [l’homme] of flesh and blood”), by always placing the ‘here I am’ 
under quotation marks, Levinas also “seems to erase the present event of any irreplaceable 
‘here I am’, also comes to say that in the ‘here I am’ the I [le Moi] is no longer presented as a 
subject, present to itself, making itself a present of itself (I-me): it is [il] is declined before all 
declension”.176 In simpler terms, Derrida’s claim here is that even in speaking of the ‘here I 
am’ in the present tense, Levinas’ writing is somehow capable of signalling a temporal 
dimension that is not simply to reducible to presence and the present.177 But at this point in 
Derrida’s text, this reflection is interrupted by another voice, who “comes to disturb the first 
one” by claiming that Levinas’ quotation of the ‘here I am’ is in fact “torn from the mouth of a 
woman, so as to be given to the other.”178 This second voice—which Derrida reveals is the 
voice of a feminine reader (léctrice) of Levinas—is here pointing out that in the original text 
from which Levinas’ quotes the ‘here I am’ (The Song of Songs), that saying is in fact said by 
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a woman. But, this feminine voice asks: “Why doesn’t [Levinas] specify that in his work?”179 
To which the first voice, as if on behalf of Levinas, responds: “Doubtless because that 
remains, in this context and with regard to his most urgent purpose, secondary.”180 And here, 
already in this brief exchange, we catch a glimpse of the double reading that Derrida 
attempts to develop in “At This Very Moment…”: although Levinas’ writing perhaps lets the 
saying inscribe the trace of illeity in its own said, that inscription perhaps also involves the 
silencing of an alterity that remains, with regard to his own purposes, secondary. 
In the remainder of his text, Derrida continues to explore how Levinas’ writing makes 
room for the saying’s trace by paying particular attention to those passages in Otherwise 
than Being where Levinas explicitly mentions the language that he is using.181  These 
analyses are long and complex and we need not recapitulate them at length here.182 The 
important point to take from them, for Derrida, is that Levinas’ writing functions via a complex 
process of seriality, which is also what enables Levinas to carry out the Work of letting the 
absolute or anarchic trace of illeity pass within the said of his own writing.183 Significantly, 
however, this account is provided by only one of the two voices in “At This Very Moment…”. 
But for the second, feminine voice in Derrida’s text, whatever the merits of Levinas’ method 
of seriality, there is still an important question to be answered regarding the assumed 
gendering of some of the central categories that Levinas equates with the idea of ethics. As 
the first two sections of this chapter highlighted, Levinas does not shy away from marking 
certain aspects of his ethics in Otherwise than Being with a gender, even when those 
aspects are also said to function before or beyond those empirical dimensions (e.g. history 
or biology) which one would normally associate with the condition of possibility for such 
gendered demarcation. We of course saw a prominent example of this in the first section, 
with Levinas' explicit claims that the way of the face in proximity can be understood as illeity, 
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that is, as a trace which “[a]s He [Il] and third person is somehow outside the distinction 
between being and entities.”184 According to the feminine voice in Derrida’s text, these types 
of example are significant because they show that Levinas’ writing continually operates with 
a gendered demarcation, specifically, one that most often favours the masculine over the 
feminine.185 
Ultimately, Derrida claims, such gendering also raises a problem for Levinas’ ethics. The 
problem is that despite gendering concepts like illeity as masculine, Levinas elsewhere 
claims that sexual difference is always secondary to the human relation that ethical concepts 
like illeity and proximity articulate. 186  Here, Derrida’s feminine voice quotes Levinas’ 
Talmudic commentaries: 
The meaning of the feminine will thus become clear against the background of human essence, 
the Isha from the Ish. The feminine does not derive from the masculine; rather, the division into 
feminine and masculine—the dichotomy—derives from what is human. (….) beyond the personal 
relationship that establishes itself between these two beings issued from two creative acts, the 
particularity of the feminine is secondary. It is not woman who is secondary; it is the relationship 
with woman as woman that does not belong to what is fundamentally human.187 
Clearly visible in this passage is Levinas’ affirmation that the particularity of sexual 
difference—understood as femininity—derives, or is secondary, to the primordial level of the 
human, or to the ethics, which, at least in Levinas’ thematisation of illeity, remains 
associated with the masculinity of man. But, the feminine voice asks: “How can one mark as 
masculine the very thing said to be anterior or still foreign to sexual difference?”188 The 
answer, Derrida clarifies, is that one can do so only by performing a certain “mastery of 
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femininity”.189 In other words, by equating the masculinity of illeity with a primary human 
neutrality that is prior to sexual difference, Levinas in fact ends up equating the secondary 
status of sexual difference with the secondary status of the feminine vis-à-vis the 
masculine.190 As the feminine voice puts it, “To desexualise the relation to the wholly other 
(…), to make sexuality secondary with respect to a wholly other that in itself would not be 
sexually marked (…), is always to make sexual difference secondary as femininity.”191 
For Derrida, this devaluation of femininity is not merely present in Levinas’ Talmudic 
commentaries, but is rather endemic to his work as a whole insofar as it continually 
denominates absolute alterity as masculinity. “What [Levinas] comments on”, Derrida argues, 
“is consonant with a whole network of affirmations that are his, or those of him, ‘he.’”192 
Against this backdrop, it is not simply Levinas’ emphasis on the illeity of the face that arises 
as problematic. To this example can be added the discussion of fecundity in Totality and 
Infinity, which, as noted in the last chapter, is precisely framed by Levinas as the ontological 
relation between two masculine beings: the father and his son.193 Similarly, and though 
Derrida does not explicitly make this connection, it is clear that Levinas’ assertion in 
Otherwise than Being that “[p]roximity is fraternity”, or that “[t]he neighbour [in proximity] is a 
brother”, falls within the scope of this problematic network of affirmations.194 Indeed, reading 
him carefully, we might even add to this network some of Levinas’ descriptions of 
substitution, specifically, his insistence that the ‘here I am’ of substitution “is the subjectivity 
of a man [Subjectivité de l’homme] of flesh and blood”, a subjectivity that, moreover, places 
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him “at the service of men [des hommes] that look at me.”195 In each of these cases, Derrida 
argues, “it always so happens that the wholly other who is [presumably] not yet marked [by 
the travails of history and being] happens to already by marked by masculinity (he-before 
he/she, son-before son/daughter, father-before father/mother, etc.).”196 And the problem that 
these repeated gendered ascriptions ultimately raises, as Simon Critchley (commenting on 
Derrida) aptly puts it, is that “Levinas’ work can only go unto the wholly other on the 
condition that feminine alterity is circumscribed and inhumed. The strange consequence of 
the latter is that Levinas’ work is itself engaged in a denial of (feminine) alterity, and thus 
remains enclosed within the economy of the Same which it has continually striven to 
exceed.”197 
How, then, does this discussion relate to Otherwise than Being’s conception of temporal 
ethics and its potential implication with history? It will have been noticed by the reader that in 
his analysis of Levinas’ work, Derrida remains relatively silent on the question of history.198 
But this is not to suggest the impossibility of relating Derrida’s text back to that question. 
Indeed, as noted at the outset of this section, one of Derrida’s central claims “At This Very 
Moment…” is that Levinas’ ethical schema in Otherwise than Being finds itself contaminated 
by some of the very domains that it precisely attempts to escape. Contamination, Derrida 
writes, does “not come about as an accidental evil. It is a sort of fate of the Saying.”199 And 
this contamination becomes nowhere more explicit than in Levinas’ repeated prioritisation of 
the presumed neutrality of the masculine. Indeed, via this gendered repetition, Levinas’ 
temporal ethics in Otherwise than Being finds itself fatefully contaminated by an historical 
tendency which, whatever other openings it might create, “simultaneously places, and this is 
what is important, masculinity [le masculin] in command and at the beginning (the arkhè), on 
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a par” with the ethical dignity of humanity itself.200 At its heart, and despite its explicit attempt 
to depart from all the structures and systems that Western thought traditionally takes as a 
‘sure harbour’ for its reflections, Levinas’ conception of temporal ethics, insofar as it 
continues to privilege the presumed neutrality of the masculine, remains implicated with 
precisely that historical “tradition” that would refuse to grant the feminine reader of Levinas 
her “ontological [nay, ethical] dignity.”201 Far from remaining anarchic, then, on these points, 
Levinas’ temporal ethics in Otherwise than Being continues to carry the trace of a well-
established historico-philosophical tradition: “‘phallogocentrism’ (as the complicity of 
Western metaphysics with a notion of male firstness).”202 In this way, if for Levinas it would 
not be possible to speak of a saying beyond essence if this saying did not leave its trace in 
the history of the West, then similarly, on the basis of these reflections, it seems impossible 
to speak of a temporal ethics that is wholly beyond history if that ethics continues to carry 
the trace of the very history that it is supposed to exceed.203 Yet, it is precisely this second 
trace—the trace of history within the beyond or the before—that makes itself felt at the level 
of Levinas’ gendering of the absolute alterity of proximity and substitution. And ultimately, it 
is precisely this historical trace that serves as the “evidence” that Levinas’ temporal ethics in 
Otherwise than Being is not wholly otherwise than history—as he of course claims it to be.204 
Nevertheless, the objection might arise that this argument only holds if one overlooks 
Levinas’ explicit pronouncements on maternity in Otherwise than Being. Does Derrida’s 
reading not ignore these assertions? And have I not, in following Derrida on these points, 
also failed to reckon with the fact that Levinas introduces the notion of maternity (qua 
substitution) precisely as a way of overcoming the problematic tendency—still evident in 
Totality and Infinity—to base temporal ethics on an historical state of affairs affirming the 
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ethical priority of masculine over feminine relations?205 Is not this patriarchal tradition exactly 
displaced in Levinas’ assertion that maternity is the ultimate meaning of substitution? This 
objection has merit, and it calls for two responses. The first involves recognising that though 
maternity is undeniably equated with substitution in Otherwise than Being, the ethical value 
of maternity is not itself unequivocably upheld throughout the text. Indeed, as we saw above, 
though for Levinas maternity suggests the proper sense of substitution, the ‘here I am’ of 
substitution, in predisposing the subject to the temporal opening of proximity, is itself “not a 
babbling language, like the expression of a mute, or the discourse of a stranger shut up in 
his maternal language [langue maternelle].”206  Now, it is true that Levinas makes this 
assertion only in passing, and it is perhaps no more than a slip of the tongue. Nevertheless, 
what this assertion begins to suggest is that though maternity—as the model par excellence 
of susceptibility and bearing of responsibility—certainly has an important role to play in 
Levinas’ late temporal ethics, this role is still not quite the unambiguous excellency of the 
saying, of the illeity that signifies the “very passing toward a past more remote than any past 
and any future which are still set in my time—the past of the other”.207 Secondly, and 
perhaps more crucially, though maternity here certainly rises above the merely subordinate 
role that it plays in Totality and Infinity, we cannot ignore the fact that as the ethical condition 
of substitution, what maternity, properly speaking, still makes possible, or grounds, is 
precisely the ethical relation between brothers in proximity. As we have repeatedly seen, for 
Levinas, the maternity of substitution signifies the subject’s susceptiveness to the anarchic 
                                                
205 This is precisely the argument that some sympathetic readers of Levinas, like John Llewelyn (1991: 
219; cf. 1995: 208-209), have provided in defence of the introduction of maternity (qua substitution) in 
Otherwise than Being. On this reading, maternity is introduced “as though to compensate for the 
virilisation the of concept of welcome acquires [in Totality and Infinity] and as though to answer or 
anticipate the objection that the use made in the earlier book of concepts of gender [like paternity] is 
indefensibly one-sided, however non-biological and non-sexual that us is claimed to be.” Bernard 
Forthomme (1979: 382-383) similarly suggests that the introduction of maternity effectively corrects 
the “virility” of fecundity in Totality and Infinity. 
206 OB 143. Though she does not focus on this specific passage, Donna Brody (2001: 74) likewise 
suggests that there is a certain ambiguity to Levinas’ characterisation of the feminine (qua maternity) 
in Otherwise than Being: “she may be read as redetermined according to the most eminent 
meaning—or she may be read as altogether obliterated, exiled even from the significance of 
maternity.” 
207 MSe 106. 
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temporality of the neighbour in proximity. But that “neighbour is a brother.”208 And it is in this 
precise sense, we might add, that the ‘here I am’ of substitution places the subject “at the 
service of men [des hommes] that look at me (…) saying itself.”209 Heeding these claims, we 
cannot fail to draw the necessary conclusion that despite being elevated from its previous, 
merely subordinate role in Totality and Infinity, in Otherwise than Being maternity continues 
to play a merely mediate role in founding that community of brothers where the subject 
becomes irrevocably exposed to the anarchic temporality beyond being and history of the 
Other: proximity. Maternity, that is, despite explicitly replacing paternity as one of the 
conditions of temporal ethics, does not entirely manage to absolve itself of the historical 
trace of patri-archy that animated the fecundity of Totality and Infinity. That trace, as 
Sandford points out, “survives, somewhat covertly, in the fraternal community that [maternity] 
founds.”210 Thus, even in elevating maternity beyond the mere femininity of dwelling or eros, 
the anarchic temporal ethics of Otherwise than Being remains incapable of completely 
extricating itself from that patriarchal trace that here, as elsewhere, functions as an evidence 
of its constitutive implication or contamination with the historical. 
In all these senses, then, Derrida seems justified in arguing that contamination is not 
merely an accidental evil in the temporal ethics of Otherwise than Being. Insofar as that 
ethics continues to constitutively premise itself on the patriarchal tradition of the West, a 
contamination with the historical is indeed “a sort of fate of the Saying”.211 And insofar as this 
contamination between Levinas’ temporal ethics and history necessarily entails a certain 
violence towards the feminine, Derrida is also correct to insist that this contamination “is to 
be negotiated. [That] it would be worse without negotiation.” 212  Once again, however, 
because the Levinas of Otherwise than Being still fails to recognise the constitutive 
implication between temporal ethics and history, it is precisely this negotiation that he fails to 
                                                
208 OB 87. 
209 OB 142, 149 (emphasis added). 
210 Sandford, 2001: 198-199. Elsewhere, Sandford adds: “Levinas’ text has not been able to effect or 
install an alternative feminine parenté because ultimately maternity must and does give way to 
paternity, that is, to the law of the father.” Sandford, 2000: 92. 
211 ATVM 185. 
212 ATVM 185. 
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provide. Like in Totality and Infinity, Levinas remains incapable of formulating a strategy for 
negotiating the risks that emerge from the historical implication of the exposure to the 
anarchic temporality of the Other in proximity.213 In this particular sense, therefore, Levinas’ 
temporal ethics of alterity, despite explicitly moving away from an intuitive framework, goes 
no further than Bergson’s temporal ethics. Not only does Levinas’ temporal ethics, like that 
of his predecessor, remain implicated with history at its most constitutive level. In the final 
analysis, because Levinas, like Bergson, refuses to acknowledge this constitutive implication, 
he likewise fails to advocate a strategy whereby the violent risks that it necessitates might 
become negotiated and averted. 
 
4.4. Conclusion: beyond Levinas 
In this chapter, I have maintained that Levinas’ temporal ethics in Otherwise than Being 
remains implicated with the order of history. I have suggested that despite reconfiguring 
some of the central ethical terms of Totality and Infinity, Levinas’ late temporal ethics, insofar 
as it continues to base itself on terms like maternity and fraternity, is not wholly beyond 
history. I have also argued that Levinas fails to recognise this constitutive implication 
between temporal ethics and the historical, and that, in so doing, he also neglects to develop 
a strategy whereby the violent tendencies that it creates might become negotiated. In this 
sense, I contend, despite decisively moving away from Bergson’s ethical emphasis on the 
intuition, Levinas has not managed to entirely extricate himself from the problem of history 
that plagued that earlier philosophy. 
Levinas’ failures to recognise the implication between ethics and history would perhaps 
be decisive from the point of view of temporal ethics if his was the only philosophy that 
sought to take up the Bergsonian injunction of ethically relating oneself to a differential 
temporality. As I noted in introduction to this thesis, however, Levinas is not the only thinker 
                                                
213 Levinas is here still no closer to fulfilling Derrida's earlier call for an ethical "vigilance (...) chosen as 
the least violence by a philosophy that takes history, that is, finitude seriously; a philosophy aware of 
itself as historical in each of its aspects." VM 117. 
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to have taken up this ethical injunction. In a real sense, this injunction is what also drives 
Deleuze’s ethical philosophy—both in his solo work, and in his joint work with Guattari. What 
remains to be decided, in the remainder of this thesis, is whether Deleuze’s ethical 
philosophy is any more capable than Bergson’s and Levinas’ of providing a successful 
resolution to the problem of history. Taking Difference and Repetition and A Thousand 
Plateaus as two privileged exemplars of Deleuze’s ethical thought, this is the question that 
the next two chapters of this thesis will strive to clarify. My argument will be that the problem 
of history only finds an adequate resolution in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus. 
We will begin to see why, in the next chapter, by tackling the distinctive historical problems 
that emerge in the intensive temporal ethics of Difference and Repetition. 
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5. Deleuze I: the intensive temporal ethics of Difference and Repetition 
Unlike Levinas, Deleuze never develops an explicit critique of Bergsonian intuition in the 
writings that immediately follow the publication of Bergsonism, where, as chapter one noted, 
the intuition is so highly valued as a method for seeking and affirming temporal difference.1 
Nevertheless, in Difference and Repetition, published only two years after Bergsonism, 
Deleuze’s philosophy and ethics of time begin to depart in significant respects from 
Bergson's prioritisation of duration and intuition. As is well known (and as this chapter's first 
section will show), Difference and Repetition develops an ontology of time that prioritises not 
Bergson’s but Nietzsche’s conception of time as the repetition of eternal return. Involved in 
this Nietzschean rethinking of time is also a radically distinctive conception of how an 
affirmative relation to temporal novelty is to be created in practice. For the Deleuze of 
Difference and Repetition, if Nietzsche’s eternal return in a certain sense explains how time 
operates to create diversity in the world, then it also tells us something about the kind of 
ethical subjects that we must become in order to make that creative temporal process the 
object of a practical affirmation. 
As I will clarify in this chapter's second section, Deleuze’s conception of this affirmative 
relation to time bears almost no resemblance to Bergsonian intuition. Alongside drawing on 
Nietzsche for his account of temporality qua eternal return, Deleuze also weds his 
conception of temporal ethics to a structuralist framework that remains entirely absent from 
Bergson's writings. Inspired by the undercurrent of structuralism that dominated French 
thought in the 1960s, Difference and Repetition argues that we can ethically affirm the 
temporality of eternal return only by making ourselves what Deleuze calls a “differenciator 
[différenciant]” of difference—a notion which he reveals bears certain affinities with the 
concept of “the empty square [la case vide]” that is promulgated by thinkers like Claude Lévi-
Strauss and Louis Althusser.2 To further cement his departure from Bergson, Deleuze also 
                                                
1 For a reading of Deleuze’s methodological divergence from Bergson, see: Bryant, 2008: 73-80. 
2 For Deleuze’s most sustained engagement with structuralism outside Difference and Repetition, see: 
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clarifies the nature of this differenciator as intensive with an appeal to Gilbert Simondon’s 
philosophy of individuation.3 
To say that Deleuze departs from Bergsonian intuition is not, however, to say that he 
breaks away from all the problems that were entailed by that notion. Indeed, as I 
demonstrate in this chapter's third section, although Deleuze does in many ways depart from 
Bergsonian intuition, his own temporal ethics in Difference and Repetition remains, like 
Bergson’s ethics, defined by a problematic relation to history and already determined forms 
of actuality.4 Bringing Deleuze’s ethical conception into dialogue with Félix Guattari’s critical 
reading thereof in “Machine and Structure”, I show that the temporal ethics of Difference and 
Repetition, despite explicitly positioning itself as such, remains unable to break itself off from 
all empirical, actual, or historical content. Indeed, as I argue with the help of Guattari, to 
operate in the affirmative way Deleuze proposes, the differenciator of difference must remain 
more implicated with the order actuality than Deleuze is willing to admit. And this constitutive 
implication with the historical presents certain dangers for the ethical project that Deleuze 
advocates in Difference and Repetition. However, as I argue, it is just these dangers that 
Deleuze fails to develop a successful strategic response to in attempting to completely 
separate his ethics from history. In this way, I suggest, despite providing another potential 
theoretical route out of Bergson’s intuitive philosophy, Deleuze’s temporal ethics in 
Difference and Repetition remains incapable of providing the resolution to the problem of 
history that we have thus far sought in this thesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
HRS 170-192; LS 36-71. On the connection between these two texts, see also: Bowden, 2011: 152-
184. 
3 Bergson criticises the notion of intensity in the Time and Free Will, and Deleuze famously picks up 
on this critique in the last chapter of Difference and Repetition. For more on Deleuze’s departure from 
Bergson on the question of intensity, see: DR 239-240; Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 74-76; cf. B 91, 100-
101; cf. Lundy, 2017: 174-194. 
4 In this chapter, I operate under the presumption that when Deleuze speaks of the 'actual' in 
Difference and Repetition, he takes the actual to be a historical formation. I believe this inference 
finds its justification on two closely related claims Deleuze makes with regards to the temporality of 
eternal return: firstly, that the eternal return leaves all historical "conditions" behind (DR 90-91) and, 
secondly, that the explicated qualities and extensions of the actual are precisely that "which does not 
pass the test of eternal return" (DR 243-244). 
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5.1. Time as eternal return 
In his original preface to the text, Deleuze presents Difference and Repetition as setting 
itself two central tasks. First, the text attempts “to think difference in itself independently 
[indépendamment] of the forms of representation which reduce it to the Same”.5 In other 
words, it attempts to liberate difference from the four conceptual and representational 
schemas—identiy, opposition, analogy and resemblance—that prevent difference from being 
thought in its immediacy.6 Against the negative conceptions of difference developed by 
thinkers like Aristotle, Leibniz or Hegel, who all make difference work only “in the service of 
identity”, Deleuze attempts first of all to think difference as “the element, the ultimate unity” 
that underlies the identity of every object and thing.7 Secondly, and as an upshot of this 
ontological effort to assert the immediacy of difference in itself, Deleuze also aims to 
conceptualise “the relation of different to different independently [indépendamment] of those 
forms which make them pass through the negative.”8 Otherwise said, besides thinking 
difference in itself, Difference and Repetition also tries to show how difference is 
ontologically capable of creating or affirming itself as difference “without any mediation 
whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed.”9 To be upheld as 
the ultimate unity underlying any identity, “Difference must [il faut] be shown as differing.”10 It 
must be shown as that which differs from itself to create the ‘diversity’ between objects and 
things in the world.11 And to understand how this process operates without any mediation 
whatsoever, Deleuze argues, we must also think difference as being inseparably tied to a 
process of repetition. We must think difference in itself as the element that repeats itself 
(once again, as difference) in the processes by which it ontologically creates diversity in the 
                                                
5 DR xix. 
6 DR 29. 
7 DR 49, 56. This critique of negative conceptions of difference (cf. DR 28-69), Deleuze later claims, is 
not without “moral” and “practical implications”. DR 268. 
8 DR xix. 
9 DR 117. 
10 DR 56. I agree with Lawlor (2019: 450-451) that we must remain attentive to Deleuze’s usage of the 
common French idiom “il faut”, a phrase he frequently deploys to convey a sense of ethical necessity. 
11 For Deleuze, diversity is distinguished from difference as an object is distinguished from its 
condition of existence: “Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which 
the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse.” DR 222. 
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world, “making it so that repetition is, for itself, difference in itself.”12 
Deleuze introduces Difference and Repetition with the strong suggestion that there is an 
immediately ethical dimension to this ontological thought of the repetition of difference. 
Indeed, on the text's very first page, Deleuze defines repetition in explicitly ethical terms, 
writing that “[t]o repeat is to behave [comporter] in a certain manner, but in relation to 
something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent”, before adding that this 
“external conduct [conduite externe]” perhaps echoes “a more profound, internal repetition 
within the singular.”13 Furthermore, shortly after positively citing Bergson’s Two Sources and 
its opposition to the “habit of acquiring habits (the whole of obligation)—which is essentially 
moral [moral] or has the form of the good”, Deleuze also claims that we “must [doit]” briefly 
reflect on what unites Nietzsche and Kierkegaard’s respective conceptions of repetition.14 In 
particular, we must recognise that unlike Hegel, those two thinkers do not simply attempt to 
develop a merely abstract or representative conception of repetition. Theirs is a practical or 
active conception: “They want to make it act, and make it carry out immediate acts [actes 
immédiats].”15 And in part, what their conception acts against is precisely the “moral law, to 
the point where it becomes the suspension of ethics [l’éthique; qua traditional morality], a 
thought beyond good and evil.” 16  To that extent, Deleuze argues, when Nietzsche or 
Kierkegaard respectively tell us about the Overman and the knight of faith, we should not 
understand these remarks as mere metaphysical musings. We “must [il faut]” take each 
case as an indication of how a repetition opposing the moral law “should [doit] be ‘played’” 
by ethical agents or actors.17 Unsurprisingly, given this emphasis on the ethical import of a 
thought of repetition, when Deleuze outlines his own project in Difference and Repetition, he 
once again deploys this ethical language, writing that in order to truly separate repetition 
                                                
12 DR 94. 
13 DR 1. 
14 DR 4, 5-11. 
15 DR 8. 
16 DR 6. 
17 DR 9-10. Deleuze frames this ethical project in theatrical terms. This framing is later echoed in The 
Logic of Sense, where “the actor” emerges as one of the figures of an ethics of “counter-actualisation”. 
LS 146-168; cf. Deleuze, 2004c: 94-116. 
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from the negative forms that distort it, “we must find [il faut trouver] the Self [Soi] of repetition, 
the singularity within that which repeats. For there is no repetition without a repeater, nothing 
repeated without a repetitious soul.”18 
These various ethical and ontological threads are most explicitly woven together by 
Deleuze in the second chapter of Difference and Repetition, which provides a “theory of 
time” showing how difference ontologically affirms itself in repetition.19 This theory of time is 
not, however, that chapter’s exclusive focus. As an account of repetition, the chapter also 
provides an indication of the kinds of action that a repetitive soul or Self must undertake in 
order to affirm difference in itself and, as such, also provides what we might call a practical 
ethical model for the affirmation of a differential temporality.20 As I demonstrate in the next 
section, this ethical Self of repetition is what Deleuze calls the intensive “differenciator 
[différenciant]” or “dark precursor [sombre prècursor]” of difference. 21  Before we fully 
understand the ethical import of this conception, however, it is vital that we provide a more 
extensive account of Deleuze’s complex notion of repetition. 
Now, for Deleuze, the process of repetition is to be understood as operating on three 
different levels or “syntheses”, which are also broadly associated with the three dimensions 
of time (present, past and future).22 Deleuze begins this account of repetition by outlining the 
first of these three syntheses, the synthesis of the present. Drawing on Hume’s notion of 
habit, Deleuze frames this first repetition as a contraction of “cases, elements, agitations or 
homogeneous instants.”23 Deleuze’s basic idea here is that everything that exists in a certain 
sense takes shape as a habitual contraction or ‘bringing together’ of divergent elements. An 
organic body, for example, is made up of “contracted water, earth, light and air—not merely 
                                                
18 DR 23. 
19 DR 85, 117. 
20 Like James Williams (2003: 84-106), I see each of Deleuze's famous three syntheses of time as 
providing distinct conceptions of practical or ethical activity. I also agree with Henry Somers-Hall 
(2013: 78-83) that Deleuze pinpoints the third synthesis in particular as “offer[ing] us the possibility of 
a more appropriate relation to temporality.” For more on the ethical import of Deleuze’s third synthesis, 
see also: Voss, 2013: 206-212; Widder, 2008: 86-99. 
21 DR 117. 
22 “In all three syntheses, present, past and future are revealed as Repetition, but in very different 
modes.” DR 94. 
23 DR 70. 
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prior to the recognition or representation [that it has] of these, but prior to their being 
sensed.”24 From the point of view of time, the important point to note about these sub-
representative contractions is that every contracting body or thing always already exists both 
as a “retention” of previous or past contractions and as a set of “expectations” about what it 
will contract in the future.25 As Deleuze writes, we contract not simply on the basis of what 
we already “are”, that is, on the basis of the contractions that we have previously undergone; 
by our contractions, “we [also] affirm our right and our expectation in regard to that which we 
[will] contract.” 26  Thus, a certain conception of time already presents itself to us as 
contracting subjects—as subjects who are passively and habitually constituted in the present 
as an aggregate of contractions.27 “This synthesis contracts the successive independent 
instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present. It is in this present 
that time is deployed. To it belong both the past and the future: the past insofar as the 
preceding instants are retained in the contraction; the future because its expectation is 
anticipated in this same contraction.”28 
Deleuze argues, however, that if this first synthesis provides an entry into the three 
dimensions of time from the perspective of the present, it also fails to provide an account of 
how the present in particular passes. “The claim of the present is precisely that it passes”, as 
can be seen from the fact that even the first synthesis of time organises the present into the 
dimensions of past and future.29 This organisation indicates that the present cannot persist 
without at the same time passing into something other than itself.30 But nothing about the 
mechanism of contraction in the first synthesis explains this passage. And here, Deleuze 
writes, “[w]e cannot avoid the necessary conclusion—that there must be another time in 
                                                
24 DR 73. 
25 DR 73. 
26 DR 73-74. 
27 The first synthesis’ contracting subject is a passive—or larval—subject that operates ‘beneath’ the 
level of conscious awareness and recognition. DR 74-75. 
28 DR 70-71. 
29 DR 79; Widder, 2012a: 45. 
30 Williams, 2011: 13. 
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which the first synthesis of time can occur. This refers us to a second synthesis.”31 
This second synthesis of time (or of the past) is where Deleuze’s account of repetition 
most heavily relies on Bergson. In accordance with Matter and Memory's argument that the 
past gives present perception its “guidance” and “direction”, Deleuze holds that the first 
synthesis of time presupposes the existence of a past "as the pure condition without which it 
would not pass."32 Yet, just like for Bergson this past is not reducible to present or actual 
perception but is rather different in kind from it, so too Deleuze argues that it would be “futile 
to try to reconstitute the past from the presents between which it is trapped”.33 The past that 
“grounds” the passage of the present is not simply a present that has passed and that is no 
longer existent, for if that were the case, we would still be left with no explanation as to how 
that present was capable of passing into the past.34 Instead, the past grounds the passage 
of the present because it has a manner “of being posed as already-there, presupposed by 
the passing present and causing it to pass.”35 Deleuze frames this ‘already-there-ness’ of the 
past in terms of its virtual coexistence with the actual present. Now, in accordance with 
Deleuze’s broader definition of the virtual as something that is not actual but nonetheless 
fully real and completely determined, the pure past must here be understood as the well-
determined set of differential relations and elements which constitutes, as it were, the other 
‘side’ of actual presents without being in any way reducible to them.36 In this manner of 
virtually coexisting with actual presents, the past also makes those presents pass. Indeed: 
“No present would ever pass were it not past ‘at the same time’ as it is present; no past 
would ever be constituted unless it were first constituted ‘at the same time’ as it was 
                                                
31 DR 79. 
32 MM 152-153; B 59; DR 81. 
33 DR 81. Matter and Memory repeatedly states that there is a radical difference in kind between 
present perception and pure memory. cf. MM 137-139. 
34 Deleuze repeatedly speaks of the second synthesis as the “ground” of the first. DR 79-80. 
35 Thus, the past “forms a pure, general, a priori element of all time.” DR 82. 
36 DR 208-210. This distinction between the virtual and the actual is one that Deleuze will continue to 
rely upon throughout his career. For prominent examples, see: B 94-102; AO 129, 249, 255, 358; ATP 
95-110, 241, 359; Deleuze, 1986: 56, 64-65, 102-112; Deleuze, 1989: 41, 46-47, 54, 68-98; Deleuze, 
2001: 31-32; Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 155-161; Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 148-152. 
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present.”37 Rather than simply being a present that has passed, the past is therefore a 
virtuality that is always both prior to and “contemporaneous” (or coextensive) with every 
actual present.38 Thus, unlike the past of the first synthesis, the virtual past is not stored up 
at the level of the successive, bodily or material contractions that compose an actual subject 
at a given moment in time. Because it must be prior to the present in order to make the latter 
pass, “the past is not conserved in the present in relation to which it is past, but is conserved 
in itself.”39 The storehouse of the past’s memories, to use Bergson’s expression, is neither 
the body nor the brain, but itself.40 This entails that when Deleuze speaks of the past that 
grounds the passage of the present, he refers not to a given present’s past—not to a present 
that has passed—but to the virtual whole of the past—the “pure past”, or the “past in 
general”.41 The entirety of this virtual past is certainly not uniform, for once again Deleuze 
holds (with Bergson) that “this whole past coexists with itself, in varying degrees of 
relaxation … and of contraction.”42 Like Bergson’s famous cone of memory, the virtual whole 
of the second synthesis includes all of the past “in all its details”, but does so at more or less 
expanded or contracted levels, in accordance with the relevance of each of those levels to 
“the present reality”.43 In this context, the present that was only an aggregate of material or 
actual contractions in the first synthesis now finds a new sense. The actual present now 
becomes the most contracted degree of the entire virtual past, and thus becomes defined in 
function of “the relations of coexistence between the levels of a pure past, each present 
being no more than the actualisation or representation of one of these levels.”44 
The second synthesis of time creates a more complex form repetition than the first.45 
Nevertheless, Deleuze claims that the repetition provided by the second synthesis remains 
                                                
37 DR 81; cf. B 58. 
38 Deleuze here echoes Bergson’s claims that true memory is “[c]oextensive with consciousness” and 
that “our consciousness of the present is already memory.” MM 151; cf. B 55-56. 
39 DR 82; cf. MM 161-162. 
40 MM 74. 
41 Deleuze writes: “the whole past coexists with the present in relation to which it is past, but the pure 
element of the past in general pre-exists the passing present.” DR 82. 
42 DR 83. 
43 MM 161-162, 241-242. 
44 DR 83. 
45 cf. DR 287. 
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unsatisfactory on at least two fronts.46 First, whilst by grounding of the passage of time in the 
present the second synthesis certainly goes ‘beyond’ the domain of actual succession, it still 
remains too closely attached to that domain. The main issue is that the articulation of the 
different levels of the virtual past still remains too closely modelled on the habitual or 
‘present reality’ that it is supposed to ground or make pass.47 In Deleuze’s words, this 
problem is 
implicit in the second synthesis of time. For the latter, from the height of its pure past, surpassed 
and dominated the world of representation (…). However, it still remains relative to the 
representation that it grounds. It elevates the principles of representation—namely, identity, which 
it treats as an immemorial model, and resemblance, which it treats as a present image: the Same 
and the Similar. The shortcoming of the ground is to remain relative to what it grounds, to borrow 
[empruter] the characteristics of what it grounds, and to be proved [prouver] by these.48  
As the ground of actual or habitual succession, the second synthesis retains too much 
similarity between itself and the actual present.49 The relations of coexistence between the 
levels of the pure past are still too closely determined or articulated on the basis of their 
resemblance to the present reality that they supposedly animate, such that a confusion 
between the two becomes “inevitable (…), the pure past assuming thereby the status of a 
former present”.50 Hence, if the second synthesis provides us with a more complex form of 
repetition than the first, this is still not quite the repetition "without any mediation whatsoever 
by the identical" that Deleuze seeks in Difference and Repetition.51 This entails, secondly, 
that if the repetition of the second synthesis provides us with a practical model for the 
                                                
46 For an extended discussion of Deleuze’s departure from Bergson on these points, see: Widder, 
2012b: 127-146. 
47 Deleuze does not explicitly frame the problems with the second synthesis in this way, but he might 
here be objecting to Bergson’s stipulation (MM 152-153) that the systems of habit and true memory 
must “lend each other a mutual support.” Deleuze’s contention that “habit never gives rise to true 
repetition” certainly seems to provide ample grounds for rejecting Bergson’s schema on this point. DR 
5, 7-8. 
48 DR 88. 
49 On this point, see also Deleuze’s corresponding critique of two virtual Ideas (namely, Epicurus’ 
atom and Geoffroy’s organism) that still model themselves too closely on “actuality [actualité]” or 
“actual existence [existence actuelle].” DR 184-185. 
50 DR 109. 
51 DR 117. 
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affirmation of difference in itself, then this model is still too inadequate to the latter’s 
demands. 52  Rather than breaking with the first synthesis' habitual representation of 
difference, the ethical action proposed by the second synthesis still remains too closely 
attached to the habit that Deleuze sees as precisely precluding the emergence of “true 
repetition”.53 
Ultimately, a conception of repetition that is adequate to the demands of difference in 
itself can be based only on a third synthesis of time, the synthesis of the future or eternal 
return. Broadly speaking, Deleuze’s claim in introducing this synthesis is that the succession 
of habit and the coexistence of memory both presuppose another, more radical, form of 
temporality.54 Unlike the last two syntheses, however, this form of time is not articulated as a 
set of contractions—be they habitual/actual or mnemonic/virtual. Instead, the claim of the 
third synthesis is precisely that it effects a dis-articulation in being, that it disjoins or puts out 
of joint the temporalities of both the past and present.55 Appealing to Hamlet’s famous 
statement that “time is out of joint”, Deleuze describes this synthesis thus: 
The joint, cardo, is what ensures the subordination of time to those properly cardinal points 
through which pass the periodic movements which it measures (…) By contrast, time out of joint 
means demented time or time outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated [libéré] from its 
overly simple circular figure, freed [affranchi] from the events which made up its content, its 
relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure form [forme 
vide et pure].56 
The third synthesis is thus not subordinated to the movement or progressivity that dominated 
                                                
52 Williams (2003: 98) reads Deleuze’s practical objection to the second synthesis as follows: “the 
pure past has given us some conditions, that hold for any given present, but no way of acting upon 
those conditions.” This reading certainly edges in the right direction. However, given Deleuze's claims 
on the second synthesis' inability to distance itself from the present, it is perhaps more accurate to 
say that the second synthesis encourages not 'no activity' but rather the wrong type of activity (one is 
still too based on the identity of habit). 
53 DR 5. Deleuze does not (explicitly, at least) intend any of this as a critique of Bergsonian intuition. 
However, it would certainly be possible to construe a critique of intuition on the basis of these 
reflections, especially if one holds that the intuition creates an opening onto Memory itself. For a 
reading of (mystical) intuition emphasising this connection, see: Lawlor, 2003: 85-111; cf. Widder, 
2008: 90-91. 
54 Somers-Hall, 2013: 78. 
55 Derrida (1994a, 2006) also ethically thematises the idea of a time out of joint.  
56 DR 88. On Deleuze’s notion of the cardo, see also: Deleuze, 1978: np. 
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the first two syntheses.57 Instead, that synthesis is both static and empty, meaning that it is 
not progressively determined in time, but is rather the unchanging temporal form under 
which any such determination can occur. “The synthesis is necessarily static, since time is 
no longer subordinated to movement; time is the most radical form of change, but the form 
of change does not change.”58 Citing Hölderlin’s reading of Oedipus Rex, Deleuze conceives 
this form of change in terms of a “caesura” between the orders of the ‘before’ and ‘after’, 
where this caesura refers to the unequal cut or fracture in being that “creates the possibility 
of a temporal series.” 59 In other words, the third synthesis is, for Deleuze, that fundamental 
“inequality” on the basis of which any ‘before’ or ‘after’—or indeed, any past, present or 
future—are capable of being constituted.60 “Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by 
which it is conditioned”, and in relation to the first two syntheses, this inequality is the third 
synthesis itself.61 
This pure and empty form of time should not be confused with anything that might 
normally be regarded as an actual or empirical content of time—a confusion, which, as we 
saw above, still governed the articulation of the second, Bergsonian synthesis. 62  For 
Deleuze, to claim that the third synthesis is empty or pure is precisely to recognise that it has 
“abjured its empirical content”.63 Said differently, the third synthesis is not articulated in 
relation to any form of actuality; its temporality is “not distributed according to this empirical 
criterion.”64 By contrast, and precisely because it lacks this empirical content and reference, 
the caesura of the third synthesis can only be described as untimely. This untimeliness, as 
Deleuze clarifies in both the Preface to Difference and Repetition and Nietzsche and 
                                                
57 Deleuze's dissociation of the third synthesis from movement opposes an age-old tradition in 
Western philosophy to conceive time in terms of movement. For two foundational examples, see: 
Plato, 1997: 37d; Aristotle, 1995: 279a15. 
58 DR 89; cf. Kant, 1998: A41/B58; Deleuze, 1984: vii-xii. 
59 DR 89. For Hölderlin (2009: 324), Oedipus undergoes a radical experience of time, where a “gap 
occurs in the course of the world” and where “beginning and end simply cannot be connected”. 
60 DR 89. 
61 DR 222. 
62 Deleuze speaks of an "end of time" (DR 94, 115) in relation to the third synthesis, to indicate, as 
Arkady Plotnitsky (2015: 140-141) recognises, that this synthesis “is no longer ‘time’ at all in any 
sense we can give to such a concept”. 
63 DR 89. 
64 DR 89. 
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Philosophy, is neither “historical” nor “of the present”.65 Instead, this untimely synthesis is 
that “discontinuity” or interruption that always acts counter to the continuity of the present 
and the historical: “namely, complete metamorphosis, the irreducibly unequal.”66 But if this 
untimely caesura that Deleuze identifies with the third synthesis lacks any historical or 
empirical content, what kind of repetition does it then create? For Deleuze, this repetition 
must be conceived in terms of Nietzsche’s conception of the eternal return.67 On this 
conception, that which repeats in the third synthesis is never similarity but always difference 
itself.68 But once again, this difference has no essential grounding in the actual or historical, 
for that would be to again collapse the distinction between the second and third syntheses.69 
What returns in the third synthesis is rather an irreducible difference that is ‘prior’ to the 
orders of the actual and the historical.70 What returns is difference understood as intensity: 
“the eternal return is neither qualitative nor extensive but intensive, purely intensive.”71 This 
means, in accordance with Deleuze’s broader definition of intensity, that what repeats in the 
eternal return is an “inequality” or “difference of potential” that is both irreducible and ‘prior’ 
to the explication it receives in the states of quality and extensity.72 In this sense, repetition 
in the eternal return is never the return of actual historical facts, agents or identities. What 
returns in the third synthesis is always a “properly chaotic world without identity (….) [which] 
excludes both the coherence of a subject which represents itself and that of an object 
                                                
65  “Following Nietzsche we discover, as more profound than time and eternity, the untimely: 
philosophy is neither a philosophy of history, nor a philosophy of the eternal, but untimely, always and 
always untimely—that is to say, ‘acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us 
hope, for the benefit of a time to come.’” DR xxi; NP 107. 
66 NP 107; DR 242. 
67 Deleuze is here drawing on his earlier reading of eternal return in Nietzsche and Philosophy, which 
states that “the eternal return is linked, not to a repetition of the same, but on the contrary, to a 
transmutation. It is the moment or the eternity of becoming which eliminates all that resists it." NP xv-
xx, 24-29, 46-49, 68-72, 189-198. 
68 “The eternal return does cause the same and the similar to return, but is itself derived from a world 
of pure difference.” DR 125. 
69 “In this manner, the [Bergsonian] ground [of memory] has been superseded by a groundlessness, a 
universal ungrounding which turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come [à venir] to return.” DR 
91. 
70 Somers-Hall, 2013: 83. 
71 DR 243. 
72 For Deleuze’s general definition of intensity, see: DR 222-223. 
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represented.”73 What returns is difference understood as the system of the “dissolved self 
[moi dissous]”, that is, as the system where the self’s coherence and identity are necessarily 
“expunged” and where what is produced and affirmed is always “the absolutely new itself”.74 
Deleuze’s claim with regard to the third synthesis is that as subjects we are always in a 
certain sense passive with respect to its creative affirmation of difference. “The eternal return 
affirms difference, it affirms dissemblance, disparateness, change, multiplicity and 
becoming”, and this affirmation is something that just happens to us as subjects whether we 
are conscious of this or not.75 As James Williams writes: “We are passive with respect to this 
sense of chancing [brought about by the eternal return]—it does not have to be a conscious 
component of creative acts.”76 However, just like for Bergson the intuition has many senses, 
so too, for Deleuze, the proposition that the eternal return affirms difference “means many 
things.”77 And beyond signifying the creation that just happens to us, that proposition also 
means that difference in the eternal return must become “an object of affirmation (…) that it 
is creation but also that it must [doit] be created, as affirming difference, as being difference 
in itself.”78 In other words, there is also a practical ethical injunction at the heart of Deleuze’s 
ontological conception of time as eternal return.79 Although a passivity to the eternal return’s 
affirmation of difference is, to repeat, a necessary aspect of our existence as subjects, it is 
also, for Deleuze, equally necessary—this time from an ethical standpoint—that we create 
ourselves as the repetitious soul or Self that affirms difference as difference in itself.80 For 
only thus, to borrow a famous expression from The Logic of Sense, can we “become worthy 
of what happens to us.”81 Only by actively creating ourselves as a repetitious Self can we do 
justice to that constitutive ontological repetition to which we are in any case passively 
                                                
73 DR 57. 
74 DR 90. 
75 DR 300. 
76 Williams, 2003: 102. 
77 DR 55. 
78 DR 55. 
79 Williams, 2003: 105. 
80 DR 23. Nietzsche and Philosophy also upholds the inseparability of ethics and ontology, claiming 
that eternal return is a principle of both ontological and ethical selection. NP xvii-xviii, 68-72. 
81 LS 149. 
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exposed. However, while we have so far seen that Deleuze’s conception of the eternal 
return abounds with characters to whom repetition happens (e.g. Hamlet and Oedipus), we 
also seem no closer to clarifying what kind of ethical action would make us worthy of its 
affirmation of difference in itself. On this score, as I have said, the only clues that Deleuze 
provides revolve around the undoubtedly obscure notion of the differenciator or dark 
precursor of difference.82 It is this agent’s activity, we are told, that relates different to 
different so as to affirm difference in the eternal return.83 But we still need to explain how and 
why, for Deleuze, this differenciator’s activity provides an ethical model for the affirmation of 
difference in the eternal return. To this task I now turn. 
 
5.2. How to affirm the eternal return 
The idea of structure is markedly absent from Deleuze’s writings on Bergson. Yet, it is 
precisely in structuralist terms that Deleuze explicates the concept of a differenciator of 
difference in Difference and Repetition. Now, Deleuze begins to properly introduce this 
concept by asking what sort of “systems [are] constituted [affectés] by the eternal return”.84 
For systems to be constituted in this manner, Deleuze answers, they must avoid making 
identity and resemblance primary: “difference must [il faut] immediately relate the differing 
terms to one another (….) difference must [Il faut] be articulation and connection in itself”.85 
For this to be possible, however, there must be something in these systems that enables 
differences to immediately relate to one another. There must be an “agent [agent]” or a 
“force” that is responsible for ensuring this immediate communication between differences.86 
And this agent is precisely what Deleuze calls the differenciator of difference. For eternal 
return to operate in a system, “[t]here must [Il faut] be a differenciation of difference, an in 
itself which like a differenciator, a Sich-unterscheidende, by virtue of which the different is 
                                                
82 DR 117; cf. Deleuze, 2004c: 97-98.  
83 DR 116-128. 
84 DR 116. 
85 DR 117. 
86 DR 119. 
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gathered all at once rather than represented on condition of a prior resemblance, identity, 
analogy or opposition.”87 
In the context of Deleuze’s discussion of eternal return, this emphasis on a differenciator 
of difference is certainly striking. But it is not entirely without precedent in his philosophy.88 In 
his earlier “How Do We Recognise Structuralism?”—a 1967 essay devoted to articulating the 
philosophical overlaps between structuralist figures as varied as Lévi-Strauss, Althusser and 
Lacan—Deleuze had already insisted on the importance of the “differenciating role [rôle 
différenciateur]” played by the “differenciator [différenciant] of difference itself.”89 Specifically, 
in that text Deleuze contends that without this notion of a differenciator we can provide only 
an abstract account of the productive role that structures play in creating worldly diversity.90 
Like the pure past of the second synthesis, Deleuze argues, these structures must be 
understood in terms of the virtual. This means that though structures have a reality, this 
reality “does not merge with any actual reality [réalité actuelle], any present or past actuality 
[actualité].”91 Instead, structures must be regarded as virtual systems that are composed of 
both differential relations and points of singularity. 92  Within a virtual structure, these 
differential relations and singular points are distributed or articulated in two or more “series”, 
which constantly interact with one another to reciprocally determine the value and place of 
their respective virtual points and relations.93 A good example of such a structure is the 
relation between dx and dy in one of the essential functions of differential calculus: dx/dy = - 
                                                
87 DR 117. 
88 Deleuze's early texts on Bergson attribute an “internal explosive force” to the virtual totality of 
duration—a force said to cause the latter’s “differentiation” into diverse or ramified series. This 
attribution resonates with the concept of a differenciator in both Difference and Repetition and The 
Logic of Sense. However, in the writings on Bergson, the precise nature of that force remains 
relatively vague and undefined. And only with the help of structuralism—and, will see shortly, Gilbert 
Simondon—is Deleuze able to clarify the nature of that internal force as the “empty [vide]” and 
“always displaced” element that makes the entire process of differenciation function. Deleuze, 2004a: 
27; Deleuze, 2004b: 40; B 94; cf. LS 48-51; HRS 184-189. 
89 HRS 180, 186 (translation of différenciant modified). For a bibliographic account of this piece, see: 
Stolze, 1998: 51-63. 
90 HRS 182, 180. 
91 HRS 178. 
92 HRS 177; LS 50. 
93 “One must state simply that every structure is serial, multi-serial, and would not function without this 
condition.” HR 182-183; LS 50. 
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x/y. 94  In this function, “dy is totally undetermined in relation to y, and dx is totally 
undetermined in relation to x: each one has neither existence, nor value, nor signification. 
And yet the relation dy/dx is totally determined, the two elements determining each other 
reciprocally in the relation.”95 
Once again, though, for this differential determination within structures (differentiation) to 
be possible, and indeed, for the virtual relations and singularities within a structure to 
become “incarnated” or “actualised” in actual terms and realities (differenciation), something 
else must drive the entire process forward.96 Deleuze's essay on structuralism admits that 
the factor responsible for animating structures in this way is “seemingly quite strange.”97 
Nevertheless, this factor can be specified as a “wholly paradoxical object or element” which 
operates as a point of convergence where the series within a structure communicate with 
one another across their differences.98 Like the “empty square [case vide]” in a fifteen-puzzle, 
this element is a kind of mobile place without value around which the distribution of a virtual 
structure can be arranged and determined: “it is in relation to [this] object that the variety of 
terms and the variation of differential relations are determined in each case”.99 Deleuze tells 
us that for each structural order, this paradoxical element or “object=x is not at all something 
unknowable, something purely undetermined [inconnaissable, un pur indéterminé].”100 In any 
given structure, this object can be determined, just as its role can be “fulfilled by quite 
diverse determinations [déterminations très diverses].”101 To play the role of a mobile empty 
square, however, this object=x cannot be fixed within any particular series; it must “circulate 
in them, and from one to another, with an extraordinary agility.”102 Similarly, the success of 
this object’s role depends on its not holding any particular identity, just as it depends on its 
                                                
94 HRS 176; LS 50; DR 170-176.  
95 HRS 176. 
96 “We call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea [or structure] differentiation; we call the 
actualisation of a virtuality into species and distinct parts differenciation.” DR 207. 
97 HRS 182-183. 
98 HRS 184; LS 40-41, 50-51, 66-67. 
99 HRS 184; LS 40, 51. 
100 HRS 188. 
101 DR 119. 
102 HRS 184. 
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independence from any form of actuality. Deleuze repeatedly exemplifies this mobility and 
independence by appealing to Lacan’s notion of the “phallus”.103 Like Lacan’s phallus, this 
paradoxical object should not be equated with any “given [donée]” or “empirical 
determination [détermination empirique]”. 104  Distinguishing this object=x is instead its 
capacity for always being “that which does not coincide with its own identity, always found 
there where it is not where one looks for it, always displaced in relation to itself”.105 It is, 
moreover, because this object=x retains this mobility and independence in relation to the 
actual that it is capable of playing the role of the differenciator of structures. As Deleuze puts 
it: “The whole structure is driven by this originary Third, which fails to coincide with its own 
origin. Distributing the differences through the entire structure, making the differential 
relations vary with its displacements, the object=x constitutes the differenciator [le 
différenciant] of difference itself.”106 
For Deleuze, some version of this framework between virtual structures and their 
differenciator is operative in the work of most worthy structuralist thinkers. This framework is 
not, however, simply a useful heuristic device for grasping how structures function to 
generate diversity in the world.107 Indeed, on Deleuze’s reading, structuralism is inseparable 
not only from the frameworks that it creates, “but also from a practice in relation to the 
products that it interprets.” 108  This means that beyond its useful account of genesis, 
structuralism also provides a model for ethical practice that is adequate to that genetic 
process' differential demands.109 Now, since structuralism dictates that things are most 
mobile at the precise point where the differenciator operates, it is also there, at that level, 
that this future-directed ethical practice must install itself. As Deleuze puts it: “It is always as 
a function of the empty square [or differenciator] that the differential relations [in structures] 
                                                
103 cf. Lacan, 2006: 575-584. 
104 HRS 187; cf. DR 103-107. 
105 HRS 187; LS 51. 
106 HRS 186 (translation modified). “But above all, we can conclude that there is no structure without 
the empty square, which makes everything function.” LS 51. 
107 Deleuze writes: “‘structuralism’ seems to us the only means by which a genetic method can 
achieve its ambitions.” DR 183. 
108 HRS 191. 
109 Structuralism provides “the criteria of the future.” HRS 192. 
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are open to new values and variations, and the singularities capable of new distributions, 
constitutive of another structure. (….) This mutation point [therefore] precisely defines a 
praxis, or rather the very site where a praxis must take hold [doit s’installer].”110 That is, far 
from altogether dispensing with the question of subjectivity, and specifically, with the 
question of what an ethical subjectivity looks like, structuralism merely reconfigures and 
disperses its terms.111 Under such dispersion, to become an ethical subject is, for Deleuze, 
precisely to become—or to play the role of—the differenciator of structures. It is to become 
what Deleuze calls “a structuralist hero”, that is, someone who deploys their “power to cause 
relations to vary and to redistribute singularities, always casting another throw of the dice.”112 
Returning to Difference and Repetition, we see that this engagement with structuralism 
also frames Deleuze’s conception of how the eternal return is affirmed. Directly after his 
claim that there must be a differenciator for a given system to be constituted by the eternal 
return, Deleuze writes: 
Under what other conditions does difference develop this in-itself as a ‘differenciator’, and gather 
the different outside of any possible representation? The first characteristic seems to us to be 
organisation in a series. A system must be constituted on the basis of two or more series, each 
series being defined by the differences between the terms which compose it. If we suppose that 
the series communicate under the impulse of a force of some kind, then it is apparent that this 
communication relates differences to other differences, constituting differences between 
differences within the system. These second-degree differences play the role of the 
‘differenciator’—in other words, they relate the first-degree differences to one another. The nature 
of these elements (…) can be determined: these are intensities, the peculiarity of intensities being 
to be constituted by a difference which itself refers to other differences (...). The intensive 
character of the systems considered should not prejudice their being characterised as mechanical, 
physical, biological, psychic, social, aesthetic, or philosophical, etc.113 
                                                
110 HRS 191. Or, as The Logic of Sense puts this: “Today’s task is to make the empty square circulate 
and to make pre-individual and nonpersonal singularities speak—in short, to produce sense.” LS 73. 
111 HRS 190. 
112 HRS 191; cf. NP 25-27. For more on this structuralist hero, see: Bowden, 2011: 172-173. 
113 DR 117. 
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Broad similarities appear between this passage and some key notions that Deleuze 
‘recognises’ in structuralism. Although Deleuze here opts for the term “system”, he 
nonetheless insists that, like structures, these systems must be constituted on the basis of 
two or more series.114 Moreover, each of these series is composed of terms or differences 
that have an existence only insofar as they communicate with one another. Finally, and this 
is for Deleuze “the most important point”, there is here likewise an agent or force that 
ensures this communication between the series within a system.115 As Deleuze writes, 
“every system contains its dark precursor which ensures the communication of peripheral 
series. (….) Given two heterogeneous series, two series of differences, the precursor plays 
the part of the differenciator of these differences. In this manner, by virtue of its own power, 
it puts them into immediate [immédiatement] relation to one another.”116 And once again, for 
Deleuze, it is important to recall that though this differenciator takes up a diversity of 
determinations (as physical, biological, social, etc.), it nonetheless has “no identity other 
than that which it lacks: it is precisely the object=x, the one which is ‘lacking in its place’ as it 
lacks its own identity.”117 
These broad similarities aside, there are also two crucial differences between the 
structuralism of Difference and Repetition and that of Deleuze’s earlier essay on the topic. 
First, Deleuze extensively reframes the concept of structures as “Ideas”.118 Taking his cue 
from Kant, Deleuze defines Ideas as problematic complexes or multiplicities, doing so in part 
to suggest that such Ideas are not given as objects of empirical experience.119 Ideas are 
virtual: they do not possess an actual existence, and “we must avoid giving the elements 
and relations which form [their] structure an actuality which they do not have.”120 This virtual 
                                                
114  For Deleuze, the distinction between “systems” and “structures” is insignificant from the 
perspective of structuralism: HRS 170. 
115 LS 40.  
116 DR 119. 
117 DR 119-120. 
118 For an excellent account of Deleuzian Ideas, see: Somers-Hall, 2013: 128-166. 
119  DR 163. Deleuze is here redeploying Kant’s (1998: A327/B384-A328/B385) assertion that 
concepts of reason, despite exceeding the bounds of experience, nonetheless “remain as a problem 
without any solution.” 
120 DR 209. 
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existence notwithstanding, the content of these Ideas can be precisely specified. Echoing his 
earlier definition of systems, Deleuze writes that each problematic “Idea is a system of 
differential relations between differential elements, a system of differential relations between 
genetic elements.”121 Moreover, Deleuze argues that “[t]hese elements must in effect be 
determined, but reciprocally, by reciprocal relations which allow no independence 
whatsoever to subsist.”122 Now introducing a more rigorous description of this process, 
Deleuze also insists that the determination of virtual Ideas is essentially related to a 
movement of “actualisation or differenciation”.123 As he puts it: “A multiple ideal connection, a 
differential relation, must be actualised in diverse spatio-temporal relationships, at the same 
time as its elements are actually incarnated in a variety of terms and forms.”124 This process 
of actualisation proceeds in two distinct directions, “one concerning the qualities or diverse 
species which actualise the varieties [of differential relations within a structure], the other 
concerning the number or the distinct parts actualising [its] singular points.”125 Insofar as 
Ideas are actualised in these two ways, their differential relations and singularities are not 
simply differentiated (t) among themselves at the level of the virtual; they are also 
differenciated (c) by becoming actualised or incarnated in actual, empirical and extensive 
species and parts.126 This entire set of conditions helps to define an Idea as a structure.127 
But once again, as it stands, this conception of structure remains incomplete, for “we need a 
third thing which determines the Idea to actualise itself, to incarnate itself in a particular 
way.”128 We still need to explain why an Idea actualises itself into this or that species or this 
or that part. We still need a third element—that is, a differenciator—providing “the 
differenciation of differenciation.”129 
                                                
121 DR 181. 
122 DR 183. 
123 DR 212. 
124 DR 183. 
125 DR 210. 
126 “Differenciation is like the second part of difference, and in order to designate the integrity or the 
integrality of the object we require the complex notion of different/ciation.” DR 209. 
127 DR 183. 
128 Deleuze, 2004c: 102. 
129 DR 217. 
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In a second, more decisive alteration, Deleuze now configures this ‘third’ that determines 
the differenciation of virtual Ideas as intensive. The notion of intensity is entirely absent from 
Deleuze's essay in structuralism, but in Difference and Repetition, as noted, the second-
degree elements that play the role of a differenciator within a system can be determined as 
intensities. Deleuze shores up this equation between intensity and the differenciator with a 
reference to Gilbert Simondon’s notion of “disparation [disparation]”. 130  On Simondon’s 
conception, the disparate can be described as a field of “tension” where an “information” that 
is irreducible to the forms of the given is made to circulate or communicate between two 
distinct realities.131 Taking this schema further and substituting its informational vocabulary 
for a notion of “signs”, Deleuze argues that insofar as this notion of a field of disparation 
implies a “fundamental difference, like a state of dissymmetry” between two differing orders, 
it can “be assimilated to a theory of intensive quanta, since each intensive quantum is itself a 
difference.”132 Every intensive quantity, as noted above, refers to a difference of potential 
that cannot in itself be equalised or cancelled. Like an irrational number that cannot be 
resolved into an integer or whole number, these intensive quantities are a sort of inequality 
to which no determined quality corresponds.133 They are the ‘remainder’ that is ‘prior’ to 
every quality, and more generally, to the states of extension within which those qualities find 
themselves explicated.134 Now, in this context, Deleuze argues that what Simondon allows 
us to see is that the ‘third’ element by which differenciation is differenciated is itself intensive. 
Indeed, if, Simondon’s conception of the disparate is reducible to the concept of intensive 
quantity, then it is in “disparateness as it is determined and comprised in difference of 
intensity, in intensity as difference”, that the differenciator of difference operates.135 More 
simply, we might say that the differenciator can now be treated as the intensive factor that is 
responsible for the differenciation of structures. 
                                                
130 DR 120. For more the importance of Simondon’s conception for Difference and Repetition, see: 
Sauvagnargues, 2016: 61-84. 
131 Simondon, 2013: 31. 
132 Deleuze, 2004d: 87; DR 20, 222.  
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In part, Deleuze adopts this notion of intensity because he sees it providing a way of 
avoiding what he calls “the most important difficulty” pertaining to the differenciator’s 
functioning within a structure.136 We have already noted Deleuze’s stipulation that—in order 
to play its proper function within a structure—the differenciator cannot have any identity, just 
as it cannot find itself grounded in any empirical or actual order. Difference and Repetition 
reframes this stipulation as a question: “When we speak of communication between 
heterogeneous systems, of coupling and resonance, does this not imply a minimum of 
resemblances between the series, and an identity in the agent which brings about the 
communication?”137 Now, significantly, it is the concept of intensity that enables Deleuze to 
provide a negative answer to this question. As noted above, one of intensity's central 
characteristics is its irreducibility to the states of extensity and quality that make up the order 
of the actual.138 “Intensity is primarily implicated in itself”, meaning that “intensity is neither 
divisible, like extensive quantity, nor indivisible, like quality.”139 Instead, intensity is that 
“original depth” or “spatium” that operates as “the transcendental principle” out of which 
extensive or empirical quantities and qualities emerge.140 As the principle of these extensive 
states, this depth should not be confused with the third dimension of space. Indeed, as 
                                                
136 DR 120. 
137 DR 119. 
138 There is an ongoing debate within Deleuze studies as to whether the intensive can be classified as 
actual or virtual, with authors like Dale Clisby (2015: 127-149) and John Roffe (2012: 142-143) 
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139 DR 237. 
140 DR 230. In Latin, the term spatium indicates not only a space or distance, but also a course that 
circles around itself (like a circuit), and an interval of time. In these respects, as Widder (forthcoming: 
15) notes, the spatium can be equated with the third synthesis' caesura. 
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Deleuze stresses, “[e]xtensity can emerge from the depths only if depth is definable 
independently [indépendamment] of extensity.”141 Now, it is true that as it explicates itself—
that is, as it gives rise to the qualities and quantities of the extended—this pure spatium 
tends to become mixed with the particular forms of the actual or the empirical.142 To that 
extent, there is a “transcendental illusion” that is tied to the process by which intensive 
quantities give rise to the determined dimensions of actual existence.143 This illusion allows 
intensive quantities to become aligned with the figures of good sense and common sense—
as in traditional thermodynamics.144 “This illusion, however, is not intensity itself, but rather 
the movement by which difference in intensity is cancelled.”145 This means that in itself, 
intensity remains a “pure implex” or a “pure spatium” that is freed from all forms of identity 
and the identical.146 In itself, intensity “is the transcendental principle which maintains itself in 
itself, beyond the reach of the empirical principle.”147 As such, it is as intensive that the 
differenciator can play its proper role as that which differenciates difference without 
resemblance or identity. As an intensive agent, the differenciator can truly be “said of a world 
the very ground of which is difference, in which everything rests upon disparities, upon 
differences of differences which reverberate to infinity (the world of intensity).”148 
No less decisively, equating the differenciator with intensity also enables Deleuze to 
develop a more precise account of how that agent plays a determinant role in the 
different/ciation of virtual Ideas. To the question of how the Idea is determined to actualise 
itself into differenciated qualities and extensities, Deleuze responds: “the answer lies 
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precisely in the intensive quantities. Intensity is the determinant in the process of 
actualisation.”149 Now, intensity plays “this determinant role” precisely because it possesses 
“its own essential process”, the process of individuation.150 Once again relying on Simondon, 
Deleuze argues that individuation is precisely the act by which the differential 
communication between disparate series is established. 151  By establishing this 
communication, individuation functions as “the act by which intensity determines differential 
relations to become actualised, along the lines of differenciation and within the qualities and 
extensities it creates.”152 Deleuze exemplifies this process of individuation with a reference 
to embryology, holding that an egg can be considered an intensive “site” where only a range 
of very special movements and transfers occur.153 These movements “create or trace a 
space corresponding to the differential relations and to the singularities to be actualised.”154 
Significantly, these movements are also entirely irreducible to that which they differenciate or 
actualise. Indeed, as Deleuze famously states, the “achievement of the embryo is to live the 
unlivable, to sustain forced movements which would break any [already-actualised] 
skeleton”.155 This is not to suggest that no subjects occupy individuating fields like the egg. 
“There are indeed actors and subjects, but these are larvae, since they alone are capable of 
sustaining the lines, the slippages and the rotations.”156  
Once again deploying Simondon, Deleuze argues that these subjects that constitute 
fields of individuation should be classified as intensive “individuals”.157 These individuals are 
not to be understood as qualified or extended.158 Neither is the individual to be equated with 
the personological figures of the constituted “I [Je]” or “Self [Moi]”, for these are only the 
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distorted figures that individuality assumes once it has already been differenciated or 
explicated.159 Fundamentally belonging to the order of the dissolved self, the individual “is 
distinguished from the I and the Self just as the intense order of implications is distinguished 
from the extensive and qualitative order of explication.”160 As such, the individual is not to be 
taken as an actual person with stable, constituted and determined qualities or attributes.161 
By contrast, the individual possesses only the following positive characteristics: 
“indeterminate [indéterminé], floating, fluid, communicative”.162 Moreover, this individual’s 
individuality “is intensive, and therefore serial, stepped and communicating, comprising and 
affirming in itself the difference in intensities by which it is constituted.”163 This means that 
within an individuating field, the individual is that which—by virtue of its intensive nature—
establishes the communication between disparate series within a given field of individuation. 
The individual “undertakes forced movements, constitutes internal resonances and 
dramatises the primordial relation of life”, and as such is precisely the agent that carries out 
the act of individuation for a given field of disparation.164 The individual is he who makes use 
of all his power for mobility and communication to determine the simultaneous 
different/ciation of Ideas.165 In this manner, the intensive individual here emerges as the 
differenciator of differences within a system of disparateness. Indeed, if Ideas find their 
actualisation only as a result of the activity of a differenciator providing the differenciation of 
differenciation, it is always an intensive individual—taken as an indeterminate, floating and 
communicative agent—who plays that determinant role. 
But if this account of intensity fills out Deleuze’s notion of what plays the determinant role 
of the differenciator within a system, how is this entire schema related to the affirmation of 
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eternal return? In short, intensity and the play of individuation that it essentially involves is 
precisely the ‘site’ within which the temporality of eternal return is affirmed or repeated. As 
we have already seen Deleuze starkly claim: “The eternal return is neither qualitative nor 
extensive but intensive, purely intensive.”166 Now equipped with the notion of individuation, 
we can provide a better explanation for this identity between eternal return and the intensive. 
In effect, the eternal return is affirmed in intensity because the only ‘things’ that pass or 
return through the latter’s individuating spatiums are those differences that maintain 
themselves beyond the reach of empirical principles. In the intensive spatium, only these 
“communicating intensities, differences of differences” return because only they are capable 
of passing through the “unqualified abyss” of individuation.167 “What does not return is that 
which denies eternal return, that which does not pass the test. It is quality and extensity 
which do not return, insofar as within them difference, the condition of eternal return, is 
cancelled.”168 Thus, intensity and its essential process of individuation constitute the true 
occasion for the repetition of eternal return: “while the laws of nature govern the surface of 
the world, the eternal return ceaselessly rumbles in this other dimension of the 
transcendental or volcanic spatium.”169 It is thus through intensive individuation that an 
untimely difference without empirical content repeats and interrupts both the present and the 
historical: “intensity affirms difference.”170 Any ethical practice attempting to affirm the eternal 
return must therefore take shape as “an ethics of intensive quantities”, just as it must adopt 
the following maxim as its first principle: “affirm even the lowest.”171 Affirm even the lowest, 
that is, precisely because it is always at the level of an intensive depth (a depth lower than 
any actual quality or extension) that difference shows itself as differing or as relating itself to 
itself without any mediation whatsoever by the identical.172 
On the basis of Deleuze’s pronouncements on intensity, we can also further specify 
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‘Who’ is capable of practically engendering this ethical affirmation of eternal return.173 Here, 
the stakes are clarified by the equation Deleuze establishes between the individual and the 
differenciator. Indeed, if the individual is the precisely differenciating agent who “by virtue of 
its power” puts the differences that circulate within a given field of individuation “into 
immediate relation to one another”, then the individual is also the ethical subject who we 
must become if we wish to practically affirm the eternal return.174 As Deleuze unequivocally 
puts it: “The thinker, undoubtedly the thinker of eternal return, is the individual, the universal 
individual.”175 To become worthy of the eternal return’s affirmation of difference in itself, it is 
therefore the figure of the individual that we must practically involve or implicate ourselves 
with. “The multiple, mobile, and communicating character of individuality, its implicated 
character, must [faut-il] therefore be constantly recalled.”176 This does not mean that we 
must seek to entirely abandon our extended and qualified nature as subjects. Deleuze 
recognises the futility of such a project by writing that its only possible outcome would be our 
own deaths as ethical subjects. 177  Nevertheless, the ontological relation between the 
individual and the eternal return places upon us an ethical injunction to relate ourselves only 
to those aspects of existence which properly speaking affirm difference. In Deleuze’s 
terminology, this injunction can be framed in terms of a “second rule” for the ethics of 
intensive quantities: “do not explicate oneself (too much)”.178 Though it is vital that we do not 
overdo our implication with the realm of intensity—that we do not let the ethics of intensive 
quantities “become a demolition job”—we must nevertheless also not seek to relate 
ourselves to the order of explication, that is, to the order of the actual and to the qualities 
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and extensities that constitute it.179 From an ethical perspective, this order of explication 
holds no particular value; it can count as little more than a ‘by-product’ of a deeper and more 
significant interplay of difference.180 More crucial from an ethical perspective is the task of 
relating oneself to the implicated order of intensity that lingers, as it were, as “a fringe of 
indetermination” beneath our actual existence.181 As Deleuze writes, “[w]e are made of all 
these depths and distances, of these intensive souls” that express the fluid and mobile 
character of individuality.182 And it is precisely with these indeterminate intensive souls that 
we must contend, or, more generally, become, if we also want to create ourselves as the 
repetitious Self of eternal return. For only these individuating souls (as opposed to our actual, 
empirical souls) can make differences communicate in a way that immediately relates 
different to different. Only these intensive souls can carry out a differenciation of the different 
without mediation. As such, only they can guide us in the ethical task of affirming that most 
disjointed of temporalities—the temporality of the eternal return. 
With all this in mind, we now can offer a more precise view of what Deleuze’s temporal 
ethics in Difference and Repetition involves. To practically affirm the eternal return and its 
absolute novelty, we must create ourselves as differenciators of difference, that is, as 
intensive individuals. This ethics of making oneself an intensive differenciator does not 
simply involve the “creation of affects and perceptions”—a simplifying gloss that 
commentators are sometimes guilty of imparting to Deleuze’s ethical thought.183 More in line 
with Deleuze’s structuralist emphasis in Difference and Repetition, we should say that that 
ethics involves creating oneself as a system “in which different relates different to different 
by means of difference itself (…). It is a matter of difference in the series, and of differences 
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of differences in the communication between series.”184 In other words, we should say that 
this ethics involves creating oneself as the indeterminate and fluid differenciator who 
establishes the simultaneous differenc/tiation of the differences within the virtual structures 
that surround us. Indeed, it is only by playing this role of the differenciator of structures—that 
is, by becoming this intensive individual who simultaneously determines the differentiation 
and differenciation of the relations and singularities within virtual structures—that we can 
begin to do justice to the intensive nature of difference, and that we can thereby begin to 
affirm the temporal repetition of difference in itself that is the eternal return. 
 
5.3. Structures and machines 
I have stressed Deleuze’s reliance on structuralism not simply because of the practical 
importance he himself attaches to that paradigm. In a certain sense, this reliance on 
structuralism is also what unites Deleuze’s ethical thought with the problem of history that I 
have thus far explored in this thesis. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to approach this 
problem from the perspective of Guattari’s joint review of Difference and Repetition and the 
Logic of Sense: “Machine and Structure.” The importance of this text for the entire trajectory 
of Deleuze’s ethical thought cannot be underestimated.185 Initially written in 1969 as a talk to 
Lacan’s Freudian School in Paris, Guattari’s review not only formed the occasion for 
Deleuze and Guattari’s meeting in that same year.186 Its insistence on “machinic” factors 
also begins to set the conceptual scene for the authors’ joint project in Capitalism in 
Schizophrenia.187 More vitally to my central focus in this thesis, Guattari’s text also attempts 
to directly tackle the relation between structures, history and what Deleuze calls the 
differenciator of difference in Difference and Repetition. Broadly speaking, Guattari’s 
argument is that for a structuralist philosophy like Deleuze’s to succeed (both theoretically 
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and practically), it must contend with the basic fact that what plays the “determinant” role of 
a differenciator within a structural system is always a historical factor that is both irreducible 
and external to that system: the machine.188 In adopting this argument, Guattari in effect 
reminds Deleuze that structures are always “haunted [hantée]” by something historical, and 
in this sense, I argue here, he provides us with vital indications as to how Deleuze’s own 
temporal ethics, in adopting a structuralist guise, remains more dependent on the order of 
actuality than the latter is perhaps willing to admit.189 What, then, is Guattari’s specific 
argument, and what implications does it raise for Deleuze’s temporal ethics in Difference 
and Repetition? 
We must begin by noting that “Machine and Structure” is not entirely unsympathetic to 
Deleuze’s structuralist ethical programme. If Deleuze’s ethics demands that we affirm the 
temporality of eternal return by making ourselves the intensive differenciators of the 
different/ciation of virtual structures, it certainly is not the case that Guattari opposes all 
aspects of this project. Neither is it accurate to claim that Guattari’s text is entirely anti-
structure.190 Indeed, Guattari explicitly prefaces his text by arguing that the distinction he is 
“proposing between machine and structure is based solely on the way we use the words” 
and that, “in reality, a machine is inseparable from its structural articulations.”191 Structures, 
Guattari adds, are still fundamentally operative in society, and that includes “above all the 
State structure, which appears to be the keystone of dominant productive relations”.192 In 
this sense, an analysis of structures is still ethically and politically required. But the crucial 
task for such analysis is that “of setting up an institutional machine whose distinctive 
features would be a theory and practice that ensured its not having to depend on the various 
social structures”.193 Differently stated, structural analysis must have the goal of showing 
how affirmative ethical or political activity might proceed without becoming entrapped in the 
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ideological aspects of repressive social structures. “The revolutionary program,” Guattari 
insists, “should demonstrate proper subjective potential, and at every stage of the struggle, 
should make sure that it is fortified against any attempt to ‘structuralise’ that potential.”194 
For Guattari, we can begin to approach this analytic task by introducing a conceptual 
distinction between structure and machine. Under this distinction, a structure is a system 
that “positions its elements by way of a system of references that relates each one to the 
others, in such a way that it can itself be related as an element to other structures.”195 This 
type of system possesses an internal “agent of action [fait subjectif], whose definition here 
does not extend beyond this principle of reciprocal determination”.196 As will be readily 
noticed, this definition of structure is not entirely different from Deleuze’s: the structure 
remains a system of relations that is determined by a factor that itself belongs to the 
structure. But for Guattari, beyond this order of structure, there also exist other 
differenciating factors that may be termed machines. Prima facie, these machines appear no 
different from what Deleuze calls the differenciator or dark precursor of difference. Indeed, 
as Guattari notes by citing Difference and Repetition, the machine relates “to the order of 
repetition ‘as a conduct and as a point of view concerning non-exchangeable and non-
substitutable singularities.’”197 Furthermore, “[t]he essence of the machine is precisely this 
function of detaching a signifier as arepresentative, [of operating] as a ‘differenciator 
[différenciant],’ as a causal break”. 198 But if the differenciator and the machine play an 
equivalent differenciating function for structures, there is also a decisive difference between 
them. Indeed, if Deleuze’s intensive differenciator fundamentally belongs to the order of 
structure as its ‘third’ element, Guattari’s machine, by contrast, is “different in kind from the 
structurally established order of things.” 199  The machine always plays the role of a 
differenciator from outside the structure: “the machine marks a date, a change, different from 
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a structural representation.”200 
The difference between what Guattari and Deleuze respectively call a differenciator is 
further marked from the perspective of history. As noted above, for Deleuze, one of the 
differenciator's essential features is its irreducible indetermination in relation to the actual 
domains the differenciation of which it determines. The differenciator is both indeterminate 
and intensive, which is exactly what enables it to play its differenciating function 
“independently” of any particular forms of actuality or extensity.201 By contrast, for Guattari, 
the relation between the machine and history must be regarded as essential. As he writes, 
the history of technology is not only “dated by the existence at each stage of a particular 
type of machine”, but machines themselves are related to one another on the basis of the 
technological history to which they belong.202 “Yesterday’s machine, today’s and tomorrow’s 
are not related in their structural determinations”.203  This entails that the function and 
diversity of machines cannot be understood simply on the basis of the determinant role that 
they play in relation to structures. Instead, that “determinant” role must itself be understood 
from the point of view of history and with regard to the actual relations of desire and 
production within which machines find themselves essentially implicated.204 We cannot fail to 
relate the determinant power of machines to “what goes on in the world of industry, on the 
shop floor or in the manager’s office, and what is happening in scientific research, and 
indeed in the world of literature and even of dreams.”205 Moreover, we must recognise that if 
change occurs in the world—if virtual structures become differenciated into actual diversity, 
to use Deleuze’s more technical language—this is because this desiring and productive 
history that machines constitutively implicate always acts upon structures to create that 
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change. “At a particular point in history desire becomes localised in the totality of 
structures.”206 And contra Deleuze, it is this precise point that a successful account of 
repetition must incorporate if it is to respect “the peculiar positions of subjectivity in relation 
to events and to history.”207 To explain the repetitious production of novelty, we cannot 
content ourselves with appealing to the operation of an indeterminate differenciator of 
structures.208 Instead, we have to focus on how novelty is repeated by the determinant 
activity of a machine that is at once external to structures and determinate from the 
perspective of the actual, social, desiring, and productive relations to which it necessarily 
belongs. In short, we have to recognise, pace Deleuze, that what he calls the “third 
condition” for the repetition of the new, that is, the differenciator, “relates exclusively to the 
order of the machine” and to the social actuality that this order implies.209 
The upshot of Guattari’s insistence on the machine is that Deleuze’s structuralist 
framework, in privileging only the operation of an indeterminate differenciator of structures, 
remains incapable of providing a successful account of repetition.210 Ultimately, Guattari also 
expresses reservations regarding the type of ethical activity that is advocated by Deleuze's 
structuralist account of repetition. Specifically, the fundamental issue that upholding an 
indeterminate differenciator as an ethical model creates is the promotion of a strangely 
apolitical conception of ethics. Indeed, as Guattari writes, one can take an indeterminate 
differenciating agent as an ethical model only by also “deluding oneself with the idea that it is 
possible to base oneself on some structural space that existed before the breakthrough by 
the machine.”211 But no element of a structure—not even its most paradoxical and mobile 
element—can ever be ‘purified’ from the activity of machines and the social history of 
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desiring and productive relations that they imply; no such “pure” or purely indeterminate site 
exists.212 And for Guattari, the risk that we run in positing the possibility and desirability of 
such a site is precisely the blind perpetuation of some of the most stagnant and oppressive 
features of contingent social structures. He writes: “Every rupture produced by the intrusion 
of a machine phenomenon is conjoined by the establishment of what one might call a 
system of anti-production, the representative mode specific to structure.”213 This means that 
differenciating agents, insofar as they are constitutively involved with a web of social 
structures and the ideological “group phantasies” (such as the family) that these encompass, 
always carry within them a tendency to also “repeat” elements of a repressive nature.214 
These differenciating agents can therefore create novel ruptures as much as they can 
operate as sites bearing only “the imprint of equivalence and identity” in relation to 
repressive social structures.215 This is why it is crucial that we not only grasp machines in 
their actual specificity, but that we also strategically wed their functioning to a concrete 
historical analysis of the structures that they act in relation to: the proliferation of productive 
“machine effects upon structures could [not] really be achieved on the basis of only one 
‘theoretical practice.’ It presupposes the development of a specific analytic praxis at every 
level of organisation of the struggle.”216 But without this strategic analysis, without relating 
the functioning of differenciating agents to the actuality that they constitutively implicate, we 
risk limiting their productive potential to repeat the new; we risk turning those agents into 
sites for the identitarian repetition of repressive social structures.217 
But what reason do we have for accepting Guattari's points, particularly as they relate to 
Deleuze’s conception of the intensive differenciator? Specifically, what evidence can we find 
in Difference and Repetition to confirm Guattari’s view that a differenciating agent must 
always operate in relation to a determined historical situation? We must begin by recalling 
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that when Deleuze first introduces the concept of an intensive differenciator, he writes that 
its status as intensive “should not prejudice [its] being characterised as mechanical, physical, 
biological, psychic, social, aesthetic or philosophical, etc.”218 In short, Deleuze’s point here is 
that within a system, the role of differenciator can be “fulfilled by quite diverse 
determinations.”219 Now, the key question that is raised by these assertions is the following: 
if the intensive differenciator is, as Deleuze repeatedly claims, ‘prior’ and independent to the 
differenciations that it engenders, how can it also take up this diversity of determinations? 
How can the intensive differenciator be judged as physical, biological, etc., if its operation as 
a principle of determination presupposes “nothing of what it engenders” and is always 
“beyond the reach of the empirical principle”?220 Unfortunately, in the relevant passages of 
Difference and Repetition, Deleuze provides us with no clear guidelines with which to make 
this judgement regarding the differenciator’s diversity. But at stake here is precisely 
Guattari’s claim that differenciating agents always find themselves implicated with the 
historical. Indeed, the unavoidable conclusion here is that if Deleuze’s differenciator is 
capable of taking up a diversity of determinations, this is because a certain history already 
enters into its constitution as the determinant principle of a system prior to the determinant 
role that it plays within that system. The differenciator takes up a variety of determinations 
because its role is partly defined by its implication with existing systems and the actuality 
that their pre-existence implies. In this sense, then, Guattari is justified in arguing that 
something external to structural systems—namely, a certain history—always “haunts” those 
systems, as if from the ‘outside’.221 And while we certainly cannot yet define this history as 
machinic, it nonetheless seems that in order to play the diversity of determinant functions 
that Deleuze attributes to it, his differenciating agent must, like Guattari’s machine, find at 
least part of its sense in the constitutive relation that it entertains with a given order of 
                                                
218 DR 117-118. 
219 DR 119. 
220 LS 97; DR 241. 
221 cf. MS 318. 
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actuality.222 
A similar conclusion imposes itself when we further examine Deleuze’s claims regarding 
the specificity of differenciations that the differenciator is responsible for determining. We 
have repeatedly seen Deleuze write that if diversity exists in the world, this is because a 
differenciating agent (namely, an intensive individual) always determines the differential 
relations and points of singularity within Ideas to actualise themselves into certain species 
and parts. Now, Deleuze himself is acutely aware that for his genetic account to explain the 
emergence of diversity without foundationally appealing to identity and resemblance, it must 
also show that the specific conditions of emergence differ from species to species and from 
part to part. As Deleuze writes, to overcome this “principal difficulty”, we cannot content 
ourselves with appealing to the operation of an individual differenciating agent “only formally 
and in general”: we have to explain how each species and each part finds its own individual 
or specific conditions of individuation.223 And to avoid this difficulty we must recognise two 
points. We must recognise, first, that individuating “individuals presuppose only Ideas”; that 
individuals determine the specific differenciation of species and parts only by expressing 
Ideal differential relations and their corresponding distinctive points. 224  Secondly, while 
intensive individuals “express the changing totality of Ideas”, they “clearly express only 
certain relations or certain degrees of variation”; meanwhile, the remaining relations and 
points in the Ideal totality are still expressed, “but [only] confusedly.”225 And it is this variable 
relation of clarity/confusion with respect to the totality of Ideas that in turn specifies what 
diverse species or part an intensive individual will determine the differenciation of. For 
example, “the ass and the wolf can be considered species only in relation to the fields of 
individuation which clearly express them.”226  
Now, while this entire schema perhaps avoids appealing to individuating individuals only 
                                                
222 Relatedly, Hallward (2006: 158) criticises Deleuze for his “non-relational” (vis-à-vis the actual) 
conception of the differenciator of difference. 
223 DR 252. 
224 DR 252. For more on these points, see: Bowden, 2017: 230-231. 
225 DR 252 (emphasis added). 
226 DR 254. 
 218 
formally and in general—in that their individuating role can now be distinguished according 
to the variable relation of Ideal clarity/confusion that they express—we continue to be faced 
with the problematic absence of an explanation for how that variable relation is itself 
determined in each specific case. Why does a given individual clearly express only those 
Ideal relations and singularities leading to the differenciated product ‘wolf’ as opposed to 
those leading to the differenciation ‘ass’? This is what Deleuze’s bold claim that individuals 
presuppose only Ideas fails to explain. Now, perhaps, Deleuze could have provided this 
explanation by insisting, with Simondon, that fields of individuation (and their corresponding 
intensive individuals) always operate in the context of a certain “historicity [historicité].”227 He 
could have argued, that is, that individuals express a specific relation of clarify/confusion 
with regards to Ideas because their operation always carries with it an irreducible “historical 
aspect” that also explains why differing individuals are predisposed to determine certain 
forms of actualisation over others.228 Alternatively, like Guattari, Deleuze could here have 
argued that an historical factor external to structure always operates to specify the variable 
determinant roles that a differenciating agent will play within that structure. However, as we 
have seen throughout this chapter, it is just this that Deleuze fails to do by claiming that an 
indeterminate differenciator alone can explain how the entirety of a structural system 
functions. True, Deleuze’s appeal to a differenciator of difference does help to explain the 
functioning of structural systems, as even Guattari recognises. But crucially, it does not do 
so with the level of differential specificity that is demanded by Difference and Repetition's 
own ontological aims; it does not do so without unwittingly invoking a resemblance and 
identity between a diversity of differenciating agents. In this sense, Guattari is therefore 
justified in arguing that Deleuze’s account of repetition will remain unsatisfactory for as long 
                                                
227 Simondon (2013: 57, 79-84, 167, 268) insists that each of the fields of individuation that he 
explores (physical, biological and psychosocial) possesses its own particular form of historicity. Not 
only does the individuation of physical systems “start from a singularity of a historical nature” insofar 
as it involves “historical singularities carried by matter”, but at the biological and psychosocial levels 
too, there is always a “historicity [historicité]” that accounts for each of their specific individuations. In 
this sense, as Andrea Bardin (2009: 189-215) recognises, there is for Simondon “a historicity of 
physical, chemical and biological individuations, just as there is an historicity of the different 
individuations of the [psychosocial] subject.” 
228 Simondon, 2013: 84. 
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as a dimension of history is not recognised as determinant in specifying the differenciating 
roles that are played by the differenciator of difference within a system. Indeed, following 
these points, we can even argue that it is only by taking up this constitutive historical aspect 
that Deleuze’s ontological account of repetition will find its success and completion.229 
What consequences follow from this discussion for Deleuze’s ethical recommendation 
that to affirm the temporality of eternal return we must create ourselves as intensive 
individuals? In effect, the preceding enables us to see that if Deleuze’s differenciator plays 
the determinant role that he attributes to it, this is only because it always finds itself 
constitutively involved with an order of actuality. There is a whole history that explains not 
only the emergence of each diverse differenciator, but which also determines the 
determinant function that each of those individual agents will play within a given structural 
system. 230  Now, if we are referring to the differenciator that we must seek to create 
ourselves as human beings in order to affirm the temporality of eternal return, what we must 
recognise, pace Deleuze, is that this differenciator is never simply indeterminate from the 
point of view of history and actuality. Indeed, the ethical effort by which we establish 
ourselves as a differenciator for the structures that linger around us (as the virtual side of our 
existence) is itself always precisely defined and determined in relation to a whole complex of 
social and historical factors. As Guattari might have written, there is no differenciating site 
that is purely “freed” or purified from the empirical contents and mediations of history, as 
evidenced by the fact that even Deleuze’s differenciator, even when it is supposed to be 
operating at its most differential level (that is, by creating specific individuations), cannot help 
but evoke such mediations.231 Hence, it makes little sense to claim that we can make 
ourselves intensive individuals only by directing our ethical attention away from the 
explication that our existence as human beings inevitably carries. On the contrary, if a 
                                                
229 My argument here links up with Jay Lampert’s (2006: 54) that the success of Deleuze’s ontological 
account of the future “requires more emphasis on actual historical events than DR calls into play.” 
230 As Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 96) will say in What is Philosophy?: “Without history becoming 
would remain, indeterminate and unconditioned, [even if] becoming is not history.” I will return to this 
claim in the next chapter. 
231 cf. MS 322; DR 88. 
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differenciator’s activity is always in part made possible by its constitutive involvement with a 
historical order, and if that order also contains within it anti-productive elements and 
tendencies, as Guattari argues, then we can make ourselves sites for the affirmation of the 
new only by strategically directing our ethical activity to our given orders of actuality.232 Only 
by developing a strategic relation to historical factors can we ensure that our determinant 
ethical activity does not tend towards the identitarian repetition of those repressive elements 
that also compose our actual existence—that ethical activity does not bear “the imprint of 
identity and resemblance” in relation to those anti-productive elements.233 Only in that way, 
to once again invoke Guattari, can we ensure that our ethical potential is fortified against any 
attempt to hinder it.234 Only by strategically relating our ethical activity to a domain of 
actuality can we have the chance to establish ourselves as the untimely caesura that 
disrupts the identitarian or ideological continuity of the present with itself. 
Yet, as we have seen, this is precisely not how Deleuze configures his temporal ethics in 
Difference and Repetition. Indeed, in a certain sense, Deleuze’s argument even runs 
counter to this ethos, insofar as the second rule of his ethics of intensive quantities demands 
precisely that we do not explicate ourselves (too much) with the order of explication or 
actuality. Now, of course, one can reply here that Deleuze’s bracketed emphasis on the ‘too 
much’ indicates something altogether different to the argument I have developed thus far. It 
might be stated, that is, that Deleuze does attribute a value to particular forms of actuality, 
that he prudentially recognises that we cannot remove ourselves from the actual so much 
that we destroy ourselves.235 However, while it cannot be denied that there is something 
significant about Deleuze’s prudentialism here—something that already points to the ethics 
of A Thousand Plateaus, as Leonard Lawlor has recently stated—it is also important to recall, 
as I noted above, that this prudentialism seeks only to avoid the death of ethical subjects.236 
                                                
232 As Lampert (2006: 69) frames this point: “[r]evolutionary politics has to be part of a theory [or 
ethics] of time.” cf. Boundas, 2006: 412. 
233 MS 325. 
234 MS 329. 
235 cf. Lawlor, 2019: 451-452. 
236 Ibid. 451-452. 
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Deleuze is not here claiming that we seek to relate ourselves to the order of explication 
because the productive operation of a differenciator depends—as a positive condition—on 
its constitutive involvement with the historical.237 What Deleuze’s emphasis on the ‘too much’ 
continues to neglect is the fact that the success of a temporal ethics always depends on the 
strategic relations it entertains with its surrounding conditions of actuality. And it is here, at 
this precise point, that Deleuze’s temporal ethics rejoins Bergson’s even as it most markedly 
departs from it. We have seen that almost nothing in Deleuze’s proposed ethics of intensive 
quantities can be classified as intuitive. And yet, like Bergson, Deleuze fails to recognise that 
the success of a temporal ethics in bringing about the order of the new always depends on a 
greater constitutive involvement with the historical than he is explicitly willing to admit. 
 
5.4. Conclusion: embracing the machine 
I have argued in this chapter that despite departing in significant respects from Bergson's 
intuitive ethics, Deleuze's temporal ethics in Difference and Repetition remains caught up in 
the problem of history. Although Deleuze deploys the notions of eternal return, the 
differenciator of difference, and intensity as a way of avoiding the implication with the actual 
that he sees as a major stumbling block for the second, Bergsonian synthesis of time, his 
own temporal ethics cannot ultimately escape that involvement. Indeed, although Deleuze 
explicitly positions those three ‘untimely’ notions in opposition to the more ‘timely’ orders of 
the present and the historical, as I have argued with Guattari’s help, those three notions 
remain more closely implicated with the historical than the early Deleuze is willing to admit. 
I have also suggested that Deleuze could have avoided some of the anti-productive 
dangers that follow from that constitutive implication by insisting that a successful temporal 
ethics must relate itself more actively to those historical dimensions that make up our 
existence. Like Guattari, Deleuze could perhaps have insisted that an ethical affirmation of 
the absolutely new requires that we give more strategic attention to the socio-historical 
                                                
237 The next chapter will say more on retaining actuality as a positive condition of ethics. 
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machineries that surround and constitute us qua human subjects. This stress on a strategic 
attention to the historical might have enabled Deleuze to present a convincing response to 
the problem of history that manifests itself in his text: anti-production. Ultimately, however, 
Deleuze does not quite achieve this position in Difference and Repetition, and in that sense, 
his text remains incapable of delivering the successful solution to the problem of history that 
I have thus far sought in this thesis. 
As we know, however, Deleuze does inevitably begin to turn more attention to socio-
historical machineries. Indeed, although Deleuze initially expresses some doubts over 
Guattari's classification of machines as historical, it is precisely a focus on historical 
machines that occupies the two authors in their joint project on Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia.238 This fact is most prominently (though not exclusively, as the next chapter 
will show) evinced by the fact that Deleuze and Guattari’s first major co-authored text, Anti-
Oedipus, devotes much of its attention to a detailed strategic and historical study of the 
social machineries that have come to constitute present-day capitalism.239 
The question in the final chapter of this thesis is whether, from the perspective of A 
Thousand Plateaus, this strategic attention to the historical enables Deleuze and Guattari to 
develop a model of temporal ethics that is capable of offering a successful resolution to the 
problem of history. The alternative is that, like Bergson in The Two Sources, Deleuze and 
Guattari insist on the importance of historical machines only secondarily, that is, only in the 
context of an immediate 'experience' of time that does not find itself constitutively implicated 
with the actuality of stratified states of affairs. To an exploration of these issues I now turn. 
                                                
238 This reservation is expressed by Deleuze (2015b: 31-35) in a letter to Guattari dated 29/07/1969, 
where Deleuze positively responds to Guattari’s text, whilst also asking for further clarification over its 
positioning of machines as historical (“there I do not know, I do not see that myself, but I am sure that 
you will convince me—need more specific examples”) and its concept of anti-production. 
239 AO 139-272. For an excellent account of the universal history provided by Anti-Oedipus, see: 
Colebrook, 2009: 1-32. 
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6. Deleuze II: the machinic temporal ethics of A Thousand Plateaus 
Following my discussion of Difference and Repetition, in this final chapter I want to 
explore the conception of ethical activity that emerges in Deleuze and Guattari’s co-authored 
work. Particularly, I want to focus on the model of temporal ethics that arises in A Thousand 
Plateaus to consider how far it might provide a resolution to the problem of history that still 
besets Deleuze’s earlier work. As is well known, A Thousand Plateaus is not the only 
Deleuze and Guattari text that deals with ethical concerns. As Foucault famously notes, their 
first co-authored work, Anti-Oedipus, is itself a profoundly ethical text.1 But though Anti-
Oedipus certainly begins to formulate many of the concepts that would become central to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s joint ethical project, its focus also remains relatively limited. As 
Deleuze explains in a subsequent interview, that text’s primary target is the “familial or 
theatrical model of the unconscious” that had until its publication pervaded structuralist 
psychoanalysis.2 The ethical concepts of Anti-Oedipus are therefore specifically designed to 
challenge that particular paradigm. 3  A Thousand Plateaus, by contrast, has a more 
expansive and creative field of application. 4  With its highly temporalised concepts of 
becoming, the refrain, rhizome, the plane of consistency, and the body without organs 
(BwO), that text also moves Deleuze and Guattari’s work somewhat closer than Anti-
Oedipus to the temporal concerns that guided Deleuze’s earlier philosophy.5 For these 
reasons, then, I here devote my attention to the temporal ethics of A Thousand Plateaus. 
A Thousand Plateaus significantly broadens the philosophical scope of Difference and 
Repetition. Although Deleuze and Guattari remain interested in the question of how we 
might ethically relate ourselves to a plane of becoming (or consistency, as they call it), this 
                                                
1 Foucault, 1983: xiii. 
2 Deleuze, 2006a: 175. 
3 The concept of desiring-machines illustrates this well. Despite playing a key role in Anti-Oedipus, the 
concept is later dropped by the authors, partly, as Dosse (2012: 135) argues, "because the concept 
had done its job of undermining the concept of structure, which no longer needed to be challenged in 
1980, when the structuralist paradigm was little more than a memory."  
4 Deleuze, 2006a: 175-176. 
5 This difference should not be overstated, since many of the concepts that receive a temporal 
exposition in A Thousand Plateaus also do so in Anti-Oedipus. The concept of the BwO, which is 
defined in both texts as an intensive spatium, is a good example. cf. AO 60, 84-85, 309, 319. 
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interest is no longer exclusively articulated through a generalised ontology of repetition. In A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari think this ethical project in connection with a 
complex range of socio-historical factors, such as the constitution and functioning of diverse 
assemblages, regimes, and machines. In a decisive alteration, as I begin to show in section 
one by turning my attention to the "Geology of Morals" plateau, Deleuze and Guattari now 
think the project of temporal ethics in close connection with a process of stratification 
whereby a diversity of stratified formations (or "strata") become historically constituted.6 In 
line with Guattari’s emphasis in “Machine and Structure”, Deleuze and Guattari now also 
frame their conception of temporal ethics in terms of the connections and disjunctions that 
can be forged between a diversity of specific machinic factors. Specifically, they argue that 
we can connect ourselves with a plane of temporal novelty only by fostering a very particular 
“little machine”, which they call the body without organs (BwO).7 
In this chapter, I want to consider whether these conceptual alterations allow Deleuze 
and Guattari to avoid the problem of history that persisted in Deleuze's solo ethics. My 
argument is that they do. Indeed, as I will show in section two, despite continuing to frame 
the BwO in terms of Deleuze's earlier conception of intensity, the authors now come to 
recognise the constitutive importance of historical factors for the creation of that particular 
ethical machine. Specifically, they argue that in order to connect ourselves to the novel 
temporality of the plane of consistency by means of the BwO, we must directly and prudently 
relate ourselves to those stratified formations (or strata) that have historically constituted us 
as subjects. And in so doing, I contend in section three, Deleuze and Guattari not only cease 
to oppose temporal becoming to history. Ultimately, by recognising the constitutive 
importance of history for ethical praxis, Deleuze and Guattari are also develop a model of 
temporal ethics that is capable of strategically negotiating what I have throughout this thesis 
                                                
6 In my view, this plateau is crucial for understanding Deleuze and Guattari's ethics in A Thousand 
Plateaus, since it not only pluralises the account of individuation provided by Deleuze in Difference 
and Repetition, but, in so doing, also provides us with vital clues as to how the temporality of the 
plane of consistency is to be affirmed in practice. 
7 ATP 161. The BwO also makes an appearance, in slightly modified form, in: AO 9-16, passim; LS 
82-93, 188-193, 198-203. 
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called the problem of history. In this sense, I suggest by way of conclusion, the authors are 
able to fulfil the promise that is first heralded by Bergson in The Two Sources: that of 
resolving the problem of history by connecting the task of temporal ethics to the operation of 
historically situated machines. 
 
6.1. Assemblages, strata and the plane of consistency 
In many ways, A Thousand Plateaus continues to be informed by the schizoanalytic aims 
of Anti-Oedipus. Like its companion volume, A Thousand Plateaus continues to think ethics 
as an enterprise that must necessarily proceed in relation to a plurality of “machinic 
connections, disjunctions and conjunctions.”8 But whereas Anti-Oedipus sets itself the task 
of articulating this schizoanalytic praxis in direct opposition to the structuralism and 
familialism of psychoanalysis, A Thousand Plateaus critically targets a much wider dogmatic 
image of thought.9 As the text's introduction explains, psychoanalysis is only one particular 
“example” of a much larger historical tendency within Western thought to engage with the 
world on the basis of “arborescence”.10 In this “sad image of thought” that has traditionally 
dominated philosophy, things are only ever grasped in terms of axioms, hierarchies and laws 
of resemblance.11 But all such modalities accomplish, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is 
prevent a "rhizomatic" understanding of the world, one where only the principles of 
heterogeneity, multiplicity and rupture reign.12 More crucially, since “it is always by rhizome 
that desire moves and produces”, arborescence also fails to give the radical potential of 
desire its due; arborescence “blocks” and “obstructs” desire. 13  And for the authors, 
philosophy can begin to overcome these blockages only by engaging in a proliferation of 
new rhizomatic concepts that not only revise arborescent ways of thinking, but which also 
                                                
8 Adkins, 2015: 9. 
9 For more on Deleuze’s changing conception of the image of thought, see: Lampert, 2012. For 
Deleuze’s own account of the transition between Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, see: 
Deleuze, 2006a: 175-180. 
10 ATP 17-18. 
11 ATP 16. 
12 ATP 7-11. 
13 ATP 14. 
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provide us with the ethical means to “live” and connect ourselves with those temporal “lines” 
that escape the dogmatic closures of arborescence.14 
Few concepts are more central to this ethical rhizomatic enterprise than that of the 
assemblage (agencement). 15  As Deleuze and Guattari define them, assemblages are 
nothing more than combinations of heterogeneous material and enunciative elements: “In 
assemblages you find states of things, bodies, various combinations of bodies, 
hodgepodges; but you also find utterances, modes of expression, and whole regimes of 
signs.”16 These combinations, moreover, are always both “machinic” and “concrete”: they not 
only operate by making and breaking intensive connections (this makes them machinic), but 
they also make and break these connections in close relation to a socio-historical field of 
desire (this makes them concrete).17 One of the examples that Deleuze and Guattari provide 
for the assemblage is the Dogon anvil.18 This example is key because, for the Dogons, the 
smith’s anvil is not simply an object for the creation of weapons and tools; the anvil is also a 
site of social significance insofar as by striking it, Dogon smiths also find themselves related 
to a range of historical myths that continually orient and organise the life of their 
community. 19  As an assemblage, the Dogon anvil is thus not simply the site for the 
connection and breakage between material bodies (e.g. metallic elements and human 
bodies) and enunciations (e.g. ‘the first smith’ and ‘the living’). From the start, that 
assemblage is also a concrete social arrangement that reifies certain preestablished ways of 
organising the relations between bodies and statements. 20  In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
terminology, this means that assemblages are first of all “territorial”.21 Assemblages always 
                                                
14 “There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree or root. 
There are only lines.” ATP 8, 14. 
15 Deleuze elsewhere reveals that “the idea of an assemblage (which replaces the idea of desiring 
machines)" provides the unity of A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze, 2006a: 177. 
16 Deleuze, 2006a: 177. 
17 ATP 71; AO 342. 
18 ATP 71. 
19 On these points, cf. Griaule, 1970: 84-88. 
20 An assemblage is not a structural formation: “An assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, 
neither deep structure nor superficial structure.” ATP 90. 
21 “The territory is the first assemblage, the first thing to constitute an assemblage; the assemblage is 
fundamentally territorial.” ATP 323. 
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institute a territory that operates as a well-defined and relatively stable way of organising and 
distributing the bodies and enunciations that are brought together in it. Nevertheless, as with 
all other social arrangements or territories, assemblages are also defined by their points of 
escape—or by what Deleuze and Guattari term their “lines of flight”. 22  Thus, even if 
assemblages tend towards the reification of particular forms of social organisation, in 
continually forging connections and breakages between bodies and enunciations, they also 
‘emit’ errant machinic elements that are capable of being ‘unified’ or ‘organised’ in a variety 
of different ways. 
Broadly speaking, there are two main ways in which the errant elements in an 
assemblage can become ‘organised’, which also correspond to what Deleuze and Guattari 
call the assemblage’s two sides.23 On the one hand, a process of “stratification” can gather 
the machinic elements of assemblages into “strata”: just as sediments become sedimentary 
rocks, for example, those elements can become organised into “layers” that not only assume 
a relative rigidity, but which also begin to interact with their surroundings as formed 
aggregates. 24  When machinic elements become stratified in this way, they undergo a 
process of “territorialisation” or “reterritorialisation”.25 By becoming stratified, those elements' 
previous mobility becomes “captured” or “recaptured” in a relatively stable form (or territory) 
to which the elements henceforth remain attached, as if locked into a geological system of 
resonance.26 On the other hand, machinic elements can become related on what Deleuze 
and Guattari call a destratified “plane of consistency or body without organs”.27 This plane or 
“body without organs is permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, 
                                                
22 “[T]here is no social system that does not leak from all directions, even if it makes its segments 
increasingly rigid in order to seal the lines of flight.” ATP 204, 216. 
23 “One side of a machinic assemblage faces the strata, which doubtless makes it a kind of organism 
(…); it also has a side facing a body without organs, which is continually dismantling the organism”. 
ATP 4, 40, 145. 
24 This example is pertinent only to the “geological” strata. Other strata have their own unique 
processes of stratification. ATP 40-41. 
25 “[Strata] operate by coding and territorialisation”. ATP 40. 
26 ATP 40. 
27 ATP 56. 
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by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles.”28 On this plane, 
the elements of assemblages are no longer caught up in systems of resonance such as 
those of formed unities and aggregates. Instead, those elements not only retain their 
fundamental mobility vis-à-vis such aggregates, but they also begin to communicate and 
connect with one another on the basis of correspondingly mobile “waves or flows of 
deterritorialisation”.29 Unlike the strata that constitute the assemblage's alternate side, the 
plane of consistency is thus defined less by its territorialised form than by the 
deterritorialising function that it plays in creating connections, conjunctions and flows 
between errant machinic elements.30 
Another way of formulating this distinction between the strata and the plane of 
consistency is temporally. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari note, it is “not the same time, the 
same temporality” that operates in each of these two sides of the assemblage.31 Deleuze 
and Guattari clarify this point by appealing to the notions of Aion and Chronos that are most 
extensively developed by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense.32 Following that text's description 
of Aion as the temporal “locus” where only disjunctions and events that are irreducible to 
static qualities and extensions communicate across their differences, the authors write that 
the plane of consistency expresses “the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that 
knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is 
at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is 
                                                
28 ATP 40. 
29 ATP 53. 
30 ATP 141. 
31 ATP 262. 
32 Deleuze and Guattari do not explicitly clarify why they articulate the temporality of the plane of 
consistency in terms of Aion instead of eternal return. Perhaps Aion—as a time that not only “traces 
the frontier between bodies and language” but also “articulates the one and the other as two series 
capable of being developed” (LS 167)—is better suited to the notion of assemblages as complexes of 
bodies and enunciations. Perhaps Aion, as a time that subdivides the present in “both directions at 
once” (LS 164) also more closely coheres with the various ‘becomings-X’ that Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasise in the becoming plateau. All that said, the difference between Aion and eternal return 
should not be overstated, since for the early Deleuze both times can be classified as “the always 
displaced paradoxical instance” where the communication between disparate series is established (cf. 
LS 175-176). Moreover, both the eternal return and Aion are formulated as expressing the being of 
becoming: “Returning is being, but only the being of becoming.” (DR 41). cf. LS 162-168. 
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both going to happen and has just happened.”33 This reference to Aion indicates that the 
plane of consistency is composed only of temporal relations that exceed those that pertain 
between pre-formed unities, aggregates or subjects. In the plane of consistency, “[t]here are 
only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at 
least between elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds.”34 
For this reason, the plane of consistency (or becoming) is “Untimely”: it “expresses the 
floating, nonpulsed time proper to Aion, in other words, the time of pure event or of 
becoming, which articulates relative speeds and slowness independently of the chronometric 
or chronological values that time assumes in [its] other modes.”35 By contrast, the strata 
express the time of “Chronos: the time of measure that situates things and persons, 
develops a form, and determines a subject.”36 This means that on the strata, the connection 
and communication between machinic elements is relatively limited from the perspective of 
time. Indeed, rather than communicating on a temporal locus that is not limited by the 
qualities and extensions of pre-made forms and aggregates, on the strata, errant machinic 
elements communicate only through those forms and aggregates; their relation and 
movement is thus limited by “the spatiotemporal and even existential coordinates” that those 
forms and aggregates embody.37 
These two temporalities are, as it were, the two fates corresponding to the two sides of 
the assemblage into which errant machinic elements can fall. But what determines whether 
an assemblage's errant elements will become entities in the strata or, alternatively, flows of 
becoming in the plane of consistency? What determines whether those elements will begin 
to express the temporality of Chronos, or, by contrast, the untimely temporality of becoming? 
Simply put, Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to this question is: “abstract machines”. 38 
                                                
33 LS 165; ATP 262. 
34 ATP 266 (emphasis added). This qualification of elements on the plane of consistency as relatively 
unformed is important, as we will see shortly.  
35 ATP 263. 
36 ATP 262. “Nietzsche opposes history not to the eternal but to the subhistorical or superhistorical: 
the Untimely, which is another name for haecceity, becoming, the innocence of becoming.” ATP 296.  
37 ATP 55. 
38 Or, as Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 87) elsewhere write: “it’s the abstract machines that measure 
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Abstract machines not only extract errant elements from assemblages, but also decide 
whether those elements will once again become related to a territory or, indeed, whether 
they will “produce an opening onto [une overture sur]” the fully destratified plane of Aion.39 
These “[m]achines are always singular keys that open [ouvrent] or close [referment] an 
assemblage”.40 To grasp how errant machinic elements are articulated as either strata 
(Chronos) or destratified flows (Aion), we must therefore define these types of machines. 
The first point to make is that these machines are, like assemblages, machinic; they too 
operate by breaking and making connections. Unlike assemblages, however, abstract 
machines do not in the first instance constitute a territory. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, 
“[c]ontrary to the strata, and the assemblages considered under their other aspects, abstract 
machines know nothing of forms and substances. This is what makes them abstract”.41 
Rather than consisting of elements that have a preestablished form or significance, those 
machines are abstract in that they consist exclusively of “unformed matters exhibiting only 
degrees of intensity.”42 Thus, though abstract machines always work in close connection 
with concrete machinic assemblages, the two remain distinct.43 The abstract machine is not 
a more general or universal version of a concrete machinic assemblage.44 Instead, the 
abstract machine is a function that inserts or plugs itself into a machinic assemblage to draw 
from it errant machinic matters: “a machine is like a set of cutting edges that insert 
themselves into the assemblage undergoing deterritorialisation, and draw variations and 
mutations of it.”45 
Given that abstract machines only handle deterritorialised or unformed machinic matters, 
one of the key questions that emerge from Deleuze and Guattari’s introduction of this 
concept is how those machines are capable of turning those matters into strata (or Chronos). 
                                                                                                                                                  
the mode of existence and reality of the assemblages in terms of the capacity that they demonstrate 
for undoing their own segments”.  
39 ATP 333. 
40 ATP 334. 
41 ATP 510-511. 
42 ATP 511. 
43 ATP 71. 
44 ATP 93, 100. 
45 ATP 141, 333, 511. 
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“The question”, as the authors frame it, “is not how something manages to leave the strata 
but how things get into them in the first place.”46 In answering this question, Deleuze and 
Guattari also start to elaborate many notions that will become crucial for their ethical project 
of creating a praxis that resonates with the temporality of the plane of consistency.47 It is 
therefore important that we dwell on this response before turning to that ethics in more detail 
in the next section. Now, as noted, stratification is the process by which unformed matters 
become strata. By itself, however, the idea of stratification does little to explain the diversity 
between stratified formations. Yet, this diversity is real. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari, 
directly borrowing from Simondon, maintain, there are at least three types of “major strata: 
physicochemical, organic, and anthropomorphic (or ‘alloplastic’).”48 But though they are all 
strata, these types of formation are clearly not the same, for they encompass entities as 
varied as rocks, animals and language. If we are to avoid generalising the real diversity 
between these aggregates, it is thus clear that the concept of stratification must be further 
developed to account for the genesis of this diversity.49 This is especially important given 
that Deleuze and Guattari also are also keen to emphasise that the matter composing 
different strata is invariably the same: “matter is the same on all the strata.”50 But if this is 
true, what, then, accounts for both the formation of strata and the diversity of stratified 
formations? 
Deleuze and Guattari find their solution to this two-pronged question by combining key 
elements of Louis Hjelmslev’s linguistics with a notion of “double articulation”.51 Specifically, 
the authors take from Hjelmslev the idea that though matter is everywhere “one and the 
                                                
46 ATP 56. 
47 As Eugene Holland (2013: 56) argues, there is something inherently ethical about in Deleuze and 
Guattari's account of stratification, insofar as it attempts "to construe the world in such a way as to 
make it maximally susceptible to change, with the value of the concepts created being determined 
pragmatically by the degree to which they enable us to produce desirable change though ‘real-life’ 
operations in the real world”. The indication that this account is fundamentally related to time is 
provided in the last lines of the stratification plateau, where we see Challenger (the plateau’s main 
character) hurrying towards the “cosmic rhythm” of the plane of consistency by means of a “particle 
Clock”. ATP 73-74, cf. 310-350. 
48 ATP 502. 
49 Adkins, 2015: 46-47. 
50 ATP 45. 
51 The latter notion is derived from André Martinet, as Ronald Bogue observes. Bogue, 2018: 48-50. 
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same”, it is not only given a different “content” and “expression” depending on what kind of 
emphases are placed on it, but each of those two articulations is itself also subject to the 
further distinction of “form” and “substance”.52 According to this schema, amorphous matter 
is not simply articulated by abstract machines into the traditional “form-content duality”: there 
is a form of content and a form of expression no less than a substance of content and a 
substance of expression.53 Now, we can clarify what each of these terms means by once 
again recalling the example of sedimentary rock formation. As the Deleuze and Guattari 
understand it, a sedimentary rock is always formed by a process of double articulation, 
which itself has two main moments—the first referring to sedimentation and the second to 
cementation. 54  In a first articulation (that of content), sediments (which provide the 
substance of sedimentation) are selected from a flow, such as for example water or wind, 
and they are then statistically ordered into layers (with this ordering becoming the form of 
content). In a second articulation (that of expression), those ordered sediments not only 
begin to calcify (form), but they are also arranged by this calcification into a solid object with 
relatively stable properties (substance). Or, as the authors, extrapolating from this example, 
write: “The first articulation chooses or deducts, from unstable particle-flows, metastable 
molecular or quasi-molecular units (substances) upon which it imposes a statistical order of 
connections and successions (forms). The second articulation establishes functional, 
compact, stable structures (forms), and constructs the molar compounds in which these 
structures are simultaneously actualised (substances).”55  From this basic description of 
double articulation we can glean a number of important insights. First, by substances, 
Deleuze and Guattari refer primarily to formed matters that are organised or “coded” by 
forms.56 Alternatively, we might call forms the functional entities that “fix” substances.57 
                                                
52  Hjelmslev, 1961: 52-58. Hjelmslev develops these categories in opposition to the structural 
linguistics of Saussure. Thus, when he speaks of matter (or what he calls “thought-mass”) and its 
differentiation, he has exclusively linguistic elements and processes in mind. Crucially, Deleuze and 
Guattari expand this schema, arguing that matter “is not linguistic in scope or origin.” ATP 43.  
53 ATP 43. 
54 For a critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s use of geological terminology, see: DeLanda, 1997: 290. 
55 ATP 40-41. 
56 ATP 41 
57 Bogue, 2018: 49. 
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Secondly, from the viewpoint of substances, the distinction between content and expression 
is relative, since the substance of an expression can always act as the substance for 
another content. 58  This is clearly exemplified in the case of the sediments. From the 
perspective of sedimentary rocks, these sediments are indeed the substances of content; 
yet, from the perspective of the form of content that orders them, for example, they are 
metastable units, which entails that on another level they too are substances of an 
expression. This relativity entails that the double articulation of strata always presupposes a 
certain history: “Form of content and form of expression (…): each has its own history, 
microhistory, segments.”59 Finally, we must acknowledge that on the basis of this “general 
relativism”, there can be no absolute or ideal separation between the two articulations.60 One 
articulation always reciprocally presupposes the other, such that “it cannot be said that the 
terms pre-exist their double articulation. It is the double articulation that distributes them 
according to the line it draws in each stratum.”61 
This notion of double articulation effectively pluralises the account of individuation that 
Deleuze provides in Difference and Repetition.62 With this notion, the real diversity between 
actualised states can now be explained as the way different abstract machines perform the 
process of double articulation on their respective “external milieus”.63 As noted above, 
abstract machines never work in complete isolation: their operation always presupposes the 
presence of an ‘exterior’ assemblage (dealing with formed matters) that they plug 
themselves into.64 Using the language of double articulation, we might say that an abstract 
machine ‘chooses’ what formed matters it will extract from an assemblage as its substances, 
                                                
58 ATP 44. 
59 ATP 67, cf. 51. 
60 ATP 44-45. 
61 ATP 44. 
62 This also suggests that the intensive abstract machine plays a similar ontological function to the 
Deleuze’s earlier intensive differenciator of difference, even if this functioning is no longer understood 
in structural terms: “an abstract machine is neither an infrastructure that is determining in the last 
instance nor a transcendental Idea that is determining in the supreme instance.” ATP 142.  
63 ATP 49. 
64 Although Deleuze and Guattari do not explicitly describe assemblages as the ‘exterior milieu’ of 
abstract machines, this is implied in their definition of such milieus as “already stratified” or 
“organised”. ATP 49. 
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just as it ‘decides’ what forms it will impose on those substances.65 And on this account, 
there is diversity between strata because abstract machines are able to form and select 
substances in a range of different ways. In the geological stratum, for example, substances 
are selected by what Deleuze and Guattari call a process of “induction”.66 This means that 
substances are always selected on the outer surface of the territory that is simultaneously 
being formed by the double articulation. “A crystal”, Deleuze and Guattari write (citing 
Simondon), “displays this process in its pure state, since its form expands in all directions, 
but always as a function of the surface layer of the substance, which can be emptied of its 
interior without interfering with the growth.”67 Conversely, in other strata, this selection and 
formation happens via other means. In the organic or biological stratum, substances are 
selected and formed not only by processes of induction (i.e. biological growth), but also via 
processes of “transduction”.68 Another way of stating this difference is to recall that biological 
systems do not simply expand at their edges: populations of animals, for example, also grow 
by exchanging genetic material through reproductive processes.69 The double articulation of 
biological strata is thus not subject to the same territorial constraints that govern the 
articulation of physical strata. Because the organic abstract machine operates via 
transduction, biological strata can expand not only at the outer edge of their territory, but 
also internally in relation to a range of other types of biological substances and forms.70 
Lastly, the abstract machine of the linguistic or anthropomorphic stratum operates by 
translation. But here, Deleuze and Guattari warn, “[t]ranslation should not be understood 
simply as the ability of language to ‘represent’ in some way the givens of another language, 
but beyond that as the ability of language (…) to represent all the other strata.”71 Otherwise 
                                                
65  While this formulation seems to directly contradict the aforementioned claim that “abstract 
machines know nothing of form and substances”, this is not the case: “The abstract machine in itself 
is destratified, deterritorialised; it has no form of its own (much less substance) and makes no 
distinction within itself between content and expression, even though outside itself it presides over 
that distinction and distributes it in strata, domains, and territories.” ATP 141 (emphasis added). 
66 ATP 60. 
67 ATP 60. 
68 ATP 60, 62. 
69 ATP 59. 
70 ATP 60. 
71 ATP 62. 
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said, the alloplastic stratum's distinctive feature consists of its ability to take the matters of 
other strata as its own substances and subject them to the forms or “overcoding specific to 
language.”72 Hence, unlike the machines operating on the biological or physical strata, which 
can select and form matters only from their own territories or strata, the abstract machine 
constituting the alloplastic stratum is able to reorganise other territories or “other strata in its 
own terms.”73 And this fact accounts for that stratum’s distinctive type of double articulation. 
We need not familiarise ourselves with the entire complexity of this account of 
stratification to gather from it a number of points that will become crucial for Deleuze and 
Guattari’s temporal ethics. Firstly, while the authors certainly insist that different abstract 
machines organise strata in a diverse range of ways, they also remind us that there is no 
“cosmic or spiritual evolution from [strata] to the other” in terms of their degree of 
organisation.74 The alloplastic stratum is no more organised than the biological or physical 
strata, or indeed, any of the other substrata from which it extracts its substances. All strata 
are organised to an equal degree by abstract machines (“everywhere the same 
Mechanosphere”), but different abstract machines perform that organisation in divergent 
ways.75 Nevertheless, as even our brief sketch of the three major types of double articulation 
makes clear, due to the way their respective abstract machines operate, each stratum 
presents its own distinctive opportunities for movements of deterritorialisation.76 To grasp 
this point, we need only recall that the physical and organic strata, for example, do not relate 
to their external milieu in the same way: while the latter reterritorialises its milieu only at its 
edges, the former is also capable of reterritorialising milieus on its interior.77 In accordance 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s famous dictum that movements of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation always imply one another, this means that the organism possesses a 
                                                
72 ATP 62. 
73 Adkins, 2015: 58. 
74 ATP 69. 
75 ATP 69. 
76 ATP 65, 72. 
77 ATP 60. 
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greater “power to deterritorialise or accelerate deterritorialisation” than any physical entity.78 
Simply put, the organism is capable of greater variation than the crystal because it is 
capable of undergoing change in ‘more’ of its territory—even if both entities are equally 
stratified or organised. And this power for deterritorialisation is even greater on the 
alloplastic stratum.79 Hence, rather than simply emphasising that territories are exclusively 
places of capture or closure, Deleuze and Guattari's account of double articulation in fact 
allows us to recognise that any territory, insofar as it is constituted by an abstract machine, 
always affords distinctive opportunities for movements of deterritorialisation and openness.80 
“The territory itself is a place of passage.”81 And in this context, the central task of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s temporal ethics, as the next section will show, involves precisely fostering a 
very particular type of abstract machine—a body without organs, or BwO—that is capable of 
‘extracting’ the radical, Aionic temporality of the plane of consistency from a given territorial 
milieu. 
Before we proceed to outline and assess this ethics, however, we must heed a couple of 
Deleuze and Guattari's warnings on the subject of deterritorialisation. First, we must bear in 
mind that not all movements of deterritorialisation are the same.82 As Deleuze and Guattari 
put it, there are both “relative” and “absolute” movements of deterritorialisation.83 And what 
qualifies a given movement of deterritorialisation as either relative or absolute is not so much 
its velocity as “whether it constitutes epistrata or parastrata and proceeds by articulated 
segments or, on the contrary, jumps from one singularity to another following a 
nondecomposable nonsegmentary line drawing a metastratum on the plane of 
consistency.” 84  Otherwise said, a movement of deterritorialisation remains relative if it 
                                                
78 ATP 10, 54, 59. 
79 ATP 62. 
80 “We have said enough bad things about the territory that we can now evaluate all the creations that 
tend toward it, occur within it, and result or will result from it.” ATP 322. 
81 ATP 326. 
82 Strictly speaking, there are three main types of deterritorialisation for Deleuze and Guattari: relative, 
negative absolute and positive absolute deterritorialisations. ATP 134. 
83 ATP 55-56. 
84 ATP 56. 
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continues to constitute strata.85 Alternatively, that movement can become absolute if it 
begins to work in favour of—or on—the plane of consistency itself. It becomes absolute by 
beginning to express the speed and temporality of the plane of consistency, a temporality of 
becoming where “there is no longer a milieu movement or rhythm, nor a territorialised or 
territorialising movement or rhythm.”86 In this sense, the deterritorialisations that occur on the 
three major strata referred to above are all relative and “should most assuredly not be 
confused with the possibility of absolute deterritorialisation, an absolute line of flight, 
absolute drift.”87 Absolute deterritorialisation expresses a time “that exceeds the capacities 
of any possible assemblage”, a temporality of becoming that is no longer tied to things and 
persons, substances and forms, and contents and expression.88 It expresses a temporality 
that is “yet to come [à venir], a new type of reality.”89 But this new temporal reality, Deleuze 
and Guattari insist, “can be obtained on the plane of consistency only by means of an 
abstract machine capable of covering [couvrir] and even creating it [de le tracer]”.90 It can be 
achieved only by means of the BwO. 
Are we to conclude from this that movements of absolute deterritorialisation can be 
created only in complete isolation from the major strata with which we have so far dealt? Not 
at all, for as Deleuze and Guattari once again explicitly warn, there is never any clear-cut 
opposition between the strata and the plane of consistency.91 Indeed, these two planes—
which are, as we noted above, the two sides of assemblages and, we might now add, the 
two “modes of existence” of abstract machines—are always in a continuous relation of 
mutual interaction, implication and dependency.92 From the viewpoint of strata, this means 
that no stratum is ever completely closed in on itself. Strata do not simply present 
                                                
85 Crystallisation exemplifies this relative movement well: though the crystal deterritorialises its former 
shape as it expands, that movement remains relative because it simply creates another layer of 
territory or strata. 
86 ATP 326. 
87 ATP 55. 
88 ATP 262, 326. 
89 ATP 142. 
90 ATP 166. 
91 ATP 70, 144-145, cf. 265-272. 
92 “We may even say that the abstract machines that emit and combine particles have two very 
different modes of existence: the Ecumenon and the Planomenon.” ATP 56. 
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opportunities for deterritorialisation. “In a certain sense”, movements of absolute 
deterritorialisation can even be said to be primary to the strata, as the latter “would be 
nothing without these movements that deposit [upon] them” the substances and forms out of 
which they are composed.93 This is not to suggest, however, that in another, certain sense, 
the plane of consistency and its movements are never dependent on the strata and the 
relative solidifications that they impose. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari also strongly 
emphasise, the plane of consistency is never simply an entirely anarchic aggregate of 
mobile elements: “The plane of consistency, or planomenon is in no way an undifferentiated 
aggregate of unformed matters, but neither is it a chaos of formed matters of every kind.”94 
The plane of consistency itself operates under certain “rules [règles]”.95 And the crucial point 
to grasp here is that it is only insofar as the plane of consistency remains dependent on, and 
imbued by, the strata (via the abstract machine that draws it) that it can take up these rules 
as its own functions. As Deleuze and Guattari put this point, just as deterritorialisation is in a 
certain sense primary: 
Likewise [C’est aussi], the plane of consistency is occupied, drawn by the abstract Machine; the 
abstract Machine exists simultaneously developed [développée] on the destratified plane it draws, 
and enveloped [enveloppée] in each stratum whose unity of composition it defines, and even half-
erected [moitié dressée] in certain strata whose form of prehension it defines. That which traces 
or dances upon the plane of consistency thus carries [emporte] with it an aura of its stratum, an 
undulation, a memory or tension. The plane of consistency retains [conserve] just enough of the 
strata to extract from them variables that operate in the plane of consistency as its own functions. 
(….) Continuum of intensities, combined emissions of particles or signs-particles, conjunction of 
deterritorialised flows: these are the three factors proper [propres] to the plane of consistency; 
they are brought about by the abstract machine and are constitutive [constituant] of 
destratification. Now there is no hint in all of this of a chaotic white night or an undifferentiated 
black night. There are rules, rules of ‘pla(n)ning’, of diagramming. We will see them later on, or 
                                                
93 ATP 55. 
94 ATP 70. 
95 ATP 70. 
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elsewhere.96 
The remainder of this chapter will draw out the full ethical consequences of this passage. 
For now, the important point to note is that for Deleuze and Guattari, the plane of 
consistency is never simply isolated from the strata that it destratifies with its movements of 
absolute deterritorialisation. Because the plane of consistency and its movements are 
always drawn by an abstract machine that remains simultaneously connected to concrete or 
stratified assemblages, that plane always retains an aura or trace of that which it destratifies. 
As the authors helpfully remind us, the abstract machine, “when it constitutes points of 
creation or potentiality [on the plane of consistency], does not stand outside history [hors de 
l’histoire]”.97 Because abstract machines always stand “erected on particular strata upon 
which they simultaneously organise a form of expression and a form of content”, their 
operation always bears a dimension of the “here and now [ici et maintenant]”, that is, of the 
“actual [actuelles]” or stratified states of affairs that they simultaneously constitute. 98 
Furthermore, it is only the operation of these historicised abstract machines that can bring 
about the three factors that are proper to the plane of consistency: continuums of intensities, 
combinations of particle-signs and conjunctions of deterritorialised flows. Thus, even if, as 
Deleuze and Guattari argue, the plane of consistency consists of an Aionic temporality yet-
to-come that is not that of substances, forms, contents and expressions, it remains the case 
that the creation of that temporality must always proceed in close relation to the historical 
actuality of strata. 99  “We should not forget”, the authors advise, “that the plane of 
consistency is at work and is constructed in the strata, in both cases piece by piece, blow by 
blow, operation by operation.”100 And as we will see in what follows, it is precisely because 
Deleuze and Guattari insist on these points that their temporal ethics is capable of providing 
                                                
96 ATP 70 (translation of "C'est aussi" modified). 
97 ATP 144. 
98  ATP 144. “Abstract, singular, and creative, here and now, real yet nonconcrete, actual yet 
noneffectuated—that is why abstract machines are named (the Einstein abstract machine (…), etc.).” 
ATP 511. 
This classification of machines as both “actual and contemporary [actuel et contemporain]” also 
emerges in Anti-Oedipus: cf. AO 130. 
99 ATP 142. 
100 ATP 337. 
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a successful resolution to the problem of history that still persists in Deleuze’s earlier work. 
 
6.2. Constructing the plane of consistency 
So far, I have primarily focused my reading of A Thousand Plateaus on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s answer to the question of how abstract machines place things into strata. As 
noted, this stratification happens via a process of double articulation, which is always 
performed by an abstract machine that itself remains dependent on prior movements of 
de/territorialisation. In this section, I want to approach Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to the 
inverse question of “how something manages to leave the strata”.101 As repeatedly indicated, 
this question is a deeply ethical one for the authors, insofar as by engaging in a process of 
destratification we not only begin to induce changes in the strata around us, but also begin 
to directly relate ourselves to the novel temporality of the plane of consistency: Aion. Now, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to this ethical question is not limited to any one place in A 
Thousand Plateaus, but it does perhaps receive its most sustained theoretical elaboration in 
the plateau entitled “How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?”102 As Brent 
Adkins notes, it is in that plateau that Deleuze and Guattari most seriously begin to tackle 
the question of how a site for becoming and change is to be created in practice.103 It is 
therefore to this plateau that I want to turn to as a way of explicating Deleuze and Guattari’s 
model of temporal ethics. 
Before I proceed to outline the ethics of creating a BwO, however, I want clarify why 
Deleuze and Guattari think such an ethics is even necessary. If, as they insist, movements 
of absolute deterritorialisation are in a sense primary, why do we also have to ethically 
                                                
101 ATP 56. 
102 Alongside its appearance in the BwO plateau, the question of destratification also recurs in several 
other places in A Thousand Plateaus. Most notably, it makes an appearance under the four main 
banners of: (1) “pass-words [mots de passage]” in the linguistics plateau; (2) “probe-heads [têtes 
chercheuses]” in the faciality plateau; (3) the ‘becomings-X’ in the becomings plateau; and (4) “war 
machine [machine de guerre]” in the later plateaus on the State. cf. ATP 110, 189-191, 233-209 
passim, 351-473 passim.  
103 Adkins (2015: 98) adds that “[t]hese questions are profoundly ethical for Deleuze and Guattari and 
in this plateau at least they think them through the body without organs.” 
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attempt to engender such movements? Should the primacy of such movements not suggest 
the futility as opposed to the necessity of such an ethics? The authors' answer to these 
questions is simple. We need to ethically engender such movements because “[w]e are 
continually stratified.”104 That is, even if movements of deterritorialisation are in a sense 
primary, this does not at all mean that as human beings we necessarily live in line with the 
plane of consistency and its temporality of becoming. Indeed, the contrary may even be said 
to be true. Insofar as, qua human beings, we presently stand at the intersection between the 
organic and alloplastic strata, we find ourselves vulnerable to not only the mode of 
organisation imposed by the “organism”, but also the operation of a range of “regimes of 
signs”, all of which impose upon us sets of arborescent or binary relations and modes of 
subjectivation.105 A good example of this is our involvement with what Deleuze and Guattari 
call the abstract machine of “faciality”.106 As they remark, this machine, which is as real and 
abstract as any of the machines that might operate to create the plane of consistency, works 
by “recognising” and “inscribing in its overall grid” all those concrete human faces that do not 
conform to the standard of “your average ordinary White Man”.107  The classic binary 
mechanism by which this machine operates is aptly summarised as follows: “A ha! It’s not a 
man and it’s not a woman, so it must be a transvestite”.108 Now, as noted above, just 
because this machine is abstract, this does not mean that it is entirely divorced from 
concrete machinic assemblages. Not only does this machine have a concrete effect on 
those human faces that it selects, grids and recognises. The machine itself is “effectuated 
[s’effectue]” in certain concrete social conditions, which is to say that its operation is itself 
triggered by contingent machinic arrangements or assemblages: “for it is not in operation all 
                                                
104 ATP 159. 
105 Unfortunately, I cannot here explore the specific operation of these regimes of signs. For more 
information on these points, see the fifth plateau of A Thousand Plateaus (ATP 111-148), as well as 
the following helpful commentaries in the literature: Adkins, 2015: 83-95; Holland, 2013: 82-85; 
Wasser, 2018: 83-98. 
106 Faciality is not a regime of signs, but an abstract machine or “a very special mechanism” that is 
situated at the concrete intersection between the regimes of subjectification and signifiance. ATP 167-
168. 
107 ATP 177-178. 
108 Hence, faciality is one of the abstract conditions of possibility for concrete racist and patriarchal 
systems of oppression. ATP 177-178. 
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the time or in just any social formations. (….) There is a whole history behind it.”109 And in 
short, it is because these types of abstract machine both have an effect on, and are 
effectuated by, concrete machinic assemblages that the temporal ethics called for by 
Deleuze and Guattari is required. By destratifying the stratifications that we are in actuality, 
by connecting ourselves to the destratified temporality of the plane of consistency, we 
effectively alter the contingent stratified conditions under which binary abstract machines like 
that of faciality find themselves presently effectuated, and in so doing, we also begin to 
modify the effects that they have on concrete machinic assemblages. 
With these considerations in mind, we can start to see why Deleuze and Guattari choose 
to articulate their ethics through the concept of the BwO. Simply put, this concept's 
importance is explained by the pragmatic effect it can have on the specific stratified 
formations that currently bind us as human beings. As Deleuze and Guattari note, there are 
three main types of strata presently separating us from the temporality of the plane of 
consistency: 
The principal strata binding human beings are the organism, signifiance and interpretation, and 
subjectification and subjection. These strata together are what separate us from the plane of 
consistency and the abstract machine, where there is no longer any regime of signs, where the 
line of flight effectuates its own potential positivity and deterritorialisation its absolute power.110 
Each of these stratified formations imposes its own distinctive set of demands upon human 
beings; but they all find their commonality in capitalism’s historical tendency to axiomatise 
substances with a view to “extract useful labour” from underlying flows of desire.111 In terms 
of the organic stratum, this tendency expresses itself as the formation of an ‘organism’ that 
organises the organs of a body in a manner that makes them maximally productive and 
docile.112  A body that walks on its head and sees through its skin is much less useful for 
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capital than an organism that sees through its eyes and walks on its legs.113 And this is why, 
as human beings, we are continually organised as an organism: “You will be organised, you 
will be an organism, you will articulate your body—otherwise you’re just depraved.”114 
Similarly, on the subjective strata, it is much easier to control and manipulate a subject that 
is consistently itself than one that seeks to continually “dismantle” itself.115 On the stratum of 
signifiance, the same contrast applies between a subject willing to interpret itself on the 
basis of transcendent principles and one refusing any such interpretation.116 Hence the 
importance of the other two imperatives by which we are presently constituted as points of 
subjectification and angles of interpretation: “You will be a signifier and signified, interpreter 
and interpreted—otherwise you’re just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, 
a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement—otherwise you’re just a 
tramp.”117 In this determined context, the ethical contribution brought about by the BwO 
concerns its ability to precisely disrupt these three major mechanisms by which human 
beings are presently, or actually, stratified.118 As the authors write, it is never simply a 
question of dismantling the organism; we must also seek to continually dismantle the “other 
two strata, signifiance and subjection.”119 It is this function, moreover, that the BwO is able to 
play by opposing itself not only to the organisation of the organism, but also to the strata of 
signifiance and subjection.120 
But if the body without organs is able to play this three-pronged destratifying role, what 
kind of entity must it in turn be? As Deleuze and Guattari define it, the BwO is first and 
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foremost a site or practice of experimentation: “it is an inevitable exercise or experimentation 
(….). It is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of practices.”121 Now, the 
distinctive feature of this experimental practice is its focus on creating intensive (as opposed 
to extensive) connections between machinic elements. To clarify the intensive nature of the 
BwO, Deleuze and Guattari redeploy some of the terminology of Difference and 
Repetition.122 Following that text’s emphasis on the intensive’s relation to embryology, they 
write that the BwO is a “spatium that is itself intensive, lacking extension”, which can also be 
compared to an egg: “The BwO is the egg.”123 In this sense, and contrary to the classical 
Cartesian definition of bodies as extended, the body to which the BwO refers is irreducible to 
space and spatiality.124 Much like an egg ‘before’ it becomes differenciated into an organism, 
the BwO should be defined only as a set of intensive vectors, gradients and thresholds.125 
That which operates ‘within’ it is not the extension of the organism and the organisation of 
the organs, but only intensities: “Only intensities pass and circulate.” 126  Hence, when 
Deleuze and Guattari recommend the ethical creation of a body without organs, they are 
decidedly not insisting that the important aspect of such experimentation is its physical or 
extended form. Indeed, although experimentation can certainly take up bodily forms—as the 
authors' twice repeated reference to the masochist’s BwO reveals—the ethically significant 
changes that are brought by such practices are never extensive in nature.127 “It is a question 
of forces.”128 When the masochist, for example, puts a bridle on themself in order to be 
ridden like a horse by a master or mistress, the ethically relevant aspect of this practice is 
not the extended presence of the bridle vis-à-vis its surrounding bodies, but rather “the 
circuit of intensities” that this assemblage causes to pass between an animal and human 
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series (the horse and the masochist).129 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, this example also shows that the BwO, like 
Deleuze’s intensive differenciator, is not equivalent to the systems of the I (Je) or the Self 
(Moi).130 Once again harking back to Difference and Repetition's definition of the intensive as 
the realm of the dissolved self, the authors argue that the practice of creating a BwO should 
not be equated with the activity of an already constituted or differenciated subjective form.131 
The task of making a BwO is never simply comparable to the practice by which a well-
formed subject interprets or attributes meaning to its own existence. Instead, this practice 
involves “opening [ouvrir] the body to connections (…), passages and distributions of 
intensity” that are not subjective in nature.132 The masochist’s BwO once again exemplifies 
the stakes here. When the masochist creates a BwO, this is not so that they can interpret or 
understand themselves and their desires anew. It is rather a matter of constructing an entire 
assemblage that effectively alters the intensive forces by which the bodies involved within it 
find themselves affected by one another.133 Thus, when we create a BwO, “there is no 
longer either a self [moi] or other [autre]” giving sense to the entire process.134 Now, to be 
sure, as we will see very shortly, this does not at all mean that the strata of the “Self [moi], 
the subject, the historical, social, or individual person” are completely irrelevant from the 
perspective of the ethical practice of creating a BwO.135 Just as experimentation on the BwO 
can take up bodily forms, so too, these subjective dimensions can become crucial matters 
for experimentation.136 The important point to note, nevertheless, is that the BwO only 
causes intensive matters to pass that are essentially non-subjective. In a spatium where only 
intensities reign, what passes are continuums of deterritorialisation, flows of intensity and 
asubjective conjunctions: “Flows of intensity, their fluids, their fibres, their continuums and 
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conjunctions of affects, the wind, fine segmentation, microperceptions, have replaced the 
world of the subject [sujet].”137 
This framing of the BwO as intensive also indicates that for Deleuze and Guattari, the 
BwO is precisely the ethical practice by which we can make our lives express the Aionic 
temporality of the plane of consistency. This identity between the BwO and the plane of 
consistency is of course already suggested in their initial definition of that plane: “the plane 
of consistency or body without organs”.138 In the BwO plateau, this identity is further clarified 
from a temporal perspective. Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, the intensive relations that 
emerge in the BwO are irreducible to the chronology (the linear ‘before’ and ‘after’) that 
pertains between well-constituted subjects, organs and organisms. 139  A reference to 
childhood clarifies the stakes here: “If [the BwO] is tied to childhood”, in the relative sense 
that as an egg it ‘pre-exists’ the differenciated forms of the adult organism, it is also “not the 
child ‘before’ the adult, or the mother ‘before’ the child: it is the strict contemporaneousness 
[contemporanéité] of the adult, of the adult and the child, their map of comparative densities 
and intensities, and all of the variations of that map.”140 All this suggests that the BwO 
constitutes part of the temporal locus of becoming where elements no longer communicate 
across the linear or chronological distribution of formed organisms. The BwO affirms a 
“floating time” where elements relate to one another relatively “independently 
[indépendamment] of the chronometric or chronological values that time assumes in [its] 
other modes”.141 Those elements, to be sure, still “distribute themselves on the BwO, but 
they distribute themselves independently of the forms of the organism; forms become 
contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are produced, flows, 
thresholds, and gradients.”142 Insofar as it establishes these intensive connections that are 
irreducible to the extensions and forms of the organism, the BwO therefore plays an 
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equivalent role to Deleuze’s differenciator of difference in Difference and Repetition. As 
Nathan Widder helpfully puts this point: “The BwO is the differenciator that relates these 
[intensive] materials through their difference, making it ‘necessarily a Place, necessarily a 
Plane, necessarily a Collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools, people, 
powers, and fragments of all of these…)’.”143 The only caveat we must add here is that if the 
BwO plays this determinant function, it no longer does so as an agent that ‘belongs’ to a 
structure. Indeed, if the BwO belongs to anything, that is the plane of consistency itself, 
which, from this temporal perspective, can also be defined as the “potential totality of all 
BwO’s”—a totality the temporality of which each BwO affirms in its own machinic 
operation.144 
But how is the BwO itself practically produced? If so far Deleuze and Guattari’s definition 
of the BwO has remained broadly in line with Difference and Repetition’s notion of an 
intensive differenciator, on this question important differences begin to emerge. Here, the 
authors provide a general formula: 
This is how it should be done: Lodge [installer] yourself on a stratum, experiment with the 
opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place [lieu] on it, find potential movements of 
deterritorialisation, possible lines of flight, experience [éprouver] them, produce flow conjunctions 
here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, always have a small piece 
of new earth [terre]. It is through a meticulous relation [rapport] with the strata that one succeeds 
in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and releasing [dégager] 
continuous intensities for a BwO. Connect, conjugate, continue: a whole ‘diagram’, as opposed to 
still signifying and subjective programs. We are in a social formation; first see how it is stratified 
for us and in us at the place [place] where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper 
assemblage within which we are held [pris]; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the 
side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: 
connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities. You have constructed your 
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own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines.145 
As this passage clarifies, though likewise intensive, the ethical experimentation 
recommended by Deleuze and Guattari does not exactly correspond to the effort by which 
Difference and Repetition would have us become an intensive differenciator. Far from simply 
following the rule not to explicate ourselves too much, here, we are guided by other, more 
“concrete rules [règles concrètes].”146 Now, these rules are concrete in the precise sense 
that they directly concern the strata or the territories that actually compose us as human 
subjects. As Deleuze and Guattari write above, only “a meticulous relation” with these 
stratified formations can liberate lines of flight and movements of deterritorialisation. This 
means that even if BwOs destratify by escaping from the demands imposed by a given 
stratum, they do not do so by destroying, ignoring or avoiding the territorial milieu within 
which they find themselves explicated.147 A destratifying escape is never an act of territorial 
evasion. Indeed, the “rule” for generating destratifying or intensive movements in the BwO 
can even be said to be exactly the inverse of this.148 Not only does the creation of such 
movements require that one “lodge” or install oneself in a given stratum. That creation also 
involves a whole labour of analysis and experimentation with the “opportunities” that are 
offered by a given stratum.149 Otherwise put, we might say that the practice of creating a 
BwO—like the functioning of abstract machines—is one that involves both sides of the 
territorial assemblage. 150  Although the BwO clearly expresses the temporality of the 
destratified side of assemblages (the plane of consistency or becoming), it does so only 
insofar as ethical subjects directly engage their other, territorial side, only insofar as we 
“gently tip the [territorial] assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of 
consistency.” 
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For Deleuze and Guattari, two main reasons explain why the ethical task of creating a 
BwO must involve this type of rapport with the territories that historically constitute us. The 
first reason is what we might call cautionary, and it refers to the “many dangers” that can be 
associated with this specific experimental practice.151 As the authors remind us, there is 
nothing inherently reassuring or positive about the practice of creating a BwO, “because you 
can botch it.”152 There is always the possibility that the creation of a BwO will go wrong. If the 
necessary cautionary steps are not taken, we can end up with an ‘empty’ or ‘cancerous’ 
BwO. We can end up, that is, either with a body that is ineffective in creating intensities to 
pass because it has gone too far in dissolving itself (an empty body), or else with a body that 
endlessly grows like a cancer and becomes too effective in proliferating fascist stratifications 
and organisations (the cancerous body).153 In particularly disastrous instances, the BwO can 
even lead to a black hole, or to death itself.154 And it is partly in order to avoid these dangers 
that an “art of prudence [prudence]” with regard to the strata that presently constitute us is 
required.155 This art involves recognising that stratification—though it separates us from the 
plane of consistency—is not the most disastrous outcome we can face. “Staying stratified—
organised, signified, subjected—is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen 
is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on 
us heavier than ever.”156 To avoid these dangers, the art of prudence therefore also requires 
us to always draw the plane of consistency with regard to the limits and possibilities of our 
particular stratified constitution. “If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the 
strata without prudence [prudence], then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, 
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plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe.”157 Retaining some relation 
to stratified material is therefore vital when crafting a BwO; only by exercising a prudent 
rapport with the strata can we have the chance of avoiding that practice's many dangers—
and even then, there are never any certainties. 
There is also a second, ontological reason for establishing a meticulous rapport with the 
strata, which relates more directly to the proper functioning of the plane of consistency 
itself.158 As the last section noted the plane of consistency is in no way a chaotic or 
undifferentiated aggregate of matters.159 In its proper functioning, that destratifying plane 
operates under certain rules. It operates as a continuum of intensities, as a combined 
emission of particles and as a conjunction of deterritorialised flows. And as we also saw, it is 
only insofar as the plane is drawn by a machine that remains connected to stratified 
assemblages that it is able to take up these rules as its own proper functioning. Now, turning 
again to Deleuze and Guattari’s general formula for how to create a BwO, we clearly see 
that, beyond mere cautionary considerations, these conditions pertaining to the plane’s 
functioning also provide another motive for closely relating to the strata when destratifying 
through the BwO. In effect, by retaining a meticulous relation to the strata, we ensure that 
the BwO is able to become a piece of the plane of consistency in its proper functioning. We 
are able to ensure, that is, that the plane operates as a temporal continuum of intensities, as 
the combined emission of particles and as the conjunction of deterritorialised flows. Or, as 
we have already seen the authors write: “It is through a meticulous relation with the strata 
that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight (….) It is only there that the BwO [and the plane to 
which it belongs] reveals itself for what it is: connections of desires, conjunctions of flows, 
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continuums of intensities.”160 True, a certain dint of prudence or sobriety is still required for 
this type of engagement with the strata.161 But this sobriety should not be confused with a 
purely cautionary avoidance of dangers. Although the dangers involved in the creation of a 
BwO are certainly to be avoided, Deleuze and Guattari do not recommend a close rapport 
with the strata simply so that we can avoid falling into their traps.162 Implicit in these 
recommendations is also the insistence that “the sobriety of the assemblages is what makes 
for the richness of the Machine’s effects.”163 Put differently, we must continually relate our 
bodies without organs to the strata because only in that way can we maximise the effects 
that they have on the assemblages that we are attempting to destratify. Indeed, without such 
due care for the strata, our destratifications on the plane of consistency risk becoming 
meaningless and ineffective as a response to the dominant reality at hand.164 Only by 
retaining a morsel of the strata can we therefore ensure that the machine created by our 
BwO aligns itself, or affirms, that temporality of becoming which the plane of consistency—in 
its proper functioning—is capable of expressing.165 “You don’t reach the BwO, and its plane 
of consistency, by wildly stratifying.”166 Indeed, only by precisely and meticulously relating to 
our strata can we ensure that our BwO not only effectively plugs itself into other collective 
machines, but also does so as a temporal continuum of intensities, as a combined emission 
particles and as a conjunction of deterritorialised flows—that is, as “a whole ‘diagram’ [of 
becoming] against still signifying and subjective programs.”167 
 
 
                                                
160 ATP 161 (emphasis added). 
161 ATP 6. 
162 Commentators have often missed this, with Protevi (2018: 111) and Hansen (2000) going as far as 
criticising Deleuze and Guattari for failing to attribute any positive value to the strata other than “as a 
negative condition for further experiment”. However, this purely cautionary reading seems hard to 
square with the authors’ insistence that the proper functioning of the plane of consistency remains 
dependent on the strata, that only on the strata does the plane (or the BwO) reveal itself for what it is. 
163 ATP 344. 
164 ATP 160. 
165 cf. ATP 188. 
166 ATP 160. 
167 ATP 161. 
 252 
6.3. Affirming becoming with history 
We have seen Deleuze and Guattari argue that the ethical practice by which we can 
begin to affirm the plane of consistency’s temporality of becoming, the BwO, necessitates a 
careful and prudent relation to those stratified formations that constitute us as human beings. 
The question I now want to confront, before closing this chapter, is whether this argument 
makes any difference with regards to the problem of history that still persists in Difference 
and Repetition. As the last chapter argued, Deleuze’s ethics of making oneself an intensive 
differenciator remains problematic not only because it fails to acknowledge its own 
constitutive implication with the historical, but also because it neglects to develop a strategy 
whereby the anti-productive tendencies that follow from such implication might become 
displaced in practice. Are Deleuze and Guattari able to convincingly resolve this problem in 
A Thousand Plateaus, particularly with their emphasis on the prudence that must go into the 
creation of a BwO? This is the question I now want to consider. 
Now, we cannot fail to notice that in contrast to Difference and Repetition, the model of 
temporal ethics developed by A Thousand Plateaus gives a great pride of place to actual or 
historical factors. As the last section demonstrated, Deleuze and Guattari argue that we 
must involve ourselves with the strata that actually constitute us not only so that we can 
avoid our own "demented or suicidal collapse, which brings [the strata] back down on us 
heavier than ever."168 More broadly, we must also relate ourselves to the actuality of strata 
so that our little BwO machine can begin to resonate with the temporality of becoming that 
the plane of consistency—in its proper functioning—is able to express: “connections of 
desires, conjunctions of flows, continuums of intensities.”169 Indeed, as we saw, because in 
its optimal functioning the plane of consistency follows certain rules, it is equally significant 
that, in attempting to create an ethical machine that expresses that plane’s temporality, we 
follow the concrete rule of directly and prudently relating ourselves to the actuality of the 
strata that surround us. As Deleuze and Guattari note, we should never assume that the 
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territorial aspects of assemblages only ever act as “a certain resistance or inertia” against 
the variability of the plane of consistency, “for even ‘constants’ are essential to the 
determination through which the variation passes”. 170  Indeed, far from dismissing the 
(relatively) stable actuality of strata, what we, as ethical subjects, must recognise, is that it is 
only by “retain[ing] just enough of the strata [that our BwO machine] extract from them 
variables that operate in the plane of consistency as its own functions.”171 
By insisting on these points, Deleuze and Guattari depart in significant respects from the 
temporal ethics of Difference and Repetition. Indeed, if, as the last chapter argued, the early 
Deleuze does not take up Simondon in considering intensive movements as involving an 
irreducible historicity, this is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari do with this emphasis on 
the relation between the plane of consistency, the BwO, and the strata. It is as though, with 
the help of Guattari, Deleuze came to agree with Simondon that the intensive movements of 
which the plane of becoming is composed are always “historical and local”, and that any 
process that affirms the creativity of becoming, insofar as it remains dependent on ‘prior’ 
stratified states, always carries with it an irreducible “historical aspect”.172 Furthermore, if, as 
I also wrote above, the BwO still broadly resembles what Difference and Repetition calls a 
differenciator (in the precise sense that the BwO is defined as an intensive spatium where 
only unextended and unqualified intensities pass and circulate), no longer do Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that we become this differenciating agent by exclusively relating ourselves to 
the intensive order of individuality. Similarly, no longer are stratified or actual formations 
purely positioned as aggregates with which we must seek not to explicate ourselves, as 
Difference and Repetition had cautioned. Indeed, though they remain actual in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s temporal ethics, the strata are now classified as the very “tool[s] for which a new 
use must be invented” in practice.173 Strata are the historical tools that we must meticulously 
engage if our lives are to have the chance of expressing the plane of consistency’s 
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temporality of becoming. 
This stress on the constitutive role of history or actuality for ethics is not merely reluctant 
on Deleuze and Guattari’s part.174 And yet, this conclusion will remain unsatisfying to those 
upholding the view that A Thousand Plateaus continues to oppose history to becoming. 
Many commentators have argued that this text continues to be guided by an emphasis on 
the primacy of becoming over history. 175  In taking this approach, commentators add, 
Deleuze and Guattari also end up with an all “too stark and abstract (…) opposition between 
Becoming and History”.176 Now, if one accepts these arguments, then the view that I have 
thus far attributed to Deleuze and Guattari’s temporal ethics that it welcomes the constitutive 
and determinant role of historical factors becomes less sustainable. It appears further 
undermined by the following assertion made by Deleuze and Guattari in What is 
Philosophy?: 
History today still designates only the set of conditions, however, recent they may be, from 
which one turns away [on se détourne] in order to become, that is to say, in order to create 
something new. (….) How could something come from history? Without history, becoming 
would remain indeterminate [indéterminé] and unconditioned [inconditionné], but becoming is 
not historical. (….) The event itself [lui-même] needs becoming as an unhistorical element.177 
Does this passage not suggest that history cannot play the determinant role in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s temporal ethics that I have thus far attributed to it? Does it not suggest that, for the 
authors, the planes of history and becoming cannot work together in the way I have 
emphasised? 
It certainly cannot be denied that A Thousand Plateaus continues to uphold a strong 
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distinction between history and becoming, just as it is true, as indicated above, that 
becoming remains the privileged term in that text’s temporal ethics. As Deleuze neatly 
summarises this dual fact in a subsequent interview: “‘Becomings’ are much more important 
than history in A Thousand Plateaus. They’re two quite different things.”178 However, just as 
the strong distinction Deleuze and Guattari draw between the strata and the plane of 
consistency does not prevent those two domains from productively interacting with, and 
depending upon, each other, so too, historical factors and becoming should not be taken as 
opposed simply because they are distinct. If becoming itself is not historical, in the particular 
sense that it is not entirely reducible to the categories and dynamics of history, this is not to 
suggest that becoming takes place ‘outside’ or ‘beyond‘ all history. Indeed, if becoming is 
never entirely reducible to history, it does nonetheless still rely on the latter as its condition 
of possibility. As Deleuze claims in an interview, even if becoming remains distinct from 
history, there are “all sorts of correlations and echoes between them. Becoming begins in 
history and returns to it, but it is not of history.”179 On this issue, furthermore, we cannot fail 
to notice the importance of Deleuze and Guattari’s above-quoted claim that without history, 
becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned. This claim indicates that practices 
for the affirmation of novelty cannot simply succeed in abstraction from the dominant 
mechanisms that have historically constituted us as subjects. To remain meaningful and 
effective, destratifying practices cannot simply interest themselves in the new without any 
relation to the ‘old’. They must also seek to pragmatically determine and condition 
themselves in relation to a given dominant reality.180 In the context of the practice of creating 
ourselves as a BwO, that is, as a machine that expresses the temporality of the plane of 
consistency, this pragmatic imperative assumes a very particular shape. As Deleuze and 
Guattari assert, in order to create an effective, destratifying BwO, “we must define what 
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comes to pass and what does not pass, what causes passage and prevents it.”181 And 
crucially, as repeatedly noted, it is by prudently relating ourselves to our historical strata that 
we can carry out this positive work of definition—that we can determine our BwO as a 
properly destratifying connection of desires, conjunction of flows and continuum of intensities. 
Without this prudence in relation to the actuality of strata, we might end up with a purely 
chaotic or undifferentiated piece of the plane of consistency; we might end up with a BwO 
that lets only indeterminate elements with no clearly defined destratifying role pass and 
circulate. But with that relation, what we can create is a little machine that lets pass only 
those elements that do have a clearly discernible role in destratifying our given social 
formations.182 We can create a BwO that lets pass only those elements that express the 
“pure determination of intensity.”183 And in this sense, history remains absolutely necessary 
for an ethical practice seeking to affirm the temporality of the new. Indeed, insofar as it 
allows us to clearly determine that practice’s direction, history can even be considered as 
one of the positive conditions for the affirmation of temporal novelty in the BwO. 
It might be countered that Deleuze and Guattari’s focus on the strata does not exactly 
map onto the dimension of history, that when they speak of the strata, they are “not doing 
history”.184 Relatedly, it might be objected that when Deleuze and Guattari speak of practices 
of becoming, they are primarily interested in “molecular” as opposed to “molar” elements and 
movements: “Yes, all becomings are molecular.”185 Does this not suggest that the authors 
are interested less in that molar historical dimension of societies “that goes toward the large 
numbers and the mass phenomena”, than they are in those intensive elements expressing 
only “the molar direction that on the contrary penetrates into singularities, their interactions 
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and connections at a distance or between different orders”?186 Now, it certainly cannot be 
denied that when Deleuze and Guattari speak of the strata, they are not doing history in the 
traditional, molar sense. They are not doing history as it is written in those textbooks and 
chronicles focused on detailing a given society’s “great resounding events”. 187  Their 
opposition to such a model of history is well known: “History has never comprehended 
nomadism, the book has never comprehended the outside.”188 This interest in becoming 
over history is of course well reflected in Deleuze and Guattari’s account of stratification, 
which, as noted above, focuses on the double articulation of major strata in part so that the 
destratifying possibilities for each of those formations can be more clearly specified.189 
Correspondingly, when the authors study the operation of diverse “regimes of signs” in the 
fifth plateau of their text, it is a focus on the molecular lines of flight that each of those 
regimes makes possible that drives the analysis forward.190 Once again, however, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s interest in molecular lines and movements does not occur in isolation from a 
consideration of distinctively molar lines and formations. Indeed, as they write in their 
introductory plateau, the real “enemy” of their ethical philosophy is not so much the molar 
aspect of societies, but the inflexible dualisms and oppositions that might be established 
between categories such as the molar and molecular.191 From this standpoint, it most 
assuredly cannot be denied that “a society is defined by its lines of flight, which are 
molecular. (….) The reverse, however, is also true: molecular escapes and movements 
would be nothing if they did not return to the molar organisations to reshuffle their 
segments”.192 Regarding the relation between the strata and the plane of becoming, the 
same principle applies. The molar movements that occur on the strata are vital for the 
intensive or molecular lines of flight that the BwO creates: “indeed it is from the forms and 
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subjects of the first plane that the second constantly tears the particles between which there 
are no longer relationships of speed and slowness”.193 Hence, not only is there no absolute 
opposition between the molecular and the molar, stratified or historical aspects of existence, 
but the latter are even necessary for any ethical practice focused on engendering those 
molecular, destratifying and intensive movements that express the temporality of 
becoming.194 In Craig Lundy’s accurate summary: “while Deleuze and Guattari are clearly in 
favour of fostering creativity and promoting freedom, it must be remembered that this is not 
necessarily at the expense of the relative, molar strata or historical processes. (….) On the 
contrary, what we are shown here is the immense importance of historical processes and 
relational mechanisms that link strata with lines of flight in order to produce ‘a small plot of 
new land.’”195 
This acknowledgement that a temporal ethics seeking to affirm the new must involve 
itself with history is not merely incidental from the perspective of the problems that continue 
to plague Difference and Repetition. As the last chapter argued with the help of Guattari, one 
of the issues arising from Deleuze’s earlier ethics of intensive quantities is its incapacity to 
successfully negotiate its constitutive involvement with anti-productive tendencies. Because 
Deleuze does not recognise history's constitutive role for that ethics, he also fails to insist on 
the necessity of a practical strategy for displacing the anti-productive elements that the 
imbrication of ethics with history necessarily entails. Now, it should be clear from our 
preceding discussion of dangers that Deleuze and Guattari do not claim to expunge all anti-
productive tendencies from their proposed ethics of creating a BwO. Indeed, if there is 
nothing “reassuring” about this ethics, this is because the BwO can take shape as both anti-
production and production, as “non-desire as well as desire.”196 That is, although this ethical 
practice can certainly produce and let pass intensities and flows that express the radical, 
destratifying temporality of the plane of consistency, it can also give rise to “totalitarian and 
                                                
193 Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 133. 
194 cf. Patton, 2009: 49-50. 
195 Lundy, 2012: 141. 
196 ATP 149. This view that production is necessarily tied to anti-production is also put forward in Anti-
Oedipus: cf. AO 47-49. 
 259 
fascist BwOs, terrifying caricatures of the plane of consistency.”197 The key difference that 
emerges here vis-à-vis Difference and Repetition is that these anti-productive tendencies 
are no longer taken as completely isolatable from the presumably ‘independent’ functioning 
of the differenciating agents Deleuze and Guattari ethically advocate. Neither are those anti-
productive tendencies simply the ‘negative’ effects that emerge when those differenciating 
agents let themselves become involved, or mediated by, ‘the identical’.198 Because the BwO 
is always engendered in close relation to a determined stratified situation, those anti-
productive tendencies are likewise always an inherent or immanent feature of that practice. 
As Deleuze and Guattari rhetorically affirm in Anti-Oedipus: “what is not escape and social 
investment at the same time?”199 
Crucially, by imbuing their temporal ethics with a recognition of the constitutive role of the 
historical, Deleuze and Guattari are also able to formulate the strategy in relation to the 
historical that the last chapter identified as lacking in Difference and Repetition. From the 
perspective of A Thousand Plateaus, temporal ethics is never simply a matter of passing 
and producing any intensities and flows, as if that creation alone will suffice to connect us to 
the temporality to-come of the plane of consistency. Creation and production always involve 
stagnation and anti-production. “That is why the material problem confronting schizoanalysis 
is knowing whether we have it within our means to make the selection, to distinguish the 
BwO from its doubles: empty vitreous bodies, cancerous bodies, totalitarian and fascist.”200 
Temporal ethics must always be conjoined by a strategic practice of 
distinguishing [distinguer] within desire that which pertains to stratic proliferation, or else too-
violent destratification, and that which pertains to the construction of the plane of consistency 
(keep an eye out for all that is fascist inside us, and also for the suicidal and demented). The 
plane of consistency is not simply that which is constituted by the sum of all BwO’s. There are 
things it rejects; the BwO chooses, as a function of the abstract machine that draws it. Even within 
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a BwO (…), we must distinguish what can be composed on the plane and what cannot.201 
To create a BwO that expresses the temporality of the plane of consistency, we must thus 
strategically distinguish between different types of intensities, flows and connections. We 
must not only haphazardly produce but also select the ‘right’ types of destratifying elements, 
particles and flows. And once again, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is precisely by adopting an 
active relation with the strata that have historically constituted us as subjects that we can 
strategically cause the ‘right’ conjugated flows to pass and escape: “It is through a 
meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing 
conjugated flows to pass and escape and releasing continuous intensities for a BwO.”202 The 
actuality of assemblages and the strata is thus always absolutely “necessary” for warding off 
the equally intensive but nonetheless totalitarian forms that a BwO can take up.203 Here, an 
attention to history becomes the main resource with which we can strategically ensure that 
our BwO does not cause to pass those intensities that bear only “the imprint of equivalence 
and identity” in relation to repressive social structures.204 History here becomes essential for 
the strategic task of providing our BwO its best chance to practically express the radical 
temporality of the plane of becoming. This is not to say that there are ‘right’ intensities and 
flows that we can always rely upon to ward off the anti-productive tendencies of all BwOs. 
Like politics, temporal ethics “is active experimentation, since we do not know in advance 
which way a line is going to turn out.”205 However, equipped with the recognition that history 
always plays a constitutive role in ethics, we can at least begin to take practical steps to 
prevent that ethics from repeating the worst repressive features of the ‘old’; we can begin to 
strategically rectify, “piece by piece, blow by blow”, the inherent tendency towards reification 
that Deleuze’s earlier ethics of intensive quantities had failed to address.206 But for this 
strategy to succeed, it must be likewise be guided by the view that a temporality of novelty 
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and becoming cannot be practically expressed or affirmed independently of all historical or 
empirical content. That temporality always remains to-come as something to be continually 
created in practice and in relation to a contingent domain of stratified states of affairs: “we do 
not arrive [arrive] on it, we cannot arrive on it, we can never be done with accessing it, it is a 
limit.”207 
Ultimately, this recognition that history and determined forms of actuality have a positive 
role to play in the ethical task of relating oneself to a temporality of becoming also 
distinguishes Deleuze and Guattari’s temporal ethics from Bergson's. Now, it cannot be 
denied that, like Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari remain interested in fostering an ethical 
relation to time that is irreducible to our habitual patterns of existence.208 It is equally true 
that like Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari frame their temporal ethics as a project that “is 
continually in the process of constructing itself.”209 However, these broad similarities should 
not be taken as an indication that the practice of creating oneself as a BwO is intuitive in the 
Bergsonian sense of that word, as some commentators have suggested.210 As Ray Brassier 
correctly notes, Deleuze and Guattari’s methodological sophistication in A Thousand 
Plateaus “precludes any appeals to the ‘intuition’ or ‘lived experience’ of the real.”211 Indeed, 
as the preceding will have clarified, for the authors, temporal ethics is never a matter of 
attempting to reach “the bed-rock of original nature” by means of the “direct vision of the 
mind by the mind”, as it is for Bergson.212 Temporal ethics is never a matter of “search[ing] 
below the social accretions, [of] get[ting] down to Life, of which human societies, as indeed 
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the human species altogether, are but manifestations.”213 Indeed, if Deleuze and Guattari’s 
temporal ethics continues to be guided by a meticulous method, this method, far from 
directing us away from social accretions, always directs us towards the concrete forms of 
actuality that our stratified existence as human subjects implies. In recognition that our forms 
of social investment are also the “enabling conditions” for the ethical task of practically 
relating ourselves to the plane of consistency's novel temporality, this ethics demands that 
we involve ourselves with the social accretions that function as the concrete side of our 
machinic assemblages.214 In this sense, just as we might say that the late Deleuze attempts 
to politically radicalise Bergson’s schema of fabulation, so too, Deleuze and Guattari can be 
seen as radicalising the position first suggested by Bergson in The Two Sources to the effect 
that the operation of historical machineries has a productive role to play in the project of 
temporal ethics.215 But this productive role is no longer confined to the assistance that 
historical machineries might provide in ‘diffusing’ and ‘expanding’ a “mystical experience 
[which,] taken in its immediacy”, remains purified of all forms of social and historical 
involvement.216 Not only is there no such unmediated experience to be found in A Thousand 
Plateaus. In that text, machines, and the history they imply, become the very means by 
which we offer ourselves the best chance of ethically relating ourselves to the temporality of 
the new, whilst avoiding the worst of the dangers that task can involve. 
 
6.4 Conclusion: machinic chances 
This chapter has examined Deleuze and Guattari's temporal ethics in A Thousand 
Plateaus. I have argued that for the authors, the intensive ethical practice by which we 
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connect ourselves to a plane of temporal becoming—the creation of a BwO—must always 
proceed through a close and meticulous relation to the historically determined, stratified 
formations that constitute us as human subjects. I have also argued that in upholding this 
view, Deleuze and Guattari do not only overcome an abstract opposition between history 
and becoming. In a certain sense, by displacing this abstract opposition, they are also able 
to recommend a potentially fruitful strategy for dealing with the historical problems of anti-
production that still lingered in Difference and Repetition. 
Although I have focused my reading in this chapter on the differences between A 
Thousand Plateaus and Difference and Repetition, the ethos informing Deleuze and 
Guattari’s temporal ethics in the former text should not be of interest only to Deleuze 
scholars. Indeed, insofar as it attempts to directly grapple with the implication between ethics 
and history that I have shown in this thesis to persist as a problem in Bergson’s and Levinas’ 
thought, Deleuze and Guattari’s text also has something to offer to those two ethical 
philosophies. Perhaps, this ethos of relating oneself to actuality as a means of affirming 
temporal difference can also offer us a chance to develop a successful resolution to 
problems of history that persist in Bergson's and Levinas' respective conceptions of temporal 
ethics—even if, as Deleuze and Guattari hold, this ethos can provide no absolute 
guarantees. 
Does this mean that Deleuze and Guattari’s specific indications for creating ourselves as 
a BwO should become a necessary feature of any ethics seeking to relate ethical subjects to 
the temporality of the new? Does this mean that we should develop Bergsonian and 
Levinasian conceptions of the BwO and the plane of consistency? Is this how we definitively 
resolve the problems of history that still persist in Bergson’s and Levinas’ ethical 
philosophies? These are the questions that I want to consider in conclusion to this thesis. 
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Conclusion 
Bergson's influence on the entire trajectory of contemporary European philosophy cannot 
be underestimated. In trying to think time in isolation from the 'mundane' representations of 
space, measurement and number, Bergson has not only placed the question of a truly 
differential temporality at the centre of contemporary philosophical reflection. By insisting 
that human beings possess an intuitive capacity for immediately connecting themselves with 
that temporality, Bergson has also challenged us to think—ethically—about how we might 
become exposed to time's novelty, such that its differential force can begin to nourish and 
revivify our everyday being. 
This thesis has in no way sought to diminish the relevance of these Bergsonian openings. 
However, as the first two chapters argued, while Bergson's model of temporal ethics is most 
assuredly inspirational, it also remains premised on a problematic relation to history. While 
Bergson's insistence on the intuition has certainly stimulated us to think about the question 
of temporal ethics anew, his philosophy also remains insufficiently attuned to that modality's 
constitutive implication with the historical, and to the problem that this implication creates. By 
framing the intuition as an immediate knowledge of duration that frees itself of all social 
'prejudice', Bergson has not sufficiently contended with the fact that—as constitutively 
involved with a socio-historical domain—the ethical method of intuition can itself tend 
towards the replication of those forms of knowledge and sensibility that have historically 
prevented humanity from establishing a contact with the new. In this way, I have argued, 
Bergson stops short of providing a successful resolution to the problem of history that 
manifests itself at the heart of his ethical philosophy. 
Beyond pointing to this problem in Bergson's thought, this thesis has also focused on two 
self-professed Bergsonians, Levinas and Deleuze, to assess whether their own ethical 
philosophies formulate a more adequate resolution to it. With regard to Levinas, my 
argument has been that his model of temporal ethics in both Totality and Infinity and 
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Otherwise than Being, despite distancing itself in crucial respects from Bergson's intuitive 
ethics, not only remains equally caught up with history at its most constitutive level. As a 
result of his refusal to acknowledge this constitutive implication between ethics and the 
historical, Levinas also remains incapable of formulating an adequate strategic response to 
the dangers that such implication presents for the ethics of relating oneself to the new. I 
developed a similar line of argument in relation to Deleuze's early work in Difference and 
Repetition, by insisting that Deleuze's effort to divorce an intensive temporal ethics from the 
actual does not quite succeed in liberating his philosophy from all trace of the problem of 
history. 
Throughout this thesis, I have maintained that a constitutive implication with history 
presents both opportunities and dangers for the task of ethically relating subjects to the new. 
While, as Bergson claims, the intuition's involvement with science can certainly enhance its 
rigour and precision as an ethical method, that involvement can also lead the latter to 
replicate those forms of thinking and seeing that have historically done violence to the 
novelty of time qua duration. Similarly, whilst, as Levinas insists, certain familial 
arrangements can perhaps establish an ethical relation to the infinite time of the Other, their 
history can also involve ethics with a tendency to do violence to certain kinds of (primarily 
feminine) alterity. Likewise, whilst existing social structures provide us with the opportunity to 
ethically become the differenciator of their differences, as Deleuze argues, our involvement 
with those structures can also lead our affirmative ethical practices to repeat their most 
repressive and anti-productive aspects. Whichever ethical modality one chooses, history 
presents as many opportunities as it does risks for the project of temporal ethics, and a 
successful temporal ethics is one that accepts and negotiates the potential dangers that 
history can introduce into our efforts to relate ourselves to the new. 
Of all the ethical models considered in this thesis, I hold that Deleuze and Guattari's 
provides the most convincing response as to how we might afford ourselves the chance of 
avoiding the dangers that can be associated with the task of temporal ethics. Because 
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Deleuze and Guattari avow their ethics' necessary implication with historical factors, they are 
able to offer us concrete suggestions as to how ethical praxis can seek to avoid the worst 
risks that follow from such implication. By avowing the constitutive role of history for ethics, 
Deleuze and Guattari are capable of recommending an ethos of prudence—in relation to 
precisely those stratified formations that have historically constituted us as human 
subjects—as one of the necessary conditions of success for the ethical project of relating 
ourselves to the time of the new. 
My final suggestion in this project is that this ethos that Deleuze and Guattari develop in 
relation to the problem of history has much to offer to contemporary politico-philosophical 
projects seeking to model themselves on Bergson's and Levinas' respective conceptions of 
temporal ethics. It seems to me that by accepting, like Deleuze and Guattari do, that history 
must always remain a constitutive part of ethics—that no ethics can every fully isolate or 
uproot itself from history—that contemporary appropriations of Bergson and Levinas could 
also begin to think a way out of the problems that I have here shown to persist in those two 
ethical philosophies. By acknowledging the constitutive role of history for ethics, those 
contemporary projects can perhaps begin to ensure that their efforts to relate ethical 
subjects to the new do not succumb—simply by virtue of their inattention to the historical—to 
the worst of the many risks that such a project can involve. Even if, as Deleuze and Guattari 
continually remind us, there are never any guarantees that this negotiation will succeed. 
This would not necessitate the formulation of Bergsonian or Levinasian conceptions of 
the BwO or the plane of consistency. Instead, it would simply require the adoption of a two-
fold recognition. First, it would involve acknowledging that history or actuality is not 
necessarily a hindrance or a blockage to a relation to the future.1 As inflexible and violent as 
they might at first appear, socio-historical manifestations and stratifications always form a 
relatively dynamic substrate which presents as many opportunities as it does hurdles for the 
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ethical project of relating oneself to the new. Secondly, incorporating Deleuze and Guattari's 
ethos would involve accepting that the success of temporal ethics always depends on a 
prudent and analytic negotiation of the opportunities and dangers that this historical 
substrate presents. That is to say, in order to relate ourselves to a novel future, we cannot 
exclusively direct our ethical 'attention' or 'intentionality' to a radically unforeseeable 
dimension of novelty. To successfully relate ourselves to the new, we must also remain 
prudently related to our past and present forms of actuality, for only in that way can we avoid 
the dangers that remain associated with the project of displacing our habitual forms of living. 
"In each case", as Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oedipus, we must seek to relate to the 
future "by way of old lands, study their nature, their density; we must seek to discover how 
the machinic indices are grouped on each of these lands that permit going beyond them.”2 In 
short, to successfully relate ourselves to the future, we must not only remain ethically vigilant 
to the constitutive implication between temporal ethics and history, but we must also seek to 
negotiate the dangers and opportunities that this implication creates. "It would be worse 
without negotiation", as Derrida says.3 
Now, it might be objected that these suggestions only function to collapse and reduce 
the transcendent distinctiveness of Levinas and Bergson's respective ethical philosophies. 
Does the appeal of those philosophies not rest precisely in their refusal to accept that 
temporal alterity—to remain truly novel—must precisely remain transcendent in relation to 
any form of worldly actuality? And am I not, by advancing the above suggestions on history, 
simply making the fairly uninteresting point that a transcendent temporal ethics can succeed 
only by becoming more immanent? 
Not at all; and I believe the stakes of my suggestions can be clarified by a brief appeal to 
Derrida’s late thought. When in Spectres of Marx, for example, Derrida considers the 
profoundly ethical task of how one should learn to “live otherwise”, he argues that this task 
requires that one “learn spirits”, that one learn to live with a paradoxical spectral presence 
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(“with ghosts”) that has neither “the actual or present reality of the present, [nor] everything 
that can be opposed to it: absence, non-presence, non-effectivity, inactuality, virtuality (…) 
and so forth.”4 Clearly, Derrida has something transcendent in mind when he speaks of the 
spectral in relation to ethics: learning how to live otherwise involves contending with a 
paradoxical presence that is beyond the presence of this world. This is not to suggest, 
however, that this paradoxical presence never finds itself implicated with any history. Indeed, 
as Derrida argues, the transcendent “non-presence of the spectre demands that one take its 
times and its history into consideration, the singularity of its temporality or of its historicity.”5 
The spectre has a history, and that history must be accounted for, contended with. Moreover, 
even if this spectre always remains an event to-come—in the precise sense that it ruptures, 
interrupts and opens the present—its futurity nonetheless always makes an apparition within 
a determined context.6 The spectre, like any future, Derrida says, “is something to-come (il y 
a à venir)”, but this to-come is not “utopian, it is what takes place here and now, in a here 
and now that I regularly try to dissociate from the present.”7 
In my view, what Derrida signals in the space of these brief remarks is the possibility of a 
transcendent temporal ethics that remains attuned to its constitutive implication with the 
historical. To be sure, the formulation of such an ethics is not an easy philosophical task, 
since it requires the creation of new concepts that function to dissociate notions like history, 
actuality, and the ‘here and now’ from the traditional present-ness of the present.8 But what 
Derrida’s late thought suggests here is the idea that a transcendent ethics need not separate 
itself from all historical or actual content in order to uphold its status qua transcendent. A 
transcendent temporal ethics can remain simultaneously transcendent and attuned to the 
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fact that an ethical relation to a transcendent future always involves a certain history. 
Moreover, that ethics can remain transcendent and acknowledge that a relation to the future 
always takes place in the context of a given ‘here and now’—with all the opportunities and 
dangers that this process of contextualisation involves. 
And it is in this spirit, I suggest, that my above suggestions for Levinas’ and Bergson’s 
temporal ethics should be received. Far from recommending that they rid themselves of their 
transcendent distinctiveness in favour of a Deleuzo-Guattarian immanence, I simply suggest 
that they accept the latter’s ethos of generalised prudence with regards to the determined 
forms of actuality with which any temporal ethics will inevitably find itself implicated. What we 
must take from Deleuze and Guattari’s ethics is not its relentless immanent bent, but the 
dual recognition that the task of relating oneself to the new implicates a certain history, and 
that this constitutive implication creates as many opportunities and it does blockages for the 
project of temporal ethics. In short, in order to continue relating ourselves to the new, we 
also have to prudently involve ourselves with those forms of actuality that have historically 
constituted us as ethical subjects. Or, as Foucault once said: “the future is something we do. 
The future is the manner in which we react to what is happening, it is the manner in which 
we transform an actual movement or question into effect. If we want to become masters of 
our future, we need to fundamentally pose the question about the today.”9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 Foucault, 1994: 434 (my translation). 
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